Haworth v. Shillinger
| Decision Date | 26 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-CV-0006-B.,94-CV-0006-B. |
| Citation | 852 F. Supp. 961 |
| Parties | Steven K. HAWORTH, Petitioner, v. Duane SHILLINGER, Warden Wyoming State Penitentiary, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General for the State of Wyoming, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming |
Gerald M. Gallivan, Director — Defender Aid Program, University of WY, College of Law (Jeffrey M. Hindoien — Student Intern, argued), Laramie, for petitioner.
Mary Beth Wolff, Asst., Office of WY Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, WY, for respondents.
ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING PETITIONER'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), and the parties' respective motions for summary judgment on the underlying substantive issue. The Court, having considered the materials on file in support of and in opposition to, having heard oral argument, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
Background
Petitioner Steven K. Haworth was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and battery for his use of a pocketknife during a fight with an individual named Rod Risk on May 23, 1990 outside a bar near Casper, Wyoming. Haworth asserted that he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this argument.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Wyoming Supreme Court, raising one issue on appeal, which was framed as follows:
whether the prosecution's deliberate and covert intrusion into petitioner's trial preparations, alerting the prosecution of petitioner's defense strategy, violated petitioner's fifth and sixth amendment rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, respectively.
Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 913 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2395, 124 L.Ed.2d 296 (1993). Petitioner's argument on appeal was grounded in the following set of facts.
Because petitioner was unable to post bail, his trial counsel made arrangements with the sheriff's office to meet with petitioner to prepare for trial for several hours of each weekend day for several weeks preceding the date of trial. These sessions were to be held in the courtroom where the trial was to take place. The sheriff's office conditioned this arrangement on the requirement that a deputy sheriff remain with petitioner at all relevant times since petitioner was being held on bond pending trial. Defense counsel made arrangements to pay the deputy's overtime wage. Counsel also stated that he expressly told the deputy that he was working for defense counsel and that "none of this goes out of the room." Id. at 913 (footnote omitted).
During the first day of trial, it became apparent to defense counsel that the prosecutor had learned not only about the weekend preparatory sessions between defense counsel and petitioner, but also about the substance of the conversations that occurred at those meetings.1 As a result, defense counsel requested a meeting in-chambers with the trial judge and the prosecutor prior to the start of trial the next morning. The Wyoming Supreme Court described the result of the in-chambers meeting as follows:
during this discussion, the trial judge learned about defense counsel's weekend trial preparation sessions with Haworth and the prosecutor's discovery of them. It was clear that the prosecutor had learned about the sessions, including the substance of some of the conversations between defense counsel and Haworth, from the deputy sheriff who had provided custodial security of Haworth during those sessions.
Haworth, 840 P.2d at 913 (emphasis added). The trial judge advised the prosecution that it could no longer make any reference to the defense's "rehearsals in this courtroom."
This issue did not resurface until the third day of trial. After the prosecution had rested and after the defense had called all of its witnesses except for the defendant, defense counsel requested another in-chambers meeting. At this meeting, defense counsel advised the court of his concern that the prosecution had learned of the substance of some of counsel's conversations with his client, referring to one specific conversation where counsel, in preparing his client to take the stand, advised him that he should describe his use of the knife during the fight with the word "cut" rather than "stab." Id. at 914. The prosecutor was concerned that this testimony had been improperly coached and he wanted to elicit this fact on cross-examination.
During this discussion in chambers, the prosecutor vigorously disputed defense counsel's representation to the court that counsel had expressly instructed the deputy sheriff that confidentiality attached to anything that he overheard during those sessions.2 The prosecutor, however, did not call the deputy sheriff to testify as to what he was told by defense counsel, thereby leaving defense counsel's representation uncontroverted.
The trial court concluded that the conversation between defense counsel and his client involved work product and that it would be improper for the prosecution to probe this matter on cross-examination. Id. The prosecutor then asked for a ruling whether he could ask the defendant the following question: "You have been specifically instructed to use the word `cut' versus `stabbed'?" The trial court advised the prosecutor that that question was objectionable. No further discussions took place in chambers, and the trial thereafter resumed, at which time the defendant took the stand.
Throughout the course of his direct testimony, the defendant used the word "cut" rather than "stabbed." On cross-examination, the prosecution asked, without objection from defense counsel, "You have specifically used the word `cut' versus `stabbed' in your testimony today, correct?" to which the defendant replied "True." During closing argument, the prosecution again made reference to the fact that the defendant had constantly used the word "cut" rather than "stabbed." After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at 916.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, over the lone dissent of Justice Urbigkit, rejected petitioner's sole claim on direct appeal that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the actions of the prosecutor and the law enforcement officials and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 918.
Petitioner subsequently filed the present petition in this Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The only issue raised in his federal petition is whether the actions of the prosecution in interfering with petitioner's attorney-client relationship violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.3 In support of his argument, petitioner relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) and its progeny at the federal appellate level.
The parties agree that this issue is one which the Tenth Circuit has never addressed. The case is, in other words, one of first impression in this circuit. After a careful review of the Weatherford decision and the decisions of the courts of appeals that have considered this issue, as well as the important social and public policies implicated by the facts of this case, this Court finds that petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights were in fact violated in this case. Because "the writ of habeas corpus is a bulwark against convictions that violate `fundamental fairness,'" Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2511-12, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)), and because this Court cannot find that petitioner's trial was fundamentally fair, the petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment is granted and accordingly, so is his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
At the outset, the Court notes that the petition is procedurally sound in that the claim sought to be raised in this Court is a federal claim that has been exhausted before the courts of the State of Wyoming. There are, therefore, no procedural impediments to this Court reaching and deciding the merits of petitioner's claim.
In order to understand fully the nature of the claim asserted, it will be necessary to start by reviewing the Weatherford decision.
Weatherford involved the following factual scenario. Brett Allen Bursey brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) lawsuit naming, inter alia, Jack Weatherford, an informant-agent of the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division, as a defendant. Bursey and Weatherford were arrested for malicious destruction of property. Although Weatherford participated in this act, he was merely posing as a wrongdoer and was actually working undercover. Bursey was subsequently indicted for this crime. In order to maintain his cover, Weatherford was ostensibly indicted for this crime as well. Both men were released on bond at which time Weatherford continued his masquerade. After he was indicted, the State made arrangements to have counsel appointed to represent Weatherford. As the Fourth Circuit stated:
the purpose of it all was to convince Bursey and others that Weatherford was in bad trouble so that he could maintain his appearance as an apparent codefendant while actually working as an undercover informant.
Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir.1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977).
During this period after indictment but prior to trial, Bursey met with his own attorney, C. Rauch Wise, to discuss his defense at trial. During at least two of these meetings, Weatherford was also present during which time he became privy to privileged information that was discussed between Bursey and Wise. Weatherford later argued that his presence at these meetings was not deliberate but...
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Shillinger v. Haworth
...other courts of appeals in light of "the important social and public policies implicated by the facts of this case." Haworth v. Shillinger, 852 F.Supp. 961, 964 (D.Wyo.1994). The district court noted that under the circumstances in Weatherford the mere intrusion into the attorney-client rel......