Hayden v. Broward Cnty.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 12-62278-CIV-ROSENBAUM/SELTZER
• Parties: RAYMOND HAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. BROWARD COUNTY, TOWN OF MEDLEY, CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF, MEDLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, NORTH MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT, JOEL CHADES, ARTURO JINETE, GREGORY TAMBURO, HUMBERTO SUAREZ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

RAYMOND HAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. BROWARD COUNTY, TOWN OF MEDLEY, CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, BROWARDCOUNTY SHERIFF, MEDLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, NORTH MIAMI BEACHPOLICE DEPARTMENT, JOEL CHADES, ARTURO JINETE, GREGORY TAMBURO,HUMBERTO SUAREZ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.

Case No. 12-62278-CIV-ROSENBAUM/SELTZER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

DONE and ORDERED: September 6, 2013

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court upon the Motions to Dismiss filed by all Defendants in this case. D.E. 8; D.E. 25; D.E. 31; D.E. 32; D.E. 35; D.E. 38; D.E. 41. The Court has considered the motions, the parties' briefs, and the Complaint and is otherwise fully advised in this matter. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants' dismissal motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which are taken as true for the purpose of analyzing Defendants' respective motions to dismiss. On June 16, 2009, the "Money Laundering Task Force," a criminal task force organized under the auspices of the United States Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), engaged in an undercover operation in Broward County, Florida. D.E. 1, ¶¶ 27, 31. Joel Chades, an officer with the Medley Police Department and member of the task force, parked hisvehicle in the driveway of an abandoned house in the Shangri-La at Woodmont housing community. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31. A resident of the community noticed Chades had been parked in the same spot for approximately ninety minutes and placed a call to police requesting their assistance. Id. ¶ 32. An officer responded and confirmed that Chades was an undercover law-enforcement officer, but no one ever informed the resident that Chades's presence had been cleared. Id. ¶ 34. The resident then contacted Plaintiff Hayden, who was the president of the community homeowners' association, and asked him to investigate the situation. Id.

Hayden approached Chades's vehicle and inquired about Chades's identity. Id. ¶ 36. Chades was dressed in plain clothes with nothing visibly identifying him as law enforcement. Id. ¶ 38. In response to Hayden's inquiry, Chades produced his IRS identification. Id. ¶ 39. Hayden believed that the IRS identification "looked bogus" and remained skeptical that Chades was actually a law-enforcement officer. Id. Hayden does not allege, however, that he communicated his skepticism or his concerns about the IRS identification to Chades.

Chades then summoned Humberto Suarez, a Broward County Sheriff's Deputy and alleged task-force member,¹ on his radio. Id. ¶ 40. Shortly thereafter, Suarez, Arturo Jinete (a Medley police officer and task-force member), and Gregory Tamburo (a North Miami Beach police officer and task-force member) arrived on the scene. Id. Hayden does not allege that these individuals identified themselves to him or that he inquired about their identities. Nevertheless, Hayden was skeptical that Suarez, Jinete, or Tamburo were law-enforcement officers. Id. Hayden made a call to 911 asking that a marked unit come to the scene and confirm or deny that the individuals were undercover law-enforcement personnel. Id. ¶ 41.

From the moment Hayden initially approached Chades, Hayden, who was licensed by the State of Florida to carry a concealed weapon, was wearing a fanny pack that contained a concealed firearm. Id. ¶ 36. Although Hayden does not allege that he told any of the officers that he was carrying a concealed weapon, at some point, Suarez asked Hayden to relinquish the fanny pack containing the firearm. Id. ¶ 42. Hayden asserts that the officers did not wait for him to comply with Suarez's request and that they did not wait for uniformed officers to arrive but, instead, "they beat Plaintiff HAYDEN to the ground and secured the pouch." Id. ¶ 43.

Some time after the fanny pack was secured, marked Broward Sheriff's Office deputies arrived on the scene. Id. ¶ 45. Suarez then issued a Notice to Appear to Hayden, charging him with resisting an officer without violence, in violation of Section 843.02, Fla. Stat. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. Hayden was not taken into custody.

Hayden alleges that Chades, Suarez, Tamburo, and Jinete "pressed" the State Attorney to prosecute the charge against him. Id. ¶ 49. The state entered a nolle prosequi on April 6, 2010. Id. ¶ 50.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a thirty-six-count Complaint against Defendants on November 19, 2012. Id. Counts I, X, XIX, and XXVIII assert claims against the individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations carried out in their capacities as state law-enforcement officers. Counts II, XI, XX, and XXIX allege claims against the individual officers in their capacities as federal task-force members under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403U.S. 388 (1971).² In each of these eight counts, Plaintiff contends that the individual Defendants violated his constitutional rights by

a. Depriving Plaintiff of the due process of law by withholding and failing disclose exculpatory and/or pertinent and relevant evidence, chiefly that Plaintiff did not know that the law enforcement Defendants were in fact law enforcement officers at the time of Plaintiff's purported resisting;

b. Utilizing excessive force in seizing, detaining and/or arresting Plaintiff;

c. By wrongfully and falsely seizing, detaining and arresting Plaintiff against his will although he had not committed the crime alleged, thus depriving Plaintiff of his liberty; and/or

d. Persisting in the malicious prosecution of Plaintiff.

D.E. 1, ¶¶ 55, 60, 125, 130, 195, 200, 265, 270.

In Counts III, XII, XXI, and XXX, Plaintiff makes common-law false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims against the individual Defendants. Counts IV and XIII levy common-law false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims against the Medley Police Department, apparently on a respondeat superior theory, for the actions of Chades and Jinete, respectively. Counts V and XIV assert the same claims against the Town of Medley. Counts XXII and XXIII plead similar claims against the North Miami Beach Police Department and the City of North Miami Beach, respectively, based on Tamburo's conduct. Counts XXXI and XXXII make the same claim against BrowardCounty Sheriff Scott J. Israel, in his official capacity, and Broward County, respectively, for Suarez's actions.

Counts VI, XV, XXIV, and XXXIII assert common-law malicious-prosecution claims against the individual Defendants for their conduct as state officers. Counts VII, XVI, XXV, and XXXIV set forth common-law malicious-prosecution claims against the individual Defendants based on their conduct as federal law-enforcement officers. Counts VIII, XVII, XXVI, and XXXV make common-law malicious-prosecution claims against the United States Department of the Treasury based on the respective individual Defendants' conduct as federal officers, while Counts IX, XVIII, XXVII, and XXXVI assert the same claims against the United States directly.

Each of the Defendants has moved to dismiss all of the claims on a variety of grounds.³ In the course of briefing these motions, Plaintiff has conceded that some counts should be dismissed. See D.E. 46 at 3; D.E. 47 at 4; D.E. 55 at 3. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motions with respect to Counts IV, VIII, XIII, XVII, XXII, XXVI, and XXXV. The Medley Police Department, the North Miami Police Department, and the United States Department of the Treasury are dismissed from this lawsuit. Additionally, Plaintiff concedes that his claims for punitive damages against the Town of Medley, the City of North Miami Beach, and the Broward County Sheriff are barred by Florida law. D.E. 46 at 8-9; D.E. 47 at 20; D.E. 57 at 15; see Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Applicable Standard on a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must limit its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached to the pleadings and, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). Upon engaging in this analysis, a court should deny a motion to dismiss where the pleading asserts non-conclusory, factual allegations, that, if true, would push the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (quotation marks omitted); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (explaining that allegations in a complaint "must . . . contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim...