Hayden v. Green
| Decision Date | 05 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09–2103.,09–2103. |
| Parties | Mitch HAYDEN, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Pontiac Police Officer Dwight GREEN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ARGUED: Eric S. Goldstein, Johnston, Sztykiel, Hunt, Goldstein, Fitzgibbons & Clifford, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. Katrina Anne Murrel–Orlowski, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Eric S. Goldstein, Johnston, Sztykiel, Hunt, Goldstein, Fitzgibbons & Clifford, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel G. Romano, Romano Law, P.L.L.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellee.Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; ROGERS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
A motorist who leaves the scene of an accident, and then disregards a rather obvious police indication to stop his vehicle, should not be completely surprised when later he is forcibly removed from it. Officer Dwight Green removed Mitch Hayden from his vehicle under those circumstances here. We hold that Officer Green is entitled to immunity from suit, and we reverse the district court's order to the contrary.
We take the district court's view of the facts in the light most favorable to Hayden, see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), except that we reject his allegations to the extent they are clearly contradicted by “a videotape capturing the events in question.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). We have such a videotape here.
On February 10, 2008, at almost 11 p.m., on Highland Street in Pontiac, Michigan, Mitch Hayden crashed his 1991 Plymouth Acclaim into another driver's vehicle. Hayden was at fault in the accident, which was severe enough to deploy the Plymouth's airbags. Hayden left the scene without calling the police or providing his contact information to the other driver.
The other driver called the police. Officer Green responded. The other driver described Hayden's vehicle and said that the missing driver might have gone to a nearby hospital. Green drove to the hospital. Under the hospital canopy, near the emergency-room entrance, Green saw a vehicle matching the description he had been given. The vehicle had a smashed front end and was moving away from the canopy towards the hospital exit. Green moved his cruiser so that it faced Hayden's vehicle and blocked part of the travel lane. Then Green lit up his rollers. Hayden says that he stopped his vehicle at that point, but the in-car video from Green's cruiser belies the claim. Instead, the video shows that Hayden's vehicle continued moving forward and then went partially up onto the curb as if to go around the left side of the cruiser. In response, Green quickly backed up his cruiser to block the lane even more. Green then exited his vehicle, strode over to the Plymouth, opened Hayden's door, grabbed Hayden's clothing near the top of his chest, yanked once without effect, and finally pulled Hayden from his seat to the pavement in one fluid motion.
Hayden had not shifted the Plymouth out of drive, so it began rolling away. At first Green hesitated about what to do—he initially looked toward Hayden, much like a third baseman would check the runner at second base before throwing to first—and then ran after the Plymouth, leaving Hayden on the ground alone. Hayden chose to stand up, which caused Green to run back to him. Green told Hayden to “go down,” which Hayden chose not to do at first, so Green said “go down” again and jerked Hayden back to the ground by his collar. After the commotion was over, Green questioned Hayden and decided not to take him into custody. Instead, Green drove him home.
Hayden later sued Green under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he had used excessive force when he put Hayden to the ground and that Hayden hurt his back and shoulder as a result. Green moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court (in this case the magistrate judge) denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
“[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We do not see any material facts in dispute in the record here, which means that the issues before us are purely legal. We therefore have jurisdiction.
When a defendant officer raises qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the officer is not entitled to that defense. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 375 (6th Cir.2009). We review de novo the district court's denial of qualified immunity. Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir.2008).
Determinations of qualified immunity require us to answer two questions: first, whether the officer violated a constitutional right; and second, whether that right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case. Scott, 550 U.S. at 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769. We are now free to address those questions in whichever order we see fit. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
We need only address the question whether there was any constitutional violation here. In Hayden's view, Green violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on “the use of excessive force by arresting and investigating officers.” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir.2006). We decide that issue based on “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In evaluating whether an officer's use of force was reasonable rather than excessive, we consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Smoak, 460 F.3d at 783 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This standard contains a built-in measure of deference to the officer's on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of the circumstances of the particular case.” Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir.2002).
Green's actions fall within that measure of deference. At the time he approached the hospital canopy, Green had ample reason to believe that Hayden's vehicle was the one that had left the accident scene. Green therefore had reason to believe that Hayden himself was a hit-and-run suspect,...
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