Hayden v. State

• Decision Date: 25 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 30363,30363
• Citation: 201 N.E.2d 329,245 Ind. 591
• Parties: Charles William HAYDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 329

201 N.E.2d 329

245 Ind. 591

Charles William HAYDEN, Appellant, v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 30363.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 25, 1964.

Money, Orr, Bridwell & Fink, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Edgar Husted, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ACHOR, Chief Justice.

Appellant asserts two grounds as cause for rehearing.They are:

1.That the conviction was not sustained by sufficient evidence.

2.That appellant did not have the benefit of counsel prior to the taking of his confession which was admitted in evidence.

The issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence was fully considered in the majority opinion and does not merit further consideration.

In support of his second contention appellant relies upon the recent decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Escobedo v. Illinois(1964), 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, decided on June 22, this year.However, the facts in the Escobedo case and the case at bar are clearly distinguishable, and, therefore, that case is not controlling of the case at bar.In the Escobedo casethe court held a confession taken from a defendant to be inadmissible for the reason that he had requested counsel before making his confession, which request was not only denied him but his attorney was forcibly restrained from conferring with him.In the present casethe defendant was advised of his right to counsel at least two times but signed the incriminating statement without requesting such counsel.Thus, even under the ruling of the Escobedocase, supra, it must also be considered that appellant waived any right to counsel.

In contradiction of the fact of such waiver, appellant asserts that he cannot be charged with a waiver because of his 'tender age.'Under other circumstances, we might concur in appellant's contention, but here it is apparent from the facts in evidence that appellant was worldly wise far beyond the years of his 'tender age.'

We cannot say that the taking of appellant's confession without benefit of counsel in anywise deprived him of any constitutional right of due process or that the admission of his confession in evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.

Petition for rehearing is therefore denied.

ARTERBURN and LANDIS, JJ., concur.

JACKSON, J., concurs in the result.

MYERS, J., not participating.