Hayes v. Bayer Cropscience, LP
| Decision Date | 05 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-07588 |
| Citation | 139 F.Supp.3d 795 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | Rodney Hayes, Plaintiff, v. Bayer Cropscience, LP, et al., Defendants. |
David M. Adkins, The Adkins Law Firm, Hurricane, WV, for Plaintiff.
David S. Russo, Joseph M. Price, Mark J. Grigoraci, Robinson & McElwee, Charleston, WV, for Defendant.
JOSEPH R. GOODWIN
Pending before the court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand this Case to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia [ECF No. 10]. For reasons more fully discussed herein, the plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED.
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Bayer Cropscience, LP ("Bayer"), at its Institute, West Virginia, facility. Compl. ¶ 13 [ECF No. 1-1]. The plaintiff worked as a chemical operator for Bayer and was a union member covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Bayer and District 54 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, effective June 11, 2012, through June 14, 2015. Compl. ¶ 13; see also Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2 [ECF No. 8]. The defendant, Steve Hedrick, is a vice president for Bayer and is the top executive at Bayer's facility in Institute, West Virginia. Compl. ¶ 3.
Around the middle of 2012, Bayer announced it would be discontinuing certain production lines at its facility and some 220 employees were expected to lose their employment as a consequence. Compl. ¶ 10. Bayer, after negotiating with the plaintiff's union, decided that it would offer a Voluntary Severance Plan, which was intended to lessen the negative financial impact on certain affected Bayer employees. Id. ¶ 11; see also Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2. The terms and conditions of the Voluntary Severance Plan are spelled out in Appendix D ("Layoff Allowance Plan") of the CBA and Letter Agreement IX ("Separation and Retention Agreement"), which were incorporated into the CBA with union approval. Notice of Removal ¶ 10(b) [ECF No. 1]; see also App. D 54–56; Ltr. Agr. 89–90 [ECF No. 1-2].
On June 27, 2012, Mr. Hedrick issued a memorandum to all employees at the Bayer Institute Industrial Park. The subject of the memorandum regarded "Employee Lay-off Timing." Mem. to Emps. 1 [ECF No. 1-1]. The plaintiff believes that the memorandum "promised that Bayer would pay the [p]laintiff $25,000 for voluntarily resigning his employment position if he stayed until at least July 30, 2012." Compl. ¶ 15. Acting on his belief, the plaintiff advised Bayer via an email communication on July 1, 2012, that he intended to resign his position effective August 2, 2012. Compl. ¶ 17; see also Pl.'s Email, July 1, 2012 [ECF No. 1-1]. Soon afterward, a representative of Bayer informed the plaintiff that Bayer "could not commit to pay the [p]laintiff $25,000 by August 2 and further advised that it could not commit to August 2 as an acceptable date of departure for the [p]laintiff." Compl. ¶ 19.
The plaintiff filed his Complaint against the defendants in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, on April 21, 2015, alleging the defendants violated the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA"). Compl. ¶¶ 26–30. The plaintiff claims entitlement to $25,000 in compensatory damages; $75,000 in liquidated damages under the WPCA; and attorney fees. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
The defendants timely removed this action to federal court on June 11, 2015, asserting this court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
, to wit: "[T]he provisions of [the WPCA] are completely preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 185 [Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) ], and 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) [Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) ]." Notice of Removal ¶ 1. The plaintiff filed his Motion to Remand and supporting memorandum of law on June 29, 2015, claiming that the LMRA and ERISA statutes are not implicated because he could rely entirely on the June 27, 2012 memorandum from Mr. Hedrick to support his claim under the state WPCA. Pl.'s Mot. Remand 1, ECF No. 10; see also Pl.'s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Remand 4–11 [ECF No. 11]. The defendants filed their response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand on July 6, 2015. Defs.' Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Remand [ECF No. 13].
A defendant may remove any case filed in state court over which federal courts have original jurisdiction to the district court of the United States for the district and division within which the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
. After a defendant has removed the case to federal court, the defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc. , 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994).
A federal court has jurisdiction over a removed case if it would have had original jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. For purposes of § 1331, an action arises under the laws of the United States if a federal claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). This is known as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id. The Supreme Court has determined that "whether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose." Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson , 234 U.S. 74, 75–76, 34 S.Ct. 724, 58 L.Ed. 1218 (1914) ).
There is an exception, however, to the well-pleaded complaint rule. When a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete preemption, the state claim can be removed. This is so because when the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.
(citations omitted).
In order to determine whether the plaintiff's claims are preempted, thereby giving rise to federal question jurisdiction, I must first distinguish between "conflict preemption" under ERISA and "complete preemption." Under conflict preemption, which is also known as "ordinary" preemption, Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. , 292 F.3d 181, 186–87 (4th Cir.2002)
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ). In terms of ordinary preemption, state laws conflict with ERISA, and are therefore preempted by ERISA, if they "relate to" an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). In those types of situations, ERISA conflict preemption may be used as a defense to a state-law action, but it does not provide a basis for removal to federal court.
In contrast to ordinary preemption, complete preemption embodies an actual federal jurisdictional doctrine. "Underlying the complete preemption doctrine is the notion that the federal policies implicated by a federal statute are sufficiently important to override the plaintiff's effort to rely on state law." Custer v. Sweeney , 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir.1996)
. Complete preemption exists where "Congress ‘so completely preempts a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.’ " Darcangelo , 292 F.3d at 187 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 481 U.S. at 63–64, 107 S.Ct. 1542 ). Accordingly, this doctrine "trumps the plaintiff's characterization of his claim" for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule "by ‘converting an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim.’ " Custer , 89 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 481 U.S. at 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542 ). Under ERISA, "[t]he only state law claims properly removable to federal court are those that are ‘completely preempted’ by ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)." Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc. , 338 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Darcangelo , 292 F.3d at 187 ). Accordingly, in order for this court to properly exercise jurisdiction over this case, ERISA must completely preempt the plaintiff's state-law claims.
The plaintiff's claim cannot be preempted by ERISA because the benefit to which he is claiming entitlement does not require an ongoing administrative plan to satisfy the employer's obligation. The plaintiff in this case is not alleging a claim under Bayer's Separation and Retention Agreement, Letter Agreement IX, which the record demonstrates allows for a qualifying employee to choose among several plan options. Ltr. Agr. 89–90. Instead, the plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a one-time, lump-sum severance payment. While the plaintiff appears to intentionally avoid direct reference to the CBA's layoff allowance provisions, the origins of any promise to pay a lump sum severance amount upon the manifestation of a triggering event is of no consequence under an ERISA preemption analysis because the Supreme Court has determined that such onetime, lump sum obligations do not create "benefit plans" under ERISA:
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...references will not operate to defeat complete preemption in this case. Further, this court's reasoning in Hayes v. Bayer Cropscience, LP, 139 F. Supp. 3d 795 (S.D. W. Va. 2015), the published companion to Swiger, cited by Kroger, is persuasive. The Swiger and Hayes opinions, each issued by......