Hayashi v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation

• Decision Date: 17 October 2014
• Docket Number: 116190.,Nos. 116023,116163,s. 116023
• Citation: 25 N.E.3d 570
• Parties: Bradley Hiroshi HAYASHI, D.C., et al., Appellants, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

25 N.E.3d 570

Bradley Hiroshi HAYASHI, D.C., et al., Appellants

v.The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et al., Appellees.

Nos. 116023

116163

116190.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 17, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 2015.

Dennis Doherty, of Chicago, for appellant Hayashi.

Charles P. Sheets, Kathryn M. Stalmack and Paula S. Kim, of Polsinelli PC, of Chicago, for appellant Jafari.

William C. Coughlin, of Worth, for appellant Khaleeluddin.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Nadine J. Wichern, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Claudia E. Castro, of Springfield, and Marc E. Rosenthal, Michael F. Derksen and Jacki L. Anderson, of Proskauer Rose LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Pursuant to section 2105–165 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105–165 (West 2012) ) (the Act), the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) permanently revoked plaintiffs' health care licenses as a result of plaintiffs' prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and criminal sexual abuse of their patients. Plaintiffs filed complaints for declaratory and injunctive relief, which the circuit court of Cook County dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, 370 Ill.Dec. 664, 988 N.E.2d 1020.

¶ 2 In this court, plaintiffs challenge the revocation of their licenses on a number of grounds. They contend that the Act: (1) does not apply to individuals who were convicted of a triggering offense prior to the Act's effective date; (2) is impermissibly retroactive and impairs certain fundamental rights, in violation of substantive due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ); (3) violates procedural due process; (4) is unenforceable based on the res judicata effect of the previous discipline imposed by the Department; (5) violates the federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy (U.S. Const., amend. V ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10 ); (6) violates the prohibition against bills of attainder in the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10); (7) violates the takings clause in the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.V); and (8) violates the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws (U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16 ).

¶ 3 We find no merit in any of plaintiffs' claims, and, consequently, affirm the appellate court's judgment affirming the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Bradley Hiroshi Hayashi, D.C., was licensed as a chiropractic physician in 2000. On May 21, 2007, Hayashi was convicted of misdemeanor battery for touching a patient inappropriately during treatment. On November 24, 2008, the Department entered an order memorializing a consent agreement between Hayashi and the Department, pursuant to its authority to discipline health care professionals under the Medical Practice Act of 1987. 225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2008). The order stated that Hayashi's license to practice as a chiropractic physician would be suspended for 30 days and, thereafter, would be reinstated on a probationary basis for a minimum of three years, subject to the terms and conditions in the order. That order was in effect at the time of the revocation of Hayashi's license.

¶ 6 Nercy Jafari, M.D., a licensed physician, was convicted in August 2001 of misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse for inappropriately touching a female patient. He was sentenced to 24 months' probation and was required to register as a sex offender for 10 years, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). In 2003, the Department determined after an investigation that Jafari's medical license need not be suspended, revoked, or otherwise limited. Jafari's duty to register as a sex offender expired on August 24, 2011.

¶ 7 Mohammed Khalleeluddin, M.D., a licensed physician, had his license to practice medicine suspended by the Department in 1998, based on allegations of inappropriate or sexual misconduct with his female patients. Khalleeluddin was convicted in 2000 of four counts of misdemeanor battery in connection with the allegations. Khalleeluddin's medical license remained suspended until December 18, 2000, when the Department issued an order restoring it subject to a term of indefinite probation. On November 9, 2007, after an evidentiary hearing, the Department entered an order terminating Khalleeluddin's probationary status and restoring his medical license to unencumbered status.

¶ 8 On July 21, 2011, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 97–156, which amended the Department of Professional Regulation Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois by adding section 2105–165 (20 ILCS 2105/2105–165 (West 2012) ). Effective August 20, 2011, the Act mandates the permanent revocation, without a hearing, of the license of a health care worker who has been convicted of certain criminal offenses, including criminal battery against any patient in the course of patient care or treatment and any criminal offense which requires registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act. The purpose of the Act was to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public by ensuring that individuals convicted of certain sex offenses would no longer be eligible to practice medicine in Illinois. 20 ILCS 2105/2105–10 (West 2012) ; 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 18, 2011, at 27 (statements of Senator Dillard).

¶ 9 Shortly after the Act went into effect, the Department issued notices to plaintiffs indicating its intent to revoke their licenses pursuant to the Act because each of the plaintiffs had been convicted of a crime listed in the Act. Plaintiffs filed separate actions in the circuit court of Cook County against the Department and individual Department officials seeking injunctive relief and a judicial declaration that the Act may be applied only to convictions imposed after its effective date. The Department subsequently entered administrative orders permanently revoking plaintiffs' health care licenses.

¶ 10 The circuit court denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions on the basis that they showed no likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2012) ), finding that plaintiffs failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the circuit court's section 2–615 dismissals. 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 52, 370 Ill.Dec. 664, 988 N.E.2d 1020.

¶ 11 We allowed plaintiffs' petitions for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013)), and consolidated the cases for review.¹

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 I. Legislative Intent

¶ 14 Plaintiffs first argue that the Act does not apply to them because there is no clear expression of legislative intent that individuals convicted of a listed offense prior to the Act's effective date are subject to mandatory revocation of their licenses. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that they fall outside the intended reach of the Act.

¶ 15 The Act provides, in part:

“(a) When a licensed health care worker, as defined in the Health Care Worker Self–Referral Act, (1) has been convicted of a criminal act that requires registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act; (2) has been convicted of a criminal battery against any patient in the course of patient care or treatment, including any offense based on sexual conduct or sexual penetration; (3) has been convicted of a forcible felony; or (4) is required as a part of a criminal sentence to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act, then, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the license of the health care worker shall by operation of law be permanently revoked without a hearing.” (Emphases added.) 20 ILCS 2105/2105–165(a) (West 2012).

¶ 16 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill.2d 453, 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006). The most reliable indicator of the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, 236 Ill.2d 433, 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113 (2010). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, a court may not depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 15, 378 Ill.Dec. 778, 5 N.E.3d 158. In determining the plain meaning, we must consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill.2d 1, 8, 319 Ill.Dec. 319, 885 N.E.2d 999 (2007). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill.2d 176, 179, 291 Ill.Dec. 656, 824 N.E.2d 232 (2005). We also review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2012) ). Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 429, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006).

¶ 17 Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, the plain language of the Act clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to apply to convictions predating its effective date. The best evidence of the legislative intent is the language of the Act itself. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113. The phrase, “has been convicted,” in...