Hawkins v. Tulsa Cnty. Court Clerk
| Decision Date | 29 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11–CV–372–JED–TLW. |
| Citation | 46 F.Supp.3d 1175 |
| Parties | Dorotha Louise HAWKINS, an individual, Plaintiff, v. Tulsa County Court Clerk, Sally Howe SMITH, in Her Official Capacity, Tulsa County, and the Board of County Commissioners for Tulsa County, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Motions granted. Daniel E. Smolen, Donald Eugene Smolen, II, Lauren Grace Lambright, Smolen Smolen & Roytman PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.
Kyle L. Buchanan, Jacob Samuel Crawford, William Kirk Turner, Newton O'Connor Turner & Ketchum PC, Douglas Allen Wilson, Nolan Morris Fields, IV, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.
This is a disability-based employment discrimination case brought by Dorotha Louise Hawkins (“Hawkins” or “plaintiff”) against Tulsa County Court Clerk Sally Howe Smith (“Smith”), the Board of County Commissioners for Tulsa County (“BOCC”), and “Tulsa County.” Hawkins alleges that she became disabled following a stroke and that the defendants failed to accommodate her limitations. Hawkins also complains that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliated against when she complained about the harassing behavior of her supervisor. The defendants seek summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims.
Hawkins maintains that, despite these seemingly kind gestures, Wehmeyer became mean-spirited to her at work after the stroke. Hawkins asserts that, within two weeks of her return to work after her stroke, Wehmeyer began harassing her on an ongoing basis. Hawkins's journal recounts how Wehmeyer “seemed to resent the fact that so many people from other departments were dropping in to see how [Hawkins] was.” (Doc. 89–10). Her journal further discusses what she believed to be the change in Wehmeyer:
I'm having to use a walker because my balance isn't good yet, but [Wehmeyer's] insisting that I go around each morning to pick up the reports and that I take the checks to the Treasurers when they're written. It's extremely hard to carry things like that when using the walker. Sally did it a few times, the 1st week I was back, but then Theresa said I had to do it. I don't understand why she's being so cold about this. When she's had an operation, Sally [and] I have done all we can to make things easier for her.
( Id.). Hawkins testified that, even though her quality of work was no different than before her stroke, Wehmeyer would frequently criticize her for making mistakes. Hawkins testified that Wehmeyer would attribute the mistakes to Hawkins's stroke-related physical condition, accusing her of memory problems.2
On March 3, 2010, an incident occurred where Wehmeyer told Doris that she should divorce her husband, then criticized Hawkins's hair as looking like a mess. Wehmeyer then proceeded to question Hawkins as to whether she was taking too much pain medication in light of the fact that Hawkins's son had died of a pain medication overdose.3 Hawkins was so upset that she went to the restroom to cry. A co-worker saw her shortly after and inquired what was wrong. When told of the incident, the co-worker then informed Vicky Goodson, an upper-level supervisor. The next day, Goodson contacted Hawkins and inquired about the incident. Goodson had Hawkins inform Smith of the details. Hawkins expressed concern at that time that she was afraid of retribution from Wehmeyer as a result of the incident being reported. Smith had a “strong talk” with Wehmeyer about her conduct, and on March 8, Hawkins and Doris were summoned to Smith's office where she, Goodson, and Wehmeyer were waiting. In the meeting, Wehmeyer apologized to Hawkins and Doris and they accepted her policy. From Smith's perspective, it appeared as though it resolved the issue. Hawkins disagrees.
Hawkins says that, in the weeks that followed the meeting with Smith, Wehmeyer's negative conduct intensified. Hawkins recounts that Wehmeyer still forced her to walk to deliver checks when she did not feel physically capable of doing so. In addition, Hawkins received an email from Wehmeyer intended for a different recipient, which was critical of Hawkins for having a new phone despite alleged money problems. Hawkins received verbal warnings for carelessness on March 3 and 8 of 2010 and May 11 and 24 of 2010. On June 18, 2010, Hawkins was issued a written warning in the form of an Unacceptable Performance Notice. The written warning resulted from three alleged mistakes in failing to follow written procedures. Hawkins signed the warning, adding that she would “accept full responsibility for not taking extra time to prevent the errors.” (Doc. 81–19). With respect to the written warning, Hawkins states that it was actually Doris who made the mistakes, but she accepted responsibility in order to protect Doris.
On June 9, 2010, Hawkins and Smith had an email exchange. Smith wrote to Hawkins, stating that she had a problem with Hawkins “shopping” for another position. (Doc. 89–13 at 2). Smith further stated that she was “obviously reviewing [Hawkins's] issues and again I currently have no position open that would accommodate your physical condition.” ( Id.). In her response, Hawkins stated in pertinent part:
As I told you yesterday, Theresa has gotten a lot worse since I was called in to your office about the time she stepped over the line with comments about my deceased son and her perceived impression of any faults caused by my stroke. I asked you not to say anything to her and just let us handle it by letting it die down quietly back here, because I knew she would set out to hurt me in other ways, which she has done. Of course the notes she has written now would be biased and not entirely true, in order to inflict the harm that she wants. I don't even care about that as long as she stops setting such a hostile, debasing environment back here.
* * *
... Things appear to be better today and, hopefully, it will continue that way. Thank you for listening and for your help.
( Id.). The record does not reflect any further complaints on the part of Hawkins regarding Wehmeyer's treatment of her.
On June 28, 2010, Hawkins had a heart attack. This heart attack resulted in Hawkins becoming permanently disabled, exhausting her Family and Medical Leave Act time, and being terminated from her position with the Court Clerk's Office. Hawkins now receives Social Security Disability benefits and has made no attempt to return to work.
On May 23, 2011, Hawkins filed this lawsuit in Tulsa County District Court, and on June 14, 2011, defendants removed the case to this Court. Hawkins's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 52) alleges claims against defendants for failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Oklahoma anti-discrimination statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1301.4 Defendants now seek summary judgment as to these claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “By its very terms, [the Rule 56] standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The courts thus determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-movant's evidence is taken as true, and all justifiable and reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that it is reversible error for a court to weigh the evidence or resolve any disputed issues in favor of the moving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866–68, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam). A district court may not credit the evidence of the party seeking summary judgment and ignore evidence offered by the nonmovant. Id. Thus, reaching factual inferences that conflict with the non-movant's evidence is contrary to the “fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1868. The reason for this longstanding principle is that Id.
As noted, defendant Smith seeks summary judgment as to all claims against her ( see Doc. 81). Defendant BOCC's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 86) adopts and incorporates the arguments made in defendant Smith's motion and also seeks judgment as a matter of law on the basis that it was not Hawkins's employer. 5 For reasons stated below, the Court finds defendant Smith's arguments to be dispositive of Hawkins's claims in their entirety.
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
6The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee...
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