Hawkins v. State

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Dillard, Presiding Judge.
• Citation: 920 S.E.2d 439
• Docket Number: A25A0697
• Decision Date: 21 August 2025
• Parties: HAWKINS v. The STATE.

920 S.E.2d 439

HAWKINS

v.The STATE.

A25A0697

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 21, 2025

Andrew Van Thomas II, for Appellant.

Jonathan Lang Adams, Jessica Brooke Haygood, for Appellee.

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

Ayesha Dawana Hawkins appeals her convictions for three misdemeanor counts and one felony count of obstruction of a law-enforcement officer. In doing so, she argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions; (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to (a) a misleading jury instruction, (b) admission of officer testimony that her failure to produce a driver’s license was an “arrestable offense,” (c) admission of a video exhibit that violated the best-evidence rule, and (d) admission of an arresting officer’s testimony that he received medical treatment at a hospital for an ankle injury after his encounter with her; (3) the trial court erred in admitting video footage into evidence showing her in jail after her arrest; and (4) the cumulative prejudicial effect of these alleged errors warrants the grant of a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict,¹ the record shows that on July 11, 2020, Sergeant Willie Brown with the Monroe County Sheriffs Office² initiated a traffic stop on 1-75 because the driver of the car—later identified as Hawkins’s boyfriend, Terrence Taylor—was speeding. Taylor provided Brown with an “identification card,” but ultimately, Brown discovered his driver’s license had been suspended. Brown then arrested Taylor for driving with a suspended license. There were three other passengers in the car—Hawkins in the frontpassenger seat and her two minor children in the backseat. After Taylor’s arrest, Hawkins exited the car and walked toward Brown, filming his interaction with Taylor with her cell phone. Brown instructed Hawkins to get back into the car for everyone’s safety because the traffic stop occurred on the side of the interstate immediately next to vehicles traveling at a high speed; but initially, she refused to do so.

Given that he was attempting to detain Taylor, while also dealing with Hawkins’s refusal to return to the car, Sergeant Brown called for back-up. And once other law-enforcement officers arrived, Hawkins agreed to get back into the car and then sat in the driver’s seat. Brown testified that their protocol for releasing a vehicle under these circumstances is to confirm that a passenger has a valid driver’s license. This ensures the passenger has the authority to move the vehicle; and if not, the vehicle must be towed. Brown added that if a passenger cannot produce a driver’s license, officers can still determine whether the passenger has a valid license if they are provided with a name and date of birth. But Hawkins refused to produce a valid license or give officers the necessary information. If she had done so, she would have been free to leave.³ Brown then advised Hawkins she was under arrest for refusing to show officers her driver’s license or provide them with the requested information. Even so, she flatly refused to exit the vehicle. At this point, Sergeant Jacob Justice—another responding officer—forcibly removed Hawkins from the car. And when he did so, there were “physical altercations” between Justice, Hawkins, and Sergeant Jacob Robins.⁴ According to Justice, during the incident, Hawkins grabbed his head and removed his sunglasses. Justice also had to be treated in a hospital emergency room later because he injured his ankle during the encounter.

When Hawkins eventually exited the car, she grabbed Sergeant Brown’s pants and tried to pull him down. Officers then attempted to handcuff Hawkins; and after they finally did, Hawkins “continued physically resisting” them. Indeed, during the struggle, Hawkins bit Sergeant Robbins on his “lower forearm around [his] wrist,” either intentionally or as a result of “scuffling with her on the road.” Judy Mercer—another investigator—also responded to the scene; and she observed Hawkins “kicking, cussing, fighting, [and] grabbing.” At some point, Hawkins “claw[ed]” Mercer’s thumb and pulled on her duty belt. This struggle occurred on the driver’s side of the car, which was extremely close to interstate traffic.

Once out of the car, Hawkins “refused to walk[,]” going “completely limp,” such that she felt like “dead weight.” Even so, the responding officers were eventually able to get her into a patrol car; but when they did so, she “actively resist[ed].” She started kicking the window, roof, and door of the car, as well as scratching the window with her handcuffs. Hawkins also kicked the car’s “security panel,” while spitting on the “plexi-glass.” As a result of Hawkins’s behavior, the patrol car was damaged. Ultimately, it took “multiple deputies to control [Hawkins].” And when Hawkins eventually arrived at the jail, she continued resisting officers, shouting profanities and racial slurs at them.

Later, Hawkins was charged, via indictment, with four counts of felony obstruction of a law-enforcement officer and one count of interference with government property. Then, following a jury trial, Hawkins was convicted of one felony count of obstruction of a law-enforcement officer and three lesser-included misdemeanor counts of the same offense; but she was acquitted of interfering with government property. Hawkins then filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal follows.

1. Hawkins first argues the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for obstruction of a law-enforcement officer. We disagree.

[1–3] When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.”⁵ And importantly, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not “weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁶ The jury’s verdict will be upheld, then, so long “as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”⁷

[4] Before addressing the merits, a brief word about the presentation of Hawkins’s arguments is necessary. In the ten pages of her brief devoted to this claim of error, she makes numerous factual allegations but provides only a few discernable record citations. And almost all of the sparse record citations are to video exhibits, generally (such as “State Ex. 6”), without providing a time stamp. This is, of course, not nearly specific enough to aid in our review of the case. Additionally, none of Hawkins’s record citations in this section of her brief comply with the rules of this Court.⁸ And as we have repeatedly emphasized, it is not the function of this Court to “cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.”⁹ To the contrary, the burden is on “the party alleging error to show it affirmatively in the record.”¹⁰ As a result, because Hawkins failed to meet this burden, “if we have missed something in the record or misconstrued an argument, the responsibility rests with [Hawkins].”¹¹

Turning to the merits, Hawkins was convicted of three misdemeanor counts and one felony count of obstruction of an officer. Under OCGA § 16-10-24 (a), “[misdemeanor obstruction requires proof that the defendant knowingly and wilfully obstructed or hindered a law-enforcemeht officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties ”¹² And felony obstruction has the same elements that must be proven as misdemeanor obstruction, “in addition to one more element—that the defendant obstructed the officer by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer.”¹³

The requirements for felony obstruction of an officer are codified at OCGA § 16-10-24 (b).¹⁴

As to Hawkins’s felony conviction, Count Four of the indictment alleged that

on or about the 11th day of July, 2020, in Monroe County, Georgia, [Hawkins] then and there did knowingly and willfully resist, obstruct, and oppose [Sergeant] Jake Justice, a law enforcement officer with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, in the lawful discharge of his official duties by offering and doing violence to said officer by fighting with him and grabbing his head in violation of OCGA § 16-10-24 (b), contrary to the laws of said State ….¹⁵

As to, Hawkins’s misdemeanor convictions, Counts One through Three of the indictment contain nearly identical language as Count Four, except for detailing the manner in which Hawkins was alleged to have committed obstruction of an officer and identifying the different officers at issue.

In Count One, the indictment alleged that Hawkins committed obstruction “on the 11th day of July, 2020 … offering and doing violence to [Sergeant] Willy Brown … by fighting with [him] and grabbing his pant leg trying to pull him to the ground …. ”¹⁶

Next, Count Two lalleged that Hawkins committed obstruction by “offering and doing violence to [Investigator] Yolanda Mercer by fighting with [her] on the side of the interstate, clawing [her] thumb, and pulling and grabbing [her] duty belt[,] including unlatching the first retainer on [her] duty weapon.”¹⁷

Lastly, Count Three of the indictment alleged that Hawkins committed obstruction by “offering and doing violence to [Sergeant Jacob Roberts], by biting him and fighting with him …. ”¹⁸

On appeal, Hawkins does not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of her individual convictions, all of which allege different acts of obstruction committed by Hawkins against different officers. Instead,, she contends there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for obstruction of an officer because her initial arrest was unlawful.¹⁹ And she alleges that because her arrest was unlawful, she did not wilfully...