Haworth v. Truby

• Decision Date: 10 November 1890
• Docket Number: 51
• Citation: 20 A. 942,138 Pa. 222
• Parties: HAWORTH ET AL., LIM., v. JOHN TRUBY
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

20 A. 942

138 Pa. 222

HAWORTH ET AL., LIM., v. JOHN TRUBY

No. 51

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

November 10, 1890

Argued October 20, 1890

APPEAL BY PLAINTIFFS FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF INDIANA COUNTY.

No. 51 October Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 339 June Term 1888, C.P.

On April 30, 1888, an appeal was entered by the defendant from the judgment of a justice of the peace in favor of Haworth &amp Dewhurst, Limited, against John Truby. Issue.

At the trial on November 14, 1889, it was shown that the plaintiffs were wholesale grocers at Pittsburgh, with John L. Chambers as a traveling salesman; that, under date of November 12 1886, Chambers sent in an order to ship to defendant, who was a retail grocer at Indiana, 2,000 lbs. of coffee. Plaintiffs shipped the coffee and sent to defendant a statement, the bill amounting to $305. A second statement was sent in December, and a third in January, 1887. On January 11th the defendant sent to the plaintiffs his individual check for $150, writing to them, "The balance I will send you in a few days." In February, the plaintiffs sent a fourth statement to the defendant, giving credit for the $150. On February 14th, the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs that he had not ordered the coffee through Chambers, but that the latter had it sent in defendant's name, and had then sold it out to other parties.

The testimony on the part of the defendant was to the effect that Chambers had asked to be permitted to order a ton of coffee in defendant's name, to save freight and to enable him to undersell other men on the road; that defendant objected to allowing the use of his name; that the coffee was shipped however, as Chambers had requested, in defendant's name and defendant was informed of the shipment before it arrived; that Chambers was away when the coffee reached Indiana, and it remained at the station until Chambers came, when the defendant called him into the store and spoke to him about having had the coffee shipped in the manner it was, when Chambers asked the defendant not to make a fuss about it, and said it would all be sold in a few days and the money collected, and defendant could then send it to the plaintiffs. Chambers then got the coffee, disposed of it, and paid to the defendant $150, part of the proceeds. The defendant testified that he would have ordered the coffee back to the plaintiffs, but the parties to whom Chambers had sold it would have been disappointed. He admitted he had received the different statements sent to him, and had sent the remittance of $150. Chambers never paid to the defendant, or to the plaintiffs, the balance of the proceeds of this coffee.

The defendant being on the stand as a witness, he was asked by his

Q. State whether or not the merchants of this place order coffee by the ton?

Counsel stated that the purpose of the offer was to show that it was an unusual circumstance for any seller of goods in this place to buy coffee by the ton; by way of showing that plaintiffs may have had knowledge of what their agent said as to his purpose in ordering it by the ton, to enable him to sell it out in parcels to different people.

Objected to as immaterial and irrelevant.

By the court: Objection overruled; exception. 1

A. I never knew them to.

A. C. Braughler, called for defendant.

Counsel stated: We want to show by this witness that he got the coffee pretty much the same [way?] from Mr. Chambers; by way of showing the probable knowledge this firm had of his methods of doing business.

Objected to.

By the court: Offer admitted; exception. 2

A. I bought two boxes from Chambers. I don't know where he got it. He had the coffee at the depot possibly. The time I got that was close on towards the holidays 1886, as near as I can say. He shipped a ton of coffee prior to this time in my name. He came to me one day and said he had a chance of selling a ton of coffee and wanted to ship it in my name. I did not buy a ton of coffee from him. I told him I would not buy it, did not want a ton of coffee. He said that by ordering in one man's name he could buy it at less and sell it for less money. I don't know who got the coffee at all. He was representing the firm of Haworth & Dewhurst, Pittsburgh.

At the close of the testimony, the court, HUNTER, P.J., 10th district, charged the jury in part as follows:

The plaintiffs in this action claim that there was shipped to the defendant, on November 16, 1886, 2,000 lbs. of coffee, the cost of which would be $305. They admit that on January 12, 1887, there was a payment made by a check sent by the defendant of $150, which would leave a balance of $155 due, together with proper interest thereon; and this is the claim of the plaintiffs and for which this suit has been brought. They contend that the coffee was ordered by their agent, John L. Chambers, and that a bill was sent to the defendant accordingly; and upon the 12th or 13th of January, this letter and check for $150 were received of the defendant, stating that the balance would be arranged; we do not give his words but the substance of them. We may say here, that if there was nothing else in the case but this, the plaintiffs' right to recovery would be beyond question.

But the defendant contends, and so testifies, that he never bought this coffee; that it was shipped in his name without his knowledge and against his express direction to the agent, Chambers; that he would not buy the coffee, did not want that amount of it, and that it should not be shipped in his name. Yet it appears, if it be the fact, if the testimony of Truby be true, that, notwithstanding this, the coffee was shipped upon an order signed by John L. Chambers, who was the agent, the acknowledged agent of the plaintiffs.

Now, the general rule of law is, that whatever an agent does within the scope of his duties the principal is bound by his acts. And here there is no question whatever but that Chambers was the agent of the plaintiffs in going about and in soliciting orders for groceries, as testified to by one of the plaintiffs themselves.

Mr. Truby explains this payment of $150; that he called Chambers, he says, into his store, and demanded to know of him why this coffee was shipped in his name and against his orders and directions. It was explained by the agent of the plaintiffs, that by shipping coffee in this way the sale of goods could be facilitated and the freight charges reduced, and that he had been so doing, as we now recall the testimony of the witness; said he proposed to retail, if I may be allowed the expression, this ton of coffee among his customers, or wherever he could sell it, and bring the money to Truby and let him send it in upon his account. Thus, Mr. Truby explains why he sent the check, the $150 having been paid according to the promise of this agent, and he supposing or resting upon the promise made by Chambers that the balance would be paid; and he explains that he wrote the letter in that way, and it was in that light and with that understanding, made with the agent of plaintiffs, that he thus acknowledged the amount of the claim and promised payment.

Now, the first inquiry that will arise in your minds is, was there a sale? Truby says there was no sale of any coffee to him; that it was shipped, as we have said, against his direction and without his knowledge; that he did not want, he says, to buy the coffee. Now this testimony is uncontradicted. Mr. Chambers, the agent, is not here. The plaintiffs themselves could not know, because they were not present. The question, then, of ratification comes up; that, although there may have been no actual sale, yet if the plaintiffs parted with their property through the representation of their agent, the same might be ratified by the defendant in this case adopting what the agent of his own volition and of his own act had done.

Now the question will come in here, [if this agent was acting fraudulently, if he had a fraudulent intent in procuring the coffee to be shipped in the manner it was, not only to this defendant but to other small dealers, retail dealers in the country, for the purpose, if he had a fraudulent intent, -- we would say, an intent to cheat and defraud his principals, -- that intent and that fraud would only bind Truby if Truby had knowledge of it.] If the defendant had knowledge that such was the purpose of the agent Chambers, and he paid money upon it and entered into the arrangement with the knowledge of such fraudulent intent, we repeat, then...