Hayden v. Caraway
| Decision Date | 23 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. JFM-11-173 |
| Parties | KERMIT DUANE HAYDEN, #11309-039 Petitioner v. WARDEN F. J. CARAWAY Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending is Kermit Duane Hayden's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent John F. Caraway, Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland Maryland, by his counsel, moves for dismissal or, in the alternative for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 5 and 17. Hayden, who is self-represented, has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) to which respondent has filed a reply. ECF No. 17. After consideration of the pleadings, the court deems a hearing unnecessary to resolve the issues. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, summary judgment will be entered in favor of defendant and against petitioner.
Hayden, who is currently assigned to a residential reentry center (RRC) in Michigan,1 filed this petition while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland. In this petition, he claims that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") incorrectly calculated his federal sentence because it used a commencement date of July 6, 2010, instead of August 1, 2007, the date when state authorities "relinquished jurisdiction of him to his federal detainer." ECF No. 13, Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. Further, he claims that hisfederal sentence was improperly imposed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on May 7, 2007, because the court "lacked authority to order a term of imprisonment be served consecutively to a not-yet-imposed term of imprisonment for violation of state parole." Id; see also Petition, p. 17. Hayden asserts that he has served his federal sentence in its entirety and should be released immediately. Petition, p. 11.¶ IV. 2
District courts are authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and such writs "shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The proper party respondent is generally the "person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge." Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35, (2004). Similarly, because "the court issuing the writ [must] have jurisdiction over the custodian," generally in "habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement." Id. at 442-43.
Hayden filed this habeas petition during the time he was incarcerated in a facility in this district.3 The Fourth Circuit has held that in a § 2241 habeas action "[j]urisdiction is determinedat the time an action is filed," meaning that "subsequent transfers of prisoners outside the jurisdiction in which they filed actions do not defeat personal jurisdiction." United States v. Edwards, 27 F.3d 564 (4th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (unpublished). Other circuits have held similarly. See, e.g., Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (); White v. Lamanna, 42 F. App'x 670, (6th Cir. 2002) (); Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 375 n. 5 (5th Cir.2001) () (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the court deems it has jurisdiction to consider this case.
Hayden is serving a thirty-month sentence followed by thirty-six months of supervised release with a projected release date of May 6, 2012. Ex. 1, Att. 12. The undisputed chronology of events is as follows:
The BOP calculated Hayden's federal sentence to begin on July 6, 2010. Ex. 1, Att. 12. The BOP's Designation and Sentence Computation Center ("DSCC") awarded Hayden prior custody credit toward his federal sentence from August 1, 2007 to December 5, 2007, because that time was not credited against his state sentence.4
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) provides that the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to .... the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in[the nonmovant's] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002). The court must, however, also abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Authority to calculate a federal prisoner's period of incarceration for the sentence imposed and to provide credit for time served is delegated to the Attorney General, who exercises it...
To continue reading
Request your trial