Hayes v. Capitol Buick Co.

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BANKS, Judge.
• Citation: Hayes v. Capitol Buick Co., 119 Conn. 372, 176 A. 885 (Conn. 1935)
• Decision Date: 21 January 1935
• Parties: HAYES, v. CAPITOL BUICK CO. (two cases).

176 A. 885

119 Conn. 372

HAYES, v. CAPITOL BUICK CO. (two cases).

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 21, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John Rufus Booth Judge.

Action to recover rent, and one for specific performance of the agreement to furnish a surety bond securing the payment of rent, by Mathew J. Hayes against the Capitol Buick Company brought to the superior court and tried to the court. Judgment for the plaintiff in both cases, and appeal by the defendant.

No error.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS JJ.

Ufa E. Guthrie, of Hartford, for appellants.

Josiah H. Peck, of Hartford, and Donald Gaffney, of New Britain, for appellee.

BANKS Judge.

On October 2, 1928, the defendant, whose name has since been changed to " The Hartford Buick Company,‘ leased from the Hayes Construction Company a portion of a building in New Britain, suitable for the display, sale, and repair of automobiles, for a period of ten years from November 1, 1928. The Hayes Construction Company subsequently conveyed its interest in the premises to the plaintiff. The defendant occupied the premises until July, 1932, when it ceased to use them except for the storage of some office furniture and equipment which were removed in October, 1933. It paid rent up to and including October, 1933, but has paid no rent since then. The plaintiff brought suit in December, 1933, to recover two months' rent, and by amendment of the complaint sought also to recover rent claimed to have accrued subsequent to the bringing of the action and up to April 1, 1934. The defense interposed to this action was that the premises had, without the fault or neglect of the defendant, become unfit for occupancy, and that the defendant was therefore absolved from liability to pay rent by virtue of the provisions of section 5023 of the General Statutes, which quoted in the footnote.^[1]

The finding, which is not subject to material correction, discloses the following facts in addition to those already stated, relevant to this defense: After the defendant closed the premises in July, 1932, two or three panes of glass in the rear of the building were broken, and as time went on the number of broken panes increased, so that there were about seventy in January, 1933, and at the time of the trial, April, 1934, slightly over two hundred. Both parties assumed that the glass was broken by boys throwing stones, which it was not practicable for either plaintiff or the defendant to prevent while the premises remained unoccupied, and there was no practical advantage to be gained by replacing the broken glass so long as this conditiion obtained. The premises could not be satisfactorily heated unless the broken glass was replaced. On December 6, 1932, the defendants wrote the plaintiff, calling attention to the necessity of protection of water pipes and other fixtures in the building, which also served an adjacent building owned by the plaintiff, against freezing, " made necessary by our recent closing and the fact that the premises are to remain closed for an indefinite time.‘ On November 17, 1933, the attorneys for the defendant accompanied by a letter stating that the defendant had elected to terminate the lease on the ground that the premises were untentable. The action of the defendant in vacating the building and refusing to pay rent after November 1, 1933, was not the result of the broken glass, but because of unfavorable business conditions. The court found that the leased premises were at all times in tentable condition, and that the plaintiff was under no duty to repair the broken glass until notified by the defendant of the latter's intention to actually occupy the premises.

Even though the premises became unfit for occupancy within the contemplation of the statute, that fact gave the defendant no right of election to terminate the lease. Under the terms of the present statute, while the tenant's obligation to pay rent is suspended, he no longer has an option to terminate the lease, and the lessor may so deal with the premises, if he acts within a reasonable time, as to make the lease again effective. Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 306, 158 A. 891. The claim of the defendant that its liability to pay rent, assumed to have been suspended by the untenatable condition of the building, cannot be revived because the plaintiff has failed to repair within a reasonable time, is not tenable. The requirement that the building must be repaired within a reasonable time is in order that the tenant may not suffer by reason of delay in restoring to him the use and occupation of the premises which he has leased. Here the defendant had not only vacated the premises, but had notified the plaintiff that they would remain closed for an indefinite period. Putting in the glass would be of no practical advantage to the defendant, and delay in putting it in would cause it no damage during the period while it voluntarily left the building unoccupied. If there were any duty upon the plaintiff to make repairs, the defendant, having notified the plaintiff that the building would remain unoccupied indefinitely, is not in a position to advance any claims based upon his failure to make them within a reasonable time. Miller v. Benton, 55 Conn. 529, 548, 13 A. 678.

The court correctly held that the defendant's obligation to pay rent was not suspended by an untenantable condition of the building within the meaning of the statute. The purpose of the statute is to mitigage the harshness of the common-law rule under which, though a tenant had been deprived of the use of the leased premises because, without fault of his own, they had become unfit for occupancy, he was still bound by his covenant to pay. The statute was designed to relieve the tenant of the burden of paying rent after it had become impossible for him to use and occupy the premises...