Hawks v. Hamill

Citation288 U.S. 52,77 L.Ed. 610,53 S.Ct. 240
Decision Date09 January 1933
Docket NumberNo. 147,147
PartiesHAWKS et al. v. HAMILL et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. W. C. Lewis, of Oklahoma City, Okl., Purman Wilson, of Purcell, Okl., and J. Berry King, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioners.

Mr. Charles B. Cochran, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for respondents.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondents, claiming to be the owners of a perpetual franchise to collect tolls for the use of a bridge across the Canadian river, brought suit in the United States District Court against the members of the state highway commission of Oklahoma, the Attorney General of that state, the county attorneys of McClain and Cleveland counties, and other persons, residents of the neighborhood, to restrain a threatened interference with the maintenance of the bridge or the collection of tolls. 50 F.(2d) 628. The jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. The defendants (petitioners in this court) made a motion, without answering, to dismiss the complaint. The complainants moved at the same time for an injunction pendente lite. The District Court denied the motion for an injunction, and granted the motion to dismiss. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the decree and directed judgment in favor of the complainants for the relief demanded in the complaint. 58 F.(2d) 41, 47. A writ of certiorari brings the case here. 287 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 16, 77 L.Ed. —-.

The facts exhibited in the bill are these: On April 22, 1911, the county commissioners of McClain county, Okl., adopted a resolution whereby there was granted to Carter and Halsell, or their assigns, a franchise to construct and operate a tollbridge across the Canadian river at the city of Purcell, the bridge to be erected within the time prescribed by law. The tolls enumerated in a schedule were not to be increased 'by the bridge company,' though they might be reduced. By the terms of the resolution, the grant was to be 'perpetual,' subject only to such limitations as were provided by law. The grantees were to be at liberty to transfer their rights and privileges to 'any individual or corporation,' with the same effect as if the grant had been made to the assigns directly. On May 16, 1911, the county commissioners of Cleveland county on the other side of the Canadian river adopted a like resolution for the grant of a like franchise to the same grantees. On May 18, 1911, Carter, one of the grantees, together with Walling and Hamill, the present respondents, caused a corporation, known as the Purcell-Lexington Toll Bridge Company, to be organized under the laws of Oklahoma, with a corporate life of twenty years. Thereafter in December, 1911, while the bridge was in course of construction, the grantees of the franchises, together with the respondents, conveyed the bridge, its approaches, and all the rights and privileges embraced within the franchises or either of them, to the Purcell-Lexington Toll Bridge Company, its successors and assigns. The corporate life of the Purcell-Lexington Toll Bridge Company was to expire, as we have seen, on May 18, 1931. Before that time, and on April 2, 1931, the bridge company conveyed to the respondents and to Carter, and their assigns, the bridge and the accompanying franchises; the respondents receiving afterwards from Carter an assignment of his interest, whatever it might be. Thereupon the defendants, who are the petitioners here, gave notice that on May 18, 1931, the bridge would become a free bridge and part of the free highway system of the state of Oklahoma. The members of the state highway commission, the Attorney General, the county attorneys, as well as the neighboring residents, who, it seems, are also the county commissioners, announced a purpose to prevent the collection of tolls by the respond- ents, and to cause the bridge to be kept open for free and unimpeded passage. This suit for an injunction followed.

The District Court held that the county commissioners were without authority to grant a franchise to individuals except in trust for a corporation organized under the bridge law; that the term of the corporate life was also the limit of the duration of the privilege to charge and levy tolls; that a perpetual franchise, if intended, would be void under article 2, § 32, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, prohibiting 'perpetuities'; and that the bill should be dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing this judgment, held that the franchises were not invalid because granted to individuals; that, upon assignment to a corporation organized for a term of twenty years, the franchises were not cut down in respect of their duration, but continued in full force when conveyed by the assignee to others; that the term 'perpetuities' as used in article 2, § 32, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, had in view the creation of future estates, and did not limit the enjoyment of a privilege or franchise; and that the complainants should have an injunction as prayed for in the bill.

Article 2, § 32, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, provides: 'Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.' Construing that provision, the Court of Appeals said: 'We do not doubt that the word 'perpetuities' * * * was not intended to mean or be equivalent to perpetual franchises, but was intended to limit the power to pass titles that would vest in futuro.' But the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not circumscribed the word so narrowly. It has said that a forbidden perpetuity is created when there is granted to an individual or corporation a perpetual privilege or franchise. It has gone farther; it has said that a privilege or franchise is perpetual if indefinite in duration, though it be subject to revocation at the pleasure of the Legislature. The question came before the court in City of Okmulgee v. Okmulgee Gas Company, 140 Okl. 88, 282 P. 640. The Legislature of Oklahoma had passed an act whereby a public service corporation holding a franchise from a municipality for a fixed term of years was to be at liberty to exchange it for a revocable permit. The court said that such a permit, if viewed as a grant from the municipality, was forbidden by article 18, § 5(a), which provides in effect that no franchise shall be granted by a municipal corporation for a longer term than twenty-five years. On the other hand, if the permit could be viewed as one proceeding directly from the state, the court said that it would then be a perpetuity within the prohibition of article 2, § 32. The permit was not saved by the reservation to the Legislature of a power to revoke it. In the view of the court (page 98 of 40 Okl., 282 P. 640, 649), a franchise 'not limited in its existence to a fixed and definite period of years' is to be classified as 'a perpetual franchise,' and hence an unlawful perpetuity. To avoid misapprehension, the court at the end of its opinion summarized its conclusions (page 100 of 140 Okl., 282 P. 640, 651). 'Any act of the Legislature which provides for issuing a license, revocable permit, indeterminate permit, or other instrument in the nature of a franchise, which is not limited as to its time of existence, violates section 32 of article 2 of our Constitution.' See, to the same effect, In re Okmulgee Gas Company, 141 Okl. 98, 284 P. 70; In re Oklahoma Power Company, 141 Okl. 100, 284 P. 12.

We do not now determine what meaning we would give to the Oklahoma Constitution if the question were before us as an original one, unhampered by any pronouncement of the courts of that state. Much can be said in support of the respondents' position that the perpetuities denounced are those arising from the creation of future estates or from restraints upon alienation without reasonable limit. The question is one distinctively local in origin and content. The prohibition is embodied in the local Constitution. Not only that, but it is designed to give effect to 'the genius' of the government, an impalpable existence that can best be apprehended and defined by perceptions and experiences sharpened and developed through the associations of the vicinage. 'In a case involving local history as this does we should be slow to overrule the decision of Courts steeped in the local tradition even if we saw reason for doubting it.' Jackman v. Rosenbaum Company, 260 U.S. 22, 32, 43 S.Ct. 9, 10, 67 L.Ed. 107. Cf. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 105, 106, 43 S.Ct. 286, 288, 67 L.Ed. 550. To define a 'perpetuity' for a young and developing community, there must be recourse to something more than the pages of a dictionary. The word to be defined, in common with words generally, will have a color and a content that will vary with the setting. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372, L.R.A. 1918D, 254; Int. Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157; Surace v. Danna, 248 N.Y. 18, 21, 161 N.E. 315. It comes down to its interpreters freighted with subtle implications, with the 'tacit assumptions,' the 'unwritten practices,' the 'thousand influences' and 'values' that 'logic and grammar never could have gotten from the books.' Diaz v. Gonzalez, supra. Out of two or more meanings that were possible and plausible the state of Oklahoma has picked the one comporting best in the thought of her official spokesmen with the 'genius' of her history. The mists of our own uncertainties are scattered when pierced by this authentic evidence of the law of the locality. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567, 570, 48 S.Ct. 396, 72 L.Ed. 703; People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 48 S.Ct. 239, 72 L.Ed. 547. Cf. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 287 U.S. 346, 53 S.Ct. 132, 77 L.Ed. 354, December 5, 1932.

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