Hawkins v. Leach, 9886

• Decision Date: 09 July 1958
• Docket Number: No. 9886,9886
• Citation: 88 R.I. 98,143 A.2d 689
• Parties: Larla HAWKINS v. Harry LEACH. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 689

143 A.2d 689

88 R.I. 98

Larla HAWKINS v. Harry LEACH.

Ex. No. 9886.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 9, 1958.

Joseph G. LeCount, Providence, for plaintiff.

John F. Dolan, Providence, for defendant.

ANDREWS, Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence. The defendant demurred to the amended declaration and his demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff excepted to this ruling and has brought the case to this court by a bill of exceptions.

The amended declaration alleges that plaintiff was employed by defendant to do general housework including cooking; that defendant's wife was aged, infirm and 'afflicted with physical ailment and disability' which made it necessary for him to give her 'constant control, care, guidance, assistance and attention'; that he failed to do so; and that as a consequence his wife came into the kitchen where plaintiff was cooking and although requested by plaintiff not to do so, took the cover off the soup kettle allowing the steam to escape; that this frightened her and she started to fall; that she then took hold of plaintiff causing her to fall against some kitchen furniture with resulting physical injuries. The amended declaration does not allege that the wife had any mental ailment, but simply a physical ailment the nature of which is not set out, but it would seem that she did not have full use of her legs.

We are of the opinion that the demurrer was properly sustained. The plaintiff has furnished us with no case in any way similar to the one at bar. Neither party has briefed this as a master and servant case. Had they treated it as such in the superior court, it is doubtful if it would be here, at least in the pleading stage. In the interest of better pleading we call the attention of the bar to the following statement of Chief Justice Stiness in Dalton v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 574, at page 575, 57 A. 383, at page 383: 'The object of a declaration is to state the case against the defendant, and the office of a demurrer is to require a sufficient statement when the declaration is deficient. The reason for this is that a defendant should not be put to the trouble and expense of a trial, possibly by an irresponsible plaintiff, unless a case is stated upon which the plaintiff, prima facie at least, has a right to recover.'

In a recent lengthy annotation on this phase of the law of master and servant in 49 A.L.R.2d 317, it is stated at page 319: 'The courts unite in recognizing the broad general principle that an employer of domestic servants may be held liable for injuries to the servant which are caused by the master's failure to exercise reasonable care for the servant's safety while the latter is engaged in the scope of his employment, so long as the servant has not assumed the risk of the danger in question and is not himself guilty of negligence contributing to his injury.' This is in accord with what was said in Collins v. Harrison, 25 R.I. 489, 56 A. 678, 64 L.R.A. 156.

A rather exhaustive search of the authorities and digests has disclosed no case even similar to the one at bar. The cases closest to it are those in which domestic servants have sought to recover damages because of being injured by dogs.

In Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga.App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646, 647, the court stated the facts and law as follows:

'The petition alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that she was bitten by the dog on entering the premises; that the defendant knew the plaintiff would come to work, and did not furnish her with a safe place to work, in that keeping the dog endangered her life and safety while she was in the performance of duties incident to her employment. * * * there are no facts alleged to show that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to work in the house with the dog present. If the petition be construed as one for damages for injuries sustained by reason of...