Hayden v. Stone

• Decision Date: 10 July 1880
• Citation: 13 R.I. 106
• Parties: MICHAEL HAYDEN v. JONAS STONE et ux.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

13 R.I. 106

MICHAEL HAYDEN v. JONAS STONE et ux.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 10, 1880

Pleas in abatement may be followed by pleas to the merits.

A. and B. his wife made and delivered their negotiable promissory note to the plaintiff. The note was made in Massachusetts where the parties resided, and was valid there. Suit on this note was brought in Rhode Island, the writ being served on the husband by attaching his interest in the realty of his wife, on the wife by attaching her realty, and on both by attaching the wife's share of an intestate estate in the hands of an administrator. Pending the suit the husband was adjudged a bankrupt and subsequently died.

Held, that the wife being legally incapable in Rhode Island to make a promissory note, the action against her could not be maintained.

Held, further, that as in Rhode Island the husband must be made co-defendant with the wife, and there was in this case no service of the writ on the husband, the action was fatally defective.

ASSUMPSIT. Heard by the court on an agreed statement of facts.

This case was heard upon the following agreement signed by the attorneys of the litigants.

" This is a suit upon a promissory note, dated Hyde Park Massachusetts, June 1, 1875, payable to the plaintiff, Michael Hayden, or order, for $2,500, eighteen months after date, with interest at eight per cent. per annum, payable quarter annually during said term, and for such further term as said principal sum or any part thereof shall remain unpaid, and signed by the defendants, Jonas Stone and Addie E. Stone his wife.

The case is submitted to the court upon the following statement of facts and a jury trial is waived:

The defendants, Jonas Stone and Addie E. Stone his wife, made the note declared on, which was secured by mortgage upon real estate in Taney County, Missouri, which note was due and unpaid at the time this suit was commenced.

That the only service of the writ in said case was by attachment of their right, title, and interest in certain real estate in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which had descended to the defendant Addie E. Stone, as one of the heirs at law of her father, Dr. Benoni Carpenter, of said Pawtucket, and by attachment by trustee process of the personal estate of the defendants, being the share of said Addie E. Stone in the personal estate of said Benoni Carpenter, in the hands of Frederic B. Carpenter, administrator upon the estate of said Benoni, as shown by his affidavit in this cause. Notice by mail as required by statute was sent by the attaching officer to the defendants.

Since the suit was commenced Jonas Stone, one of the defendants, has been adjudged a bankrupt, and died subsequent to such adjudication. Both the plaintiff and defendants at the time said note was made and this suit was commenced resided in the State of Massachusetts.

That chapter 184 of the acts of the Legislature of Massachusetts of the year 1874 is to be considered a part of this statement, with the same effect as if specifically set forth. The declaration and pleas are made part of this case.

It is agreed that under the foregoing statement of facts the court shall decide the question of the liability of said Addie E. Stone upon said note to the plaintiff, and whether any of the property of said Addie E. Stone, in this State, is liable to the attachment in said suit shown by the officer's return on the writ."

William H. Clapp, for plaintiff.

Charles H. Parkhurst, for defendant.

POTTER J.

This is an action brought in Rhode Island against Jonas Stone and his wife, upon a promissory note executed in Massachusetts by husband and wife, both being then domiciled there.

Jonas Stone pleads in abatement that the writ was served by attaching certain land, and by garnishment of certain personal property and not otherwise; and it appears by the statement of facts that the land belonged to his wife, and the personal property was in the hands of an administrator of his father-in-law's estate. According to previous decisions^[1] this constitutes no service on the husband.

Addie E. Stone, the wife, pleads that the writ was served on her in the same manner and not otherwise; and that she had no attachable interest in either the personal or real estate.

The replication mistakes one fact which it is not material to consider, and sets forth that the defendants, by pleading the general issue, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.

The husband, after suit commenced, was adjudged bankrupt, and has since died.

That the defendant may plead in abatement and does not waive that defence by filing his pleas to the merits at the same time, provided they be subsequent in order, is settled in Gardner v. James, 5 R.I. 235.

But the main question in the case is as to the capacity or power of a married woman resident in Massachusetts to make a contract there, enforceable in this State.

The statutes of Massachusetts, of 1874, cap. 184, § 1, provide that " A married woman may… make contracts oral and written… in the same manner as if she were sole; " and § 3 provides she " may sue and be sued in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if she were sole."

As a general rule the validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the place of contract. Story Conflict of Laws, §§ 242, 280; Wharton Conflict of Laws, §§ 401, 419; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65. So with the forms of execution and solemnization. Wharton Conflict of Laws, §§ 401, 606, 676; see also Savigny and Foelix, quoted by Lawrence, Commentaries, tome iii. 265.

But there is much contrariety of decision and many exceptions made by the cases, the courts generally trying to carry into effect the intention of the parties, and sometimes to protect their own citizens from imposition, especially in the case of married women and persons under age.

But here the contract was without dispute good in Massachusetts, and the question before us is what by the law writers would be called a question of status, or the effect of the capacity to contract.

Being capable of making the contract in Massachusetts, and not capable in Rhode Island, does her capacity in Massachusetts avail her in Rhode Island, so that such contract would be enforceable here against her personal or real estate.

The civil law writers held that the capacity of the domicile followed the person everywhere, and a still older doctrine was that the capacity of the domicile of origin was not changed by a change of domicile.

But while there is great difference of opinion upon some of the points we have mentioned, there is very little upon the points which more immediately affect this case; and the reason will be apparent from the mere statement of them.

Every State has full control over property within it and over the process of its courts. It has the right to regulate the transfer of real property, stocks, and personal property within its limits; and it will not permit a foreign law to be intruded or to interfere with its own laws on those subjects. See Wharton Conflict of Laws, §§ 278, 297, 304, 334, 335, 339, 353. And a contract valid by the laws of one State cannot be enforced in another, unless such a contract made between its own citizens could be enforced there, or, in other words, it depends on the lex fori .

On any other doctrine we should have a confusion of laws in the community, some persons and acts being regulated by the local laws and some by the laws of foreign states; and we should be in the situation of some countries in the Middle Ages, where different nationalities had been intermingled by immigration, or oftener by conquest, each retaining its ancient laws.

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