Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Parole

Decision Date31 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-3733.,No. 07-3720.,07-3720.,07-3733.
Citation551 F.3d 193
PartiesDebra HAYBARGER, Appellee v. LAWRENCE COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE; County of Lawrence; William Mancino, in his individual and official capacities, Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Gregory G. Paul, (Argued), Robert Peirce & Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorney for Appellee Debra Haybarger.

A. Taylor Williams, (Argued), Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Administrative Office of PA Courts, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellant Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole.

Edmond R. Joyal, Jr., Law Office of Joseph S. Weimer, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorney for Appellee William Mancino.

Before: FISHER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

State governments and their subsidiary units are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. We have held that Pennsylvania's judicial districts are arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir.2005). This immunity is not absolute, however. Under the Rehabilitation Act, States waive their immunity when they accept federal funds. In this interlocutory appeal, we must identify the proper entity to determine whether a judicial district has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

I.

Alleging violations of both federal and state antidiscrimination laws, Debra Haybarger filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Lawrence County, the Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole Department (LCAPPD), and Chief Probation Officer William Mancino. Haybarger served for sixteen years as an office manager for the LCAPPD, which is a department of the Fifty-Third Judicial District of Pennsylvania encompassing all of Lawrence County. A diabetic, Haybarger endured a lengthy hospital stay that caused her to miss work for almost the entire month of July 2004. Upon her return to work, she was told that her health problems were causing her to "slack" in her performance. On October 4, 2004, Haybarger received a formal letter of discharge.

Following her discharge, Haybarger filed a complaint seeking equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages against Lawrence County, the LCAPPD, and Mancino, in both his official and individual capacities. Haybarger asserted violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794, et. seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 PA. CONS.STAT. § 951, et. seq.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court dismissed all claims against Lawrence County and Mancino individually, finding that the LCAPPD, rather than Lawrence County, was Haybarger's true employer. The remaining Defendants claimed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and the District Court agreed in part, dismissing Haybarger's ADA and FMLA claims because Congress did not validly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the relevant provisions of those laws. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir.2000). Additionally, the District Court dismissed Haybarger's PHRA claims because Pennsylvania has retained its immunity against those claims when they are brought in federal court. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b). As for Haybarger's Rehabilitation Act claim, the District Court ordered limited discovery to discern whether Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System (UJS) or the Fifty-Third Judicial District received federal funds during the relevant time period, which would result in a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the RA.1

Discovery revealed that although the LCAPPD received no federal funds, the Domestic Relations Section (DRS) of the Fifty-Third Judicial District was receiving federal funds under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651. These federal monies—which were earmarked specifically for child support enforcement—flowed from the federal government to Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare (DPW), which reports to the Governor of Pennsylvania. DPW then contracted with the domestic relations sections of various counties. In the case of Lawrence County, the parties to the agreement to provide Title IV-D funds were DPW and the "Domestic Relations Section (DRS) of the Court of Common Pleas and County Commissioners of Lawrence County." The agreement was signed by the County Commissioners of Lawrence County and the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County.

Following discovery, the LCAPPD and Mancino moved for summary judgment, claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court denied the motion, holding that the Fifty-Third Judicial District had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if only one section of the judicial district accepted federal funds. The LCAPPD and Mancino brought this interlocutory appeal and we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

II.

We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2007). We "apply the same test required of the district court" and view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995). Our review of Defendants' entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity is plenary. Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 244, 246 (3d Cir.1987).2

III.

The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment renders unconsenting States immune from suits brought in federal courts by private parties. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); see also Lombardo v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir.2008).

The Supreme Court long ago extended the Eleventh Amendment's coverage to suits brought against a State by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). More recently, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits against subunits of the State. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). In addition, a suit may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though a State is not named a party to the action, so long as the State is deemed to be the real party in interest. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997). We consider several factors in determining whether a suit against an entity is actually a suit against the State itself, including: (1) the source of the money that would pay for the judgment; (2) the status of the entity under state law; and (3) the entity's degree of autonomy. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir.1989).

We have held that Pennsylvania's judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Benn, 426 F.3d at 241. The Commonwealth vests judicial power in a unified judicial system, PA. CONST. art. V, § 1, and all courts and agencies of the UJS are part of the Commonwealth government rather than local entities. Benn, 426 F.3d at 240. As an arm of the State, an individual judicial district and its probation and parole department are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute, however. In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir.1998). States and their subunits can waive immunity by taking voluntary action inconsistent therewith. See, e.g., Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574, 67 S.Ct. 467, 91 L.Ed. 504 (1947). For instance, a State may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). Alternatively, Congress may require a waiver of immunity as a condition for receipt of federal funds, even though Congress could not order such a waiver directly. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 242-44 (3d Cir.2003). When a State participates in a federal financial assistance program "in light of the existing state of the law," it is on notice that its acceptance of federal funds may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 687, 94 S.Ct. 1347.

A.

The federal law at issue in this case is the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 of the RA states: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."3 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

The RA has a history of scrutiny under the Eleventh Amendment. See Nihiser v. Ohio EPA, 269 F.3d 626, 628 (6th Cir.2001). In 1985, the Supreme Court held that Section 504 did not make sufficiently clear whether Congress intended the States to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity against RA lawsuits as a condition of accepting federal funds. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246, 105 S.Ct....

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