Hawley v. Barker
Decision Date | 01 December 1879 |
Citation | 5 Colo. 118 |
Parties | HAWLEY v. BARKER. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Error to District Court of Arapahoe County.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr WILLARD TELLER, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs BUTLER, WRIGHT & KING, for defendant in error.
In this case there was a general demurrer to the complaint; the demurrer was sustained and judgment entered thereon. The plaintiff brings the case to this court by writ of error. The complaint shows that on May 28, 1875, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant in the District Court of Gilpin County, in an action on a written instrument for the payment of money, for the sum of $1,136. A motion for a new trial was made by defendant, and remained undisposed of until March 26, 1877, when it was denied, and judgment entered on the verdict; the case was appealed to this court and judgment affirmed. The judgment was for the exact amount of verdict and the present action is brought to recover interest on the amount of the verdict from the date of its rendition up to the time of entry of judgment thereon.
There is but little harmony among adjudicated cases upon the subject of interest. It is defined to be 'the compensation which is paid by the borrower of money of the lender for its use, and generally by a debtor to his creditor, in recompense for his detention of the debt.' (Bouvier Law Dic.)
Again it is said to be 'a legal and uniform rate of damages allowed in the absence of any express contract, when payment is withheld after it has become the duty of the debtor to discharge the debt.' Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. St. 411.
In Colorado, interest is regulated by statute, and in this case the plaintiff claims to recover under the provisions of section 2 of the Statutes (Gen. Laws, p. 513). The section is as follows:
'Creditors shall be allowed to receive interest when there is no agreement as to the rate thereof at the rate of ten per cent. per annum for all moneys after they become due, on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument of writing, or any judgment recovered before any court or magistrate authorized to enter up the same within this State, from the day of entering up said judgment until satisfaction of said judgment be made; likewise on money lent; on money due on the settlement of account from the date of the last just entry that may have been made in account; on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's knowledge, and on money withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay.'
In the case of Sammis v. Clark et al. 13 Ill. 544, substantially the same section was under consideration. Mr. Justice Trumbull says: .
We accept this construction as the law. If, therefore, the plaintiff can recover interest on his verdict, it must be in virtue of its express or implied enumeration in the section quoted, and to this inquiry the controversy is narrowed.
The plaintiff bases his right to recover thereunder upon three grounds:
First. That the verdict is an instrument of writing within the meaning of the section.
Second. That it is a settlement of account within the meaning of the section.
Third. That in this case it may be treated as 'money withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay,' within the meaning of the section.
Without reference to the question whether this can be regarded as an action ex contractu, we will consider the points made in their order.
To the first proposition it may be replied that the term 'instrument of writing,' as here used, has a definite legal meaning, which excludes a verdict as something essentially different. An instrument of writing implies an agreement or contract which it contains, and of which it is the memorial. (Bouvier.) A verdict is the unanimous decision made by a jury and reported to the court on the matters lawfully submitted to them in the course of the trial of a cause. (Bouvier.) Nor can a verdict with any more propriety be called a 'settlement of account,' which is an agreement by which two or more persons who have dealings together, so far arrange...
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Davis Cattle Co., Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Company
...In Colorado, interest is wholly a creature of statute and thus is not allowable on a common law, or equity basis. See Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118 (1879); Denver S. P. & P. R. Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1, 5 P. 142 (1884); Hunter v. Wilson, 147 Colo. 36, 362 P.2d 553 (1961). See also Mitton v.......
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Fail v. Community Hosp.
...sum that becomes due on the date the award is issued pursuant to § 5-12-102(2), C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2). However, in Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118, 120-121 (1879), a case in which two years passed before judgment was entered, our supreme court held that interest is not recoverable on a ju......
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City of Rawlins v. Jungquist
...By no construction of the statutes on the subject can they be made applicable to a claim for damages caused by a change of grade. (Hawley v. Baker, 5 Colo. 118; Palmer v. Murray, 21 P. L. E. Armstrong, for defendant in error. The liability of a municipal corporation for damages caused to ab......
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