Hayes Freight Lines v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 02 March 1948
• Docket Number: 28299.
• Citation: 77 N.E.2d 580,226 Ind. 1
• Parties: HAYES FREIGHT LINES, Inc., et al. v. WILSON.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

77 N.E.2d 580

226 Ind. 1

HAYES FREIGHT LINES, Inc., et al. v. WILSON.

No. 28299.

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 2, 1948

Appeal from Warrick Circuit Court; Eldo W. Wood Special Judge.

Carl M. Gray and Edward L. Waddle, both of Petersburg, and Leonard Ashley, of Boonville, for appellants.

McDonald & McDonald and Sanford Trippet, all of Princeton, for appellee.

O'MALLEY Judge.

The appellee commenced this action against the appellants, Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., Loren T. Sinclair, and Carl H. Douglas. In her complaint she charged that on September 25, 1943, she and her mother were riding southward on Indiana Highway No 57, in an automobile being driven by her husband, Carl Block. It was alleged that this automobile was proceeding from the town of Mackey toward the city of Evansville at about 8:30 p m. and that at the same time the defendants were operating three tractor and trailer trucks north along the same road from Evansville. The complaint further alleged that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding met the trucks at a point near the intersection of a highway known as Base Line Road and State Highway No. 57; that the defendants were operating their trucks and trailers in a careless and negligent manner, by driving with bright and blinding lights and failing to dim the same when meeting the automobile in which appellee was riding; by operating on the left half of the highway which was provided for traffic going in the opposite direction and failing to yield one-half of the highway to the automobile in which the appellee was riding; by operating at such speed that the trucks swayed from side to side and onto the side provided for southbound traffic; and by following too close to the truck preceding and thus the trucks were spaced less than 150 feet apart as they proceeded on the highway. The complaint then charged that as a result of each of such acts of negligence the appellee was severely injured and thus suffered damage in the sum of $25,000.

The evidence most favorable to the appellee was to the effect that there was some swaying of the trucks; that the speed of the trucks was from 45 to 50 miles per hour; that the trucks were being driven on the wrong side of the road to the extent of two feet; that the lights on the trucks were blinding and that the husband of appellee signalled for dimmers but that the drivers of the trucks did not dim the truck lights; that the first truck started to pull over on the west side of the road when about 30 feet from the car in which the appellee was riding; that appellee's husband was driving from 30 to 35 miles per hour and had both headlights burning; that the first truck sideswiped the car in which appellee was riding, the contact being made between the left side near the rear end of the truck and the left front part of the automobile; that this collision caused the car in which the appellee was riding to swerve to the left and to strike the second truck in a headon collision; and that the trucks were spaced from 30 to 50 feet apart at the time of the accident.

By stipulation it was agreed that the defendant, Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., owned the first two trucks, and that Loren T. Sinclair and Carl H. Douglas were the drivers respectively of the first and second trucks. The evidence disclosed that the third truck also belonged to the same corporation.

The evidence which was not contradicted in any way was that the driver of the first truck felt the impact of the contact between the car and his truck and that he then looked in the rearview mirror and saw the second truck and the automobile collide; that he did not stop his truck at once because he feared that as a result of the collision the second truck might not be under control; that the second truck did not travel to exceed 12 feet after the contact with the automobile because the front wheels were knocked from under it and the front end went down; that the second truck was over on the berm to its right when it came to rest excepting the left rear wheel which was two feet over on the pavement; that the third truck stopped behind the second one and then started and went around the second one and parked close to the rear of the first truck; and that all three trucks were empty. There was evidence that the three trucks were bound for Marion, Indiana.

The giving of appellee's instruction number 9 is the first claimed error treated in appellants' brief. This instruction was drawn under § 47-2019, Burns' 1940 Replacement, and in effect told the jury that if the trucks were being driven in such manner that truck No. 2 was less than 150 feet from truck No. 1, and truck No. 3 was less than 150 feet from truck No. 2, 'then such driver, or drivers, were following too closely together, and were driving in violation of said statute.' It further told the jury that if they found that such violation of the statute contributed proximately to the collision and resulting injuries, their verdict should be for the plaintiff. There can be no question that this instruction stated the law. The question is whether or not it was proper to give such instruction under the facts disclosed in this case.

In Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 1914, 182 Ind. 593, 601, 106 N.E. 365, 368, Ann.Cas.1917A, 474, the court had before it a cause of action for damages caused by the collapse of a building under construction. In that case, at the time that the building contemplated in the original plans was about completed the owner caused changes to be made, an additional story was added on the plans, and while the additional story was under construction the building collapsed. No evidence was given as to the cause of the collapse except that no permit was secured for the change in the plans and that the addition was made and construction thereof commenced without the consent or knowledge of the building inspector, all of which was in violation of an ordinance. The appellee in that case claimed he did not need to show the proximate cause of the collapse of the building because it was governed by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court held that a causal connection must be shown between the negligence charged and the injury complained of. In its opinion the court said: 'A violation of penal statutes constitutes negligence per se, but to make such negligence actionable it must be a proximate cause of the injury for which the action is brought. * * * The violation of a statute or ordinance raises no liability for an injury which another may have suffered, unless the injury was in some material degree the result of such violation.'

The great weight of authority seems to be in accord with the rule announced above.

In 38 Am.Jur., § 166, p. 837, on negligence, it is said: 'It is not material whether the negligence complained of in an action was the violation of a duty imposed by the common law or the violation of one imposed by a statute or ordinance, so far as concerns the requirement that negligence must have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to warrant a recovery. Regardless of whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is regarded as negligence, negligence per se, or evidence of negligence, the plaintiff, to be entitled to recover, must show a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the statutory prohibition or mandate. In other words, he must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury.'

In some instances the question of proximate cause or causal connection is approached by stating the rule as follows: 'But for the defendant's act the consequence in question would not have occurred.' 20 Cal.L.R. 229, 235, and authorities cited. That test is also called the 'sine qua non' or 'but for' rule, and is of service in making a test for a causal connection.

Unless it can be said that without the act of negligence under consideration in instruction number 9 no damage would have resulted, there is no connecting cause between the negligence and the happening that caused the damage and about which complaint is made.

In § 107, p. 251, of Harper on Torts, it is said: 'Nowhere in the law is one liable for harms not caused by his conduct or the conduct of one for whose acts and omissions he is responsible, nor indeed is he liable for all damages actually produced by his acts.' Section 109, p. 253, of the same work uses the following language: 'Before any question of proximate or legal cause can arise, it must first appear that the defendant's acts were the actual cause or cause in fact of the harm in question. There can be no legal or proximate cause unless there is causal connection in fact.' See 27 Mich.L.R., p. 116.

It has been aptly said in 38 Am.Jur., § 63, p. 715, on negligence, that: 'An injury cannot be attributed to a cause unless, without it, the injury would not have occurred. Accordingly, the mere concurrence of one's negligence with the proximate and efficient cause of a disaster will not impose liability upon him; * * *.'

The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, § 431, p. 1159, contains this enlightening language: 'The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.'

The comment in that work contains this language:

'a. * * *. In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. Except as stated in § 432(2), this is necessary but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence must also be a substantial factor as well as an actual factor in...