Hayden v. Westfield Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-4523,13-4523 |
| Parties | DANA HAYDEN, and; DAN HAYDEN, Individually, and as husband and wife, Appellants v. WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on September 8, 2014
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
Appellants Dan and Dana Hayden ("the Haydens") appeal from three orders of the District Court: one denying their motion to join an additional defendant; one denying their motion to amend their complaint; and one denying their motion to voluntarily dismiss their complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only those facts and procedural history relevant to our conclusion.
This matter stems from an insurance dispute following a "hail and windstorm event" in Western Pennsylvania. The storm allegedly caused damage to the Haydens' roof, which allowed water to enter their home and damage the attic and interior bedrooms. At the time of the storm, the Haydens had a homeowner's insurance policy with Appellee Westfield Insurance Company ("Westfield").
The storm occurred on March 23, 2011, but the Haydens did not report any damage to Westfield until nearly six months later. Before anyone from Westfield inspected their home, the Haydens removed plaster and carpeting from their attic and from rooms on the second and third floors of their home. After a Westfield adjuster visited the property, Westfield decided that the Haydens' claim was better treated as twoindividual claims: one for the hail damage to the roof and one for the resulting water infiltration. Westfield then issued the Haydens a payment for the hail damage totaling $741.63 (after a $1,000 deductible), but continued its investigation of the water infiltration claim.
On March 1, 2012, the Haydens filed suit against Westfield in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, asserting claims of breach of contract, statutory insurance bad faith, and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("CPL"). Westfield removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds.
Ten months later, the Haydens filed a motion to join two additional defendants: Lisa Brown and Duncan Insurance Agency, the insurance agent and agency through which the Haydens filed their insurance claim.1 Soon after, Westfield filed a motion to compel discovery from the Haydens. The District Court ruled on both motions on February 13, 2013. First, it denied the Haydens' motion for joinder, noting "the sparseness of [the Haydens'] Motion and supporting papers, and their complete failure to cite to or rely upon any applicable legal authority in support of their Motion." App. 32. The Court found that denial of joinder was proper for several reasons, including the effect of joinder on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).Second, the District Court granted Westfield's motion to compel discovery, although the Haydens did not comply before the close of discovery in February 2013.
As litigation continued, Westfield arranged to have an engineer inspect the Haydens' roof. The Haydens later alleged that during this process, Westfield hired Disaster Restoration Services ("DRS") to replace a tarp on the Haydens' roof and DRS negligently replaced the tarp with an underlayment, which required an excessive amount of nails. This allegedly caused enough damage to force the Haydens to install a new roof.
On April 1, 2013, Westfield filed a motion for summary judgment. The Haydens opposed summary judgment on their breach of contract and bad faith claims, but not on their CPL claim. Furthermore, the Haydens did not dispute any of the facts Westfield asserted in its Concise Statement of Material Facts, leading the District Court to treat those facts as admitted.2
With Westfield's summary judgment motion pending before the District Court, the Haydens filed two motions on May 23, 2013. First, the Haydens moved to join DRS, a Pennsylvania corporation, as an additional defendant ("Motion to Join DRS"). Second, they moved for leave to amend their complaint to add a negligence claim against DRS—but not Westfield—and to add allegations about the damage DRS allegedly caused totheir roof to their breach of contract and bad faith claims against Westfield ("Motion to Amend").
The District Court denied those motions on July 11, 2013. The Court held:
Because the claims to be asserted against such proposed Additional Defendant (1) are not otherwise within the jurisdiction of this Court, (2) are not part of a common nucleus of operative fact with the original claims, (3) the denial of joinder will not prejudice the Plaintiffs' ability to assert them in state court, (4) the Additional Defendant to be joined by amendment has not been alleged to have had anything to do with the breach of contract/bad faith claims central to the original action, and (5) the Motions come late in the process of this case with no imperative reason that they be asserted in this civil action, the Motions for Joinder of Additional Defendant and for Leave to Amend, are therefore, denied.
App. 4-5. A month later, with the motion for summary judgment still pending, the Haydens filed a new lawsuit against Westfield and DRS in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their federal complaint ("Motion to Dismiss").
The District Court denied the Haydens' Motion to Dismiss on October 25, 2013, finding that allowing the Haydens to "press the eject button and dismiss their motion at this late juncture would markedly prejudice Westfield," and that the motion "evidence[d] a backdoor attempt to shop for . . . a more favorable forum in state court." App. 10, 12. The District Court also granted Westfield's motion for summary judgment.3
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review each of the District Court's orders for abuse of discretion. See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009); Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 863 (3d Cir. 1990).
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether review of the District Court's July 11, 2013 orders denying the Haydens' Motion to Join DRS and Motion to Amend (the "July 11 orders") is proper. Westfield contends that the Haydens waived any right to review the July 11 orders because the Haydens included only the order issued on October 25, 2013 (the "October 25 order"), in their Notice of Appeal. We disagree.
Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states that a notice of appeal must "designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from," Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), we "liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3(c)," Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1990); Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, we have held review of orders not specified in the notice of appeal is appropriate where: "(1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified order, (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent, and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues." Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 777 (citing Polonski v.Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Each of these criteria is satisfied here. First, although Westfield argues that the July 11 orders were not connected to the October 25 order, the motions denied in each order were the means by which the Haydens sought to achieve the same end: pursuing claims against both Westfield and DRS in one forum. Had the District Court granted the Haydens' Motion to Join DRS and Motion to Amend, it is doubtful the Haydens would have filed their Motion to Dismiss.4 The District Court recognized this, describing the three motions as part of a "daisy chain" of filings stretching back to the Haydens' first failed motion for joinder, all of which had the apparent goal of defeating federal jurisdiction. App. 10 n.2. Whether or not that was the goal, there is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders. Second, the Haydens' intent to appeal the July 11 orders is apparent from their opening brief. See Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 777 (); Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (). And third, Westfield evidently had a full opportunity to brief the issues and does not argue that it was prejudiced. Therefore, review of the July 11 orders is appropriate.
The Haydens argue that the District Court abused its discretion by denying their Motion to Join DRS. A plaintiff generally may join defendants in an action if the plaintiff (1) asserts a right to relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, and (2) "any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B). The Haydens contend that Rule 20's requirements were satisfied because Westfield hired DRS to replace the tarp on the Haydens' roof so Westfield's expert...
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