Hayes v. Colchester Mills

• Decision Date: 31 January 1894
• Citation: 37 A. 269,69 Vt. 1
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: HAYES v. COLCHESTER MILLS.

37 A. 269

69 Vt. 1

HAYES

v. COLCHESTER MILLS.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Chittenden.

Jan. Term, 1894.

Exceptions from Chittenden county court; Tyler, Judge.

Action on the case by William B. Hayes, by next friend, against the Colchester Mills, for personal injuries. Defendant pleaded the general issue, and there was a trial by jury at the April term, 1893. There were verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Affirmed.

C. M. Wilds, Seneca Hazelton, and E. R. Hard, for plaintiff.

W. L. Burnap, Henry Ballard, and H. F. Wolcott, for defendant.

MUNSON, J. The plaintiff, a boy of 14. was one of several helpers employed in the defendant's spinning room. He lost an arm while at work under the immediate direction of one Sturgis, who was mending a belt which hung from a revolving shaft. The plaintiff was standing near the top of a step-ladder, holding the belt from the shaft, to prevent it from crawling, when he was caught by the belt in some manner, and drawn over the shaft. He had been employed in this room about two years. His evidence tended to show that his ordinary duties were to sweep the floor, pick up waste, change bobbins, mend broken threads, and occasionally oil and clean some parts of the machinery when it was not running; that up to this time he had not been called upon to render such service as he was engaged in when injured, nor assisted in mending a belt, nor made use of a stepladder; that Sturgis was the second hand in the spinning room, and had the oversight of the machinery, and the immediate charge of the helpers, and entire charge of the room when the first hand was absent from it, as was the case at the time of the accident; that Sturgis generally hired the helpers, and set them at work, and discharged them if dissatisfied, but that the first hand could retain them notwithstanding Sturgis' action if he thought best. The shaft from which this belt was hanging was the main shaft, elevated 13 feet above the floor, and having 300 revolutions a minute. Attached to this shaft was a drum 4 feet in diameter, which was connected by a 12-inch belt with the gearing of the water power beneath. There was a space of 5 or 6 feet between the drum and the wall of the building. The stepladder was set up in this space, by the side of the drum and main belt, and about a foot from them. It was a stepladder of the ordinary construction, 12 feet high, somewhat worn, and not entirely firm. There was nothing by which the plaintiff could steady himself but the ladder. The rapid motion of the drum and connecting belt produced a considerable movement of the air where the ladder stood. It was not claimed that the plaintiff came in contact with either the drum or the main belt. The evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that, on going up the ladder, he became frightened, and returned to the foot of the ladder, and told Sturgis he did not want to stay up there, for fear he would be hurt; and that Sturgis thereupon clapped his hands together, and told him with an oath to go up, or take his hat and go home; and that upon this he went up the ladder again, and received his injury. The case was submitted to the Jury on the theory that there was evidence tending to show that Sturgis was negligent in requiring of the plaintiff a dangerous service, not suited to his capacity, and in failing to give him such advice and instructions as the case required; and that the negligence of Sturgis in these respects was the negligence of the defendant. The defendant insists that there was no evidence tending to show negligence in the respects claimed, and that, if there was any negligence on the part of Sturgis, it was the negligence of a fellow servant.

It is well settled that one who engages in a dangerous employment as the servant of another takes upon himself all the risks which are ordinarily incident to that employment, and that among the risks thus assumed are those which arise from the negligence of a fellow servant it is also true that one who is engaged with another in the same employment is not divested of the character of a fellow servant by the mere fact that he has authority to direct the other in his work. A minor, even if a child of tender years, is held to be within the application of these general rules. But in the case of young persons their effect is modified by other rules, which impose special duties upon the employer, in view of the inexperience and want of judgment of servants of this class. It is the duty of one who employs an immature and inexperienced person for a dangerous service to explain to him the perils incident to his work, and instruct him how to avoid them. But the giving of proper instructions will not relieve an employer from liability to a child, if the work required of him was not within the scope of his employment, and not such as ought to have been required of a person of his capacity.

The plaintiff was not engaged for the performance of any specific work. He was to do such general work in the spinning room as was suited to his capacity. His engagement contemplated the undertaking of more difficult work as he became fitted to do it it is evident that this is not a case in which it can be said, as matter of law, that the service the plaintiff was called upon to render was or was not such as it was his contract duty to perform. This new service had come within the line of his employment if his advancing years and experience had prepared him to undertake it. It had not come within the line of his employment if it was still beyond his capacity. It was therefore proper for the court to treat the question of the defendant's negligence in requiring the service as depending simply upon the plaintiff's capacity. If this service was beyond the plaintiff's capacity, and so outside the scope of his employment, he did not assume the risks attendant upon it A person of mature years might have been held to have assumed them by consenting to do the work; but the rights of a child are not permitted to depend upon his ability to discriminate promptly as to the work required of him, or to refuse obedience to the command of his superior. This limitation of the plaintiff's risk renders the doctrine of fellow servant inapplicable. In entering the...