Hayes v. Board of Regents of Kentucky State University, 410.
Decision Date | 03 August 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 410.,410. |
Citation | 362 F. Supp. 1172 |
Parties | Richard HAYES, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF REGENTS OF KENTUCKY STATE UNIVERSITY, a body corporate, and Carl Hill, President of Kentucky State University, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Robert Allen Sedler, Richard N. Rose, Lexington, Ky., for plaintiff.
Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Com. of Ky., Frankfort, Ky., for defendants.
Tarrant, Combs, Blackwell & Bullitt, Louisville, Ky., for intervening defendants.
This class action challenges the right of Kentucky State University to classify as nonresidents for tuition purposes students who have been admitted to the franchise in this State. The plaintiff, a registered Kentucky voter and student at Kentucky State University, does not claim that the procedure utilized by defendants for ascertaining residence is improper, or attack the right of the State to distinguish between residents and nonresidents. Rather, it is argued that the determination of domicil made by the voting authorities is binding upon college officials and that the University's classification of student-voters as nonresidents is constitutionally impermissible.
The record is before the court for decision on two motions: plaintiff's for summary judgment, and defendants' for dismissal as a class action. Plaintiff urges that the University's conduct is improper as a matter of law and, as there are no controverted facts, the case is ripe for summary judgment. While the purported scope of the motion for dismissal is less than clear, it is apparently grounded upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), relating to motions for failure to state an actionable claim, as well as Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1), concerning the maintenance of this suit as a class action. The defendants' criticism of the propriety of this class reveals a misunderstanding of the characteristics of this form of action; however, the reliance placed upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is well-founded. This court has concluded that for two reasons this action must be dismissed.
Plaintiff contends that the determination of domicil by voting authorities is conclusive upon college officials in assessing tuition rates. This proposition is tenable only if "domicil" bears a fixed meaning and composition for all applications. If the scope of this term varies according to the purpose served, Kentucky State University is obviously not bound by the identification of "domicil" made by other agencies.
Arguing that the meaning of this term is static, plaintiff places considerable reliance upon Restatement (Second) of Conflicts Section 11, Comment o, Paragraph 1, at pp. 47-48:
These Restatement views have been subjected to criticism by one of the Reporters who argues that different agencies with varying emphases and motivations will legitimately adopt conflicting definitions. W. L. M. Reese, "Does Domicile Bear A Single Meaning?", 55 Columbia Law Review 589 (1955). Further, this language should be supplemented by Paragraph 2 of the same Comment:
Similarly, this court discussed domicil "for voting purposes" in connection with its analysis of franchise discrimination against students. Bright v. Baesler, E. D.Ky., 336 F.Supp. 527 (1971). See also Ruoff v. Brownell, D.C., 14 F.R.D. 371 (1953).
The courts tend to regard the place of voting as one of several relevant factors to be considered in attempting to ascertain the litigant's domicil for a particular purpose. In Dist. of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329 (1941), the Supreme Court enumerated and discussed various indicia of domicil, including: the individual's intent; nature and place of employment; type of housing; financial arrangements, and social ties. Voting played a significant, albeit limited, role:
Id. at 456-457, 62 S.Ct. at 310.
Other decisions have followed this reasoning. Ascertaining domicil for jurisdictional purposes, the court in Lyons v. Borden, D.Hawaii, 200 F.Supp. 956, 958 (1961), warned against according excessive weight to the place of voting.
"A careful study of the authorities indicates that even the solemn acts of registering under oath to vote, and voting, in a new jurisdiction, do not have a conclusive effect — do not constitute the absolute estoppel to claim retention of the previous domicile — contended for by counsel for the defendant."
In Mallon v. Lutz, E.D.Mich., 217 F. Supp. 454 (1963), a diversity determination was conducted by examining numerous factors; voting was considered but not given conclusive weight. While the court in Hadnott v. Amos, M.D.Ala., 320 F.Supp. 107 (1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 968, 91 S.Ct. 1189, 28 L.Ed.2d 318 (1972), stated that every individual has only one domicil, the decision considered a number of circumstances in that identification. Analyzing this concept for tax purposes, the Kentucky Court in Pettit's Ex'x v. City of Lexington, supra, weighed but did not accord decisive effect to voting domicil. See also Burr's Adm'r v. Hatter, supra.
The plaintiff in West v. Bowers, 502 P.2d 270 (Or.1972), relied on numerous local involvements, including voting, to buttress her claim that she was improperly denied resident student status. Noting that variance with the Restatement's unitary application of "domicil" is not necessarily unconstitutional, the Oregon Court held that contrary determinations may reflect the purpose served by this concept:
"There is nothing inconsistent about election officials having determined petitioner is a resident for one purpose based on the statutory criteria, and Oregon State University officials having determined petitioner is not a resident for another purpose based on different criteria." Id. at 276.
These authorities manifest that domicil is not susceptible to a rigid and arbitrary definition. The term will display varying hues as its application shifts. Consequently, there is no reason to presume that a determination of...
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