Hawkins v. State

Decision Date03 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 211,211
Citation34 Md.App. 82,366 A.2d 421
PartiesWalter Russell HAWKINS v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief, for appellant.

Leroy Handwerger, Atty. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., for Prince George's County and Daniel Cassidy, Asst. State's Atty., and Prince George's County on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, MOYLAN and DAVIDSON, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Walter Russell Hawkins, the appellant, was convicted of rape, false imprisonment, and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The jury also specifically found him to have been sane at the time of the offenses. Judge Joseph A. Mattingly imposed sentences totaling thirty-five years. On appeal the appellant contends the trial judge failed to require the proper order of proof, that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of sanity, and that the trial judge erred in denying a new trial and in failing to merge the crimes of false imprisonment and rape.

The victim testified that on May 21, 1974, she was waiting in a wooded area for a friend when the appellant approached her. After a brief conversation, he seized her by the throat and held a gun to her side. She was ordered to disrobe and lie on the ground; whereupon her assailant engaged in sexual intercourse with her without her consent. The defense introduced no evidence denying either the crime or the criminal agency, but after the conclusion of the State's case produced a psychiatrist who testified, out of the presence of the jury, that in his opinion the appellant was insane at the time the crime was committed. The trial judge ruled that the issue of insanity was presented, and the appellant proceeded to introduce, before the jury, his evidence tending to show that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. The State produced evidence tending to show that he was sane at the time.

Dr. Irving L. Berman, a psychiatrist, testified that he had evaluated the appellant on the basis of a one hour interview on September 19, 1975 and upon examination of the reports and tests from Clifton T. Perkins Hospital. It was his opinion that the appellant was 'suffering from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia' and because of this mental disorder Hawkins lacked the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Irwin J. Papish testified that he had interviewed the appellant on September 10, 12, and October 6, 1975. Based on the interviews, tests, and reports supplied by Clifton T. Perkins Hospital he concluded:

'What I found was that for many years he has been suffering from both visual and auditory hallucinations. These are hearing things that are not real and seeing things that are not real. He has also tended to have suspicious, somewhat paranoid feelings about other people; that they would again have some malice or hostility or ill will towards him. And this has been a feature of his illness.'

'I would state that I think he had some impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, but that he very definitely was substantially impaired as to his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.'

Appellant's wife, brother, and cousin testified for the defense stating that Hawkins had suffered from hallucinations and delusions since he was 14 or 15 years of age. (He was 25 at the time the crime was committed.)

A report to the court from the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital signed by Dr. Yavuz Inel, was introduced; it contained the following paragraph: 1

'Our evaluation disclosed a Full Scale I.Q. of 93 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale with no evidence of psychotic symptoms. Psychological examination disclosed adequate reality testing, inadequacy and lack of basic trust. Dr. Inel, Acting Superintendent and Dr. Aceituno, Staff Psychiatrist diagnosed the patient as Schizophrenia, Chronic Undifferentiated Type (in Remission) and felt that, at the time of the offenses, the patient's mental disorder was in a state of remission, and therefore, he was responsible for his actions. Dr. Mola, Staff Psychiatrist, diagnosed the patient as Schizophrenia, Chronic Undifferentiated Type and she offered the opinion that, at the time of the various offenses, the patient was suffering from Schizophrenia and, because of that, he was not responsible for his behavior. Dr. Adamo, Acting Clinical Director, found no evidence of Schizophrenia at this time or during the extended period at which time the alleged offenses occurred. His diagnosis was Schizoid Personality with Anti-Social Features. It was Dr. Adamo's further opinion that this patient has been attemption to malinger more serious psychopathology such as auditory and visual hallucinations since the age of sixteen. Dr. Inel also agreen that the patient is attempting to malinger a psychosis.'

Dr. Ido Adamo testified on behalf of the State:

'A. It is my opinion that at the time of all the offenses he was not suffering from a mental disorder which could have caused him to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

Q. Doctor, what was the opinion of Dr. Inel of your staff?

A. Dr. Inel agreed with my opinion.

Q. And how about Dr. Aceituno?

A. He also agreed.

Q. And Mrs. Mola?

A. Mrs. Mola gave a dissenting opinion. She felt that he was suffering from a schizophrenia and, therefore, he was not responsible.

Q. Doctor, in the Clifton T. Perkins report, Defense Exhibit No. 2, is there an admission note in there by Mrs. Mola?

A. On admission she happened to see this man when he first came on April 9th, and at that time she didn't find any evidence of a psychosis or schizophrenia or delusions. She felt he was a little depressed, non-committal. He didn't want to talk about the offenses, but the felt there was no evidence of psychosis. She gave the diagnosis of anxiety neurosis at that time. Then she changed her diagnosis.

Q. Doctor, in the report you state that the Defendant has schizoid personality with antisocial features. Would you please explain that diagnosis to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury?

A. That was my diagnosis and still is. Schizoid personality is a personality disorder. It refers to individuals who are somewhat shy, unable to relate well to other people to express their feelings, to show hostility openly. They are suspicious, they don't trust people. That is a schizoid personality. The antisocial features are because of the attitude with regard to the various offenses.

Q. Doctor, have you had an opportunity to sit in the courtroom today as an expert, with the permission of the Court, and listen to some of the defense witnesses in this case?

A. Some of them, yes.

Q. And have you had an opportunity to speak with a Mr. George Shearard, a co-worker of the Defendant?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And in your conversation with Mr. Shearard as to the Defendant's past conduct over the last five years, did that strengthen or weaken your diagnosis of the Defendant?

A. It actually reinforces my opinion that I stated very clearly in the letter-I personally dictated the report of the findings of the staff-that there was no evidence that this man has ever been showing clear signs of a psychosis. And in discussions with Mr. Shearard he indicated that he knew him for five or six years-he also is a mail carrier-and never at no time did he notice anything unusual or peculiar in the way he was talking, the way he was communicating with people, with himself, which confirms my own impression.

Q. Are you aware of the fact that the Defendant lived with his wife and two children for approximately eight and a half years?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. How would that fact have a bearing on your opinion?

A. Well, it is some differences with my own colleagues ar Perkins, some of them they actually gave a diagnosis chronic undifferentiated, although they felt he was in remission. And my opinion was that this man has never been documented or reported in a documented fashion as being a psychotic. He has been saying that he hears voices, he has also visions since he was 16. He also has been saying that he becomes some other man within himself who controls him. Now, if a man, if any person develops this kind of symptoms which, as they are reported, they are very severe, very serious to require admission to a psychiatric facility, the individual would be unable to function with those symptoms. Those are symptoms of psychosis, not just schizophrenia. Schizophrenia, there can be some signs. But sometimes a schizophrenic patient can function within some limitations. But when a schizophrenic patient develops these gross secondary symptoms, such as hallucinations, they just can't function, cannot marry, cannot properly care for their families. They cannot function at work where they are staying for a period of time without drawing the attention of a psychiatrist, coming to the attention of a psychiatrist. That is why I objected to diagnosing this man as a schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated type. Even the psychological testing, the psychological does not show this man has a psychosis. At the time of the testing, the psychological simply indicated that under stress this individual can develop something else. But it doesn't say that he will. He can; it is possible.

Q. Doctor, in your report you indicate that you felt the Defendant was malingering.

A. That is correct. The thinking, the way he communicated with us showed that he did not have a thinking disorder, which would be what we call a primary sympton. In order to have a secondary symptom, such as hallucinations, one must show signs of a primary disorder, which is basically in the thinking...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Gregory v. State, 1411
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 6, 1978
    ...responsible. At the commencement of trial, both sides agreed to an "order of proof" consistent with that approved in Hawkins v. State, 34 Md.App. 82, 366 A.2d 421 (1976); namely: the defense would introduce the issue of "sanity" in its case-in-chief, and the State, in rebuttal, would respon......
  • Howard v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 28, 2017
    ...conviction were "incidental to" the acts supporting his conviction for first-degree assault. He relies on Hawkins v. State , 34 Md.App. 82, 366 A.2d 421 (1976). In that case we held that the trial court erred by not merging the defendant's convictions for rape and false imprisonment, where ......
  • Garcia–perlera v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 6, 2011
    ...sentences for appellant's convictions of false imprisonment and robbery. Appellant relies upon this Court's decision in Hawkins v. State, 34 Md.App. 82, 366 A.2d 421 (1976), to support his contention that these convictions should have been merged for purposes of sentencing because the false......
  • Brooks v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • August 27, 2014
    ...of Special Appeals had occasion to consider whether a false imprisonment conviction merges into a rape conviction in Hawkins v. State, 34 Md.App. 82, 92, 366 A.2d 421 (1976). In that case, the defendant approached the victim in a wooded area, seized her by the throat, held a gun to her side......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT