Hawse v. Page

• Decision Date: 30 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1960,20-1960
• Citation: 7 F.4th 685
• Parties: Lauren HAWSE; Frank R. O'Brien, Jr.; Jean M. O'Brien; Stephen J. Pieper, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. Sam PAGE, in his capacity as County Executive of St. Louis County, Missouri; Faisal Khan, in his capacity as Director of the St. Louis County Public Health Department, Defendants - Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

7 F.4th 685

Lauren HAWSE; Frank R. O'Brien, Jr.; Jean M. O'Brien; Stephen J. Pieper, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.Sam PAGE, in his capacity as County Executive of St. Louis County, Missouri; Faisal Khan, in his capacity as Director of the St. Louis County Public Health Department,¹ Defendants - Appellees.

No. 20-1960

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 19, 2021

Filed: July 30, 2021

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 23, 2021

Michael Desranleau Quinlan, Quinlan Law Firm LLC, Saint Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Steven J. Capizzi, St. Louis County Counselor's Office, Michael L. Jente, Neal F. Perryman, Jerina Dominique Phillips, LEWIS & RICE, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before COLLOTON, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

The appellants in this case challenged a public health order entered by St. Louis County in April 2020. The district court² ruled that there was no Article III case or controversy because the appellants failed to allege adequately that an order of the court would redress their injuries. We conclude that the appellants lack Article III standing, and that any controversy is now moot, so we affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint.

I.

In the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, the St. Louis County Acting Director of Public Health issued a "Stay at Home Order." The order's stated intent was "to ensure that the maximum number of people remain in their places of residence to the maximum extent feasible, while enabling essential services to continue, to slow the spread of COVID-19 within St. Louis County." The order defined activities necessary for a person to participate in religious services and other spiritual practices as "essential activities" that were not forbidden, but only to the extent that the activities complied with a gathering size limitation of fewer than ten people in a single room or space. The order distinguished between churches, which were subject to the gathering size limitation, and various secular businesses that were not.

The order took effect on March 28, 2020, with an expiration date of April 22, 2020. R. Doc. 2-1. On April 20, the County replaced the March 28 order with an amended order that continued the same limitations.³ On May 18, 2020, however, the County superseded the April 20 order, eliminated the requirement that religious gatherings be limited to fewer than ten persons, and established capacity restrictions of ten percent or twenty-five percent of a building's authorized occupancy, depending on the size of the building.⁴ The May 18 order applied those same capacity restrictions to big box stores, supermarkets, restaurants, and other businesses that engaged in direct interactions with members of the public. Subsequent orders over the next year imposed gathering size limitations ranging from twenty-five percent to fifty percent of a building's authorized occupancy. On May 14, 2021, the County rescinded all restrictions on religious gatherings, and there is currently no COVID-based limit on the number of persons who may attend a religious service or any other activity in St. Louis County.

In a complaint filed on April 28, 2020, the appellants sued county officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the Public Health Order of April 20, 2020, violated their rights to free exercise of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly under federal and state law. In four separate counts, they invoked the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Missouri Constitution, and the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

The district court ruled that the appellants lacked Article III standing on these claims because they did not adequately allege that an order of the court would redress their injuries. The court reasoned that the complaint did not allege that the Public Health Order was responsible for the closure of the appellants’ churches, or that the churches would hold gatherings of ten or more people but for the Order. Accordingly, the court dismissed the four counts without prejudice for lack of standing. (The district court declined to dismiss a fifth count based on the Due Process Clause, but the appellants later dismissed that claim voluntarily with prejudice.)

Appellants filed a notice of appeal on May 11, 2020. On May 12, the appellants moved for an injunction pending appeal. The appellants filed their reply in support of that motion on May 18, after receiving a requested extension of time. On May 18, 2020, the County superseded the challenged Order. On May 19, this panel denied the motion for injunction pending appeal without dissent. In July 2020, the appellees moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. This panel, without dissent, ordered the motion taken with the case for consideration after full briefing and oral argument. (Of course, mootness must be reassessed at the time of decision in any event.) The appellants did not seek expedited treatment of the appeal, and after briefing was completed, the case was scheduled for oral argument in the ordinary course during April 2021. The record accurately reflects no vote by the dissenting judge to expedite the appeal on the court's own motion, and there is no call for the dissent to demean the court's ordinary case processing as an exercise in "letting this case sit." The appeal was handled properly like any other case in which the appellants are content to proceed with a normal schedule for briefing and oral argument.⁵

II.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action, and it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). A plaintiff must support each element of standing "in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof." Id . at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to support a reasonable and plausible inference that she satisfies the elements of Article III standing. Auer v. Trans Union, LLC , 902 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 2018) ; Stalley ex rel. United States v. Cath. Health Initiatives , 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) ("The plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims (here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent with such a right.") (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ); Silha v. ACT, Inc. , 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).⁶

On appeal, the appellants contend primarily that the district court erred in two respects when it concluded that they lacked standing. First, they argue that the court mistakenly construed the complaint to allege only that the Order precluded them from participating in religious activities in their churches, as opposed to other locations. Second, they maintain that even as to religious activities at church, the complaint adequately alleged that injunctive relief would redress their injuries. The County defends the district court's conclusion on standing and also maintains that the case is moot.

The most important factual allegations relevant to the question of standing are set forth in three paragraphs of the complaint. As indicated by italics in the quotations below, those paragraphs focus on religious activity in churches attended by the appellants:

1. Plaintiff Lauren Hawse is a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri, who is a Christian. Attending and participating in worship and fellowship in her church community , especially on Sundays, is an essential requirement of her sincerely held religious belief. As a result of restrictions imposed by the defendants as set forth below, she has been unable to attend Sunday services and other religious activities in which she usually participates and she has been impeded in her exercise of rights to freely associate and assemble and to freedom of expression. The church building in which she regularly worships has a seating capacity of up to 600, and there is ample space for 150 to exercise proper social distancing. Her church is also equipped with hand sanitizers and other materials to enable visitors to observe appropriate hygienic precautions related to the COVID-19 situation.

2. Plaintiffs Frank and Jean O'Brien, husband and wife, are residents of St. Louis County, Missouri. They are Christians. Attending and participating in worship and fellowship in their church community , especially on Sundays, is an essential requirement of their sincerely held religious belief. As a result of restrictions imposed by the defendants as set forth below, they have been unable to attend Sunday services and other religious activities in which they usually participate and they have been impeded in their exercise of rights to freely associate and assemble and to freedom of expression. The church building in which they regularly worship has a seating capacity of at least 500, and there is ample space for 150 to exercise proper social distancing. Their church is also equipped with hand sanitizers and other materials to enable visitors to observe appropriate hygienic precautions related to the COVID-19 situation.

3. Plaintiff Stephen Pieper, M.D. is a resident of Glencoe, St. Louis County, Missouri, who is a Christian. Attending and participating in worship and fellowship in his church community , especially on Sundays, is an essential requirement of his sincerely held religious belief. As a result of restrictions imposed by the defendants as set forth below, he has been unable to attend

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