Hawkins v. United States

• Decision Date: 09 July 2015
• Docket Number: Nos. 12–CF–1499,12–CF–1526.,12–CF–1501,12–CF–1500,s. 12–CF–1499
• Citation: 119 A.3d 687
• Parties: Darnell HAWKINS & Marvin Verter, Jr., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

119 A.3d 687

Darnell HAWKINS & Marvin Verter, Jr., Appellants

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 12–CF–1499

12–CF–1500

12–CF–1501

12–CF–1526.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 19, 2014.

Decided July 9, 2015.

Abram J. Pafford, Lynchburg, VA, for appellant Verter.

Phillip C. Zane, Washington, DC, for appellant Hawkins.

Nicholas Coleman, Assistant United States Attorney, for appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Vinet Bryant, and SuzAnne C. Nyland, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, BECKWITH, Associate Judge, and REID, Senior Judge.

Opinion

BECKWITH, Associate Judge:

After a joint trial, a jury convicted appellants Darnell Hawkins and Marvin Verter of various charges stemming from the May 2010 shooting death of Dawan Felder in the southeast quadrant of the city. On appeal, appellants raise several claims of error. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reverse Mr. Hawkins's conviction for obstruction of justice under D.C.Code § 22–722(a)(3)(B),¹ we reverse Mr. Verter's conviction for obstruction of justice under D.C.Code § 22–722(a)(6), and we remand to allow the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal on those counts as well as to effectuate the merger of Mr. Hawkins's remaining obstruction convictions under D.C.Code § 22–722(a)(2)(A) and (B). We affirm appellants' remaining convictions.

I. Factual Background

According to the testimony of the government's witnesses, Darnell Hawkins, Marvin Verter, and Dawan Felder were all members of a group called the “Get Money Soldiers” (GMS). They “got money” by selling drugs, assisted in part by several women—including Jerita Campbell, her roommate Dominique Hunter, and their next door neighbor Sharde Wright—who called themselves the “Get Money Bitches.” Jerita Campbell testified, in particular, that she sold marijuana out of her apartment to GMS customers.

After a series of incidents that included a customer's complaint about being shorted marijuana in a bag prepared by Dawan Felder, Mr. Verter and Mr. Hawkins began to suspect that Mr. Felder was stealing from the GMS, and Mr. Felder became estranged from the group. At some point, according to Jerita Campbell's testimony, Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Verter told her to alert them if she saw Mr. Felder near her apartment. Several weeks later, Ms. Campbell called Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Verter after seeing Mr. Felder, and they both came to her apartment and spoke with Mr. Felder outside the apartment building. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hawkins shot Mr. Felder eight times, killing him.

Ms. Campbell testified that she entered the apartment building “crying” after the shooting and went straight into her bedroom in the back of her apartment. Sharde Wright testified that she was next door in Jerita Campbell's and Dominique Hunter's apartment when she heard the shots fired and saw Ms. Campbell run screaming into the apartment building with Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Verter on her heels. According to Ms. Wright, Mr. Hawkins asked for a shirt to replace the distinctive orange one he was wearing, and Mr. Verter gave him a new shirt and threw the orange one away. Mr. Hawkins then left. Ms. Campbell and Dominique Hunter testified that Mr. Verter then came into Ms. Campbell's apartment, gave his car keys to Ms. Campbell, and told her to pick up Mr. Hawkins from a street nearby.² Ms. Campbell testified that she did so and then drove Mr. Hawkins to a gas station to meet Darrell Matthews, who was the head of GMS. Mr. Matthews testified that he took Mr. Hawkins to his house, where Mr. Hawkins confessed to him that he killed Mr. Felder because of his disloyalty to the group.

The government also presented evidence that Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Verter used various means to attempt to cover up the shooting. Mr. Hawkins instructed Ms. Campbell to lie to the police about what happened, and he instructed his girlfriend, Teyarra Butler, to lie to both the police and the grand jury. Mr. Verter also instructed Ms. Wright to lie to the police and the grand jury and to delete his Facebook page. Ms. Wright also testified that Mr. Verter told her during a visit with him at the D.C. Jail that Ms. Campbell had to be “dealt with” or “gotten out of the way.”

The jury convicted Mr. Hawkins of first-degree murder while armed,³ possession of a firearm while committing a crime of violence (PFCV),⁴ carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL),⁵ and three counts of obstruction of justice.⁶ The jury acquitted Mr. Verter of first-degree murder but convicted him of accessory after the fact to murder,⁷ three counts of obstruction of justice,⁸ and tampering with physical evidence.⁹ This appeal followed.

II. Evidentiary Insufficiency Claims

Both appellants contend that the government presented insufficient evidence to support an obstruction-of-justice conviction, and Mr. Verter also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his accessory-after-the-fact conviction. We reverse a conviction on sufficiency grounds if “the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime.” Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 265 (D.C.1987) ). Juries are “entitled to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from evidence,” but they may not “base a verdict on mere speculation.” Harrison v. United States, 60 A.3d 1155, 1162–63 (D.C.2012) (quoting Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134 ). “Slight evidence is not sufficient evidence; a ‘mere modicum’ cannot ‘rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” In re D.P., 996 A.2d 1286, 1288 (D.C.2010) (quoting Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134 ).

A. Mr. Verter's Obstruction–of–Justice Conviction

Marvin Verter challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his obstruction-of-justice conviction under D.C.Code § 22–722(a)(6) —specifically, the fourth count of the March 2012 indictment alleging that he “corruptly and by threats of force endeavored to obstruct or impede” the grand jury proceedings by making a statement to Sharde Wright about Jerita Campbell once it became clear Ms. Campbell would be a government witness. Sharde Wright testified that she visited Mr. Verter at the D.C. Jail, where he was being held on an unrelated charge, and when the two were discussing this case, Mr. Verter said that Jerita Campbell had to be “dealt with.” The prosecutor asked Ms. Wright if she remembered “the specific words that he used,” to which she responded that Mr. Verter said, “She has to be gotten out the way or something.” “We have to get her out of the way?” the prosecutor asked. Over Mr. Verter's unsuccessful objection to the leading question rephrasing Mr. Verter's statement, Ms. Wright responded, “Yeah.” Ms. Wright testified that Mr. Verter made these statements about Ms. Campbell because “she was talking” and “[s]he was the main witness.”

At trial, the prosecutor indicated in her opening statement that in support of this obstruction charge, the government would show that Marvin Verter “actually threatened the life of Jerita Campbell because she was a witness against them.” At the end of trial, after Sharde Wright testified about her conversation with Mr. Verter, the government suggested that Mr. Verter violated the obstruction statute by directing Ms. Wright to silence Ms. Campbell, stating in its closing argument that “[l]ater [Ms. Wright] goes to visit [Mr. Verter] at the jail, and what does he say? ‘We got to get rid of Jerita because she's talking.’ That's obstruction of justice.” And likewise in rebuttal: “What you have is obstruction for [Mr. Verter] telling Sharde that we have to get rid of Jerita because she's talking.”¹⁰

The trial court instructed the jury on six distinct obstruction charges—three involving Marvin Verter.¹¹ With respect to the count at issue here—“obstruction of judicial proceedings against Darnell Hawkins and Marvin Verter”—the court, using the standard jury instruction, told the jury that it could find Mr. Verter guilty on this count if the government persuaded it beyond a reasonable doubt that he “obstructed or impeded or endeavored to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice in a proceeding in a court of the District of Columbia” and that he “did so with the intent to undermine the integrity of the pending proceeding.” The court added that “[t]he government need not prove that Marvin Verter successfully obstructed or impeded the due administration of justice.” Neither the court's instruction nor the verdict form clarified for the jury which factual allegations were intended to support which of the many obstruction charges.

Immediately after the jury returned its verdict of guilt on this obstruction offense, the trial court ordered the government to brief the question whether Mr. Verter's statement constituted obstruction of justice—that is, whether Mr. Verter's statement, “without more, without any overt act, without any activity other than the bald statement ‘We've got to rid [sic] of Jerita’ is enough to make out an obstruction count.” In a memorandum in support of the conviction, the government backed away from the theory presented at trial, arguing instead that the conviction was valid based upon a theory the jury never heard—that the evidence “was sufficient for a jury to infer that Verter endeavored to obstruct justice by intimidating Sharde Wright from testifying against him” when he made a threatening statement about Ms. Campbell in her presence. Mr. Verter filed an opposition requesting a judgment of acquittal on this count. The trial court agreed with the government, ruling orally at Mr. Verter's sentencing that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the obstruction count under § 22–722(a)(6) on the ground that the jury could reasonably interpret Mr. Verter's statement as a “threat[ ]”...