Hayes v. Colvin

Decision Date08 October 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 14-129 SECTION "J" (2)
PartiesGERALD ANTHONY HAYES v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Gerald Anthony Hayes, seeks judicial review pursuant to Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act") of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income benefits ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1382c. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.2(B).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hayes filed his applications for DIB and SSI on September 1, 2011, alleging disability beginning December 15, 2010, due to pins in his right leg, asthma, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis in his hands and legs, and surgery on his left leg. (Tr. 113-26, 170). After his claims were denied at the agency level, he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on September 5, 2012. The ALJ issued a decision denying the application for benefits on October 26, 2012. (Tr. 14-22). After the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on November 15, 2013,the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of this court's review. (Tr. 1-3).

Plaintiff filed a timely memorandum of facts and law. Record Doc. No. 12. Defendant filed a timely reply memorandum. Record Doc. No. 13.

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ made the following errors:

A. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding.
B. The ALJ failed to consider Medical-Vocational Guideline 201.10.
III. ALJ'S FINDINGS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Hayes meets the insured status requirements for DIB through June 30, 2012.
2. He has severe impairments consisting of pins in the right leg, asthma, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis in hands and legs, and status post surgery on left leg.
3. He has the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except he can lift/carry 20 pounds maximum and 10 pounds frequently; walk/stand six hours in an eight-hour day in increments of 30 minutes at a time; sit up to six-plus hours in an eight-hour day in increments of 45 to 60 minutes at a time; needs to be able to change positions after the times indicated; can stoop occasionally; can grasp, turn and hold; can use his fingers for precise work; has difficulty completing work tasks in a normal work day at a consistent pace; has difficulty maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; should avoid dust/fumes/gases; and cannot climb stairs.
4. Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. However, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptomsare not entirely credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
5. Hayes cannot return to his past relevant work as a brick mason and cement mason, which was heavy, skilled work.
6. Plaintiff was 51 years old and closely approaching advanced age on the alleged disability onset date. He has a limited education and is able to communicate in English.
7. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework supports a finding that Hayes is not disabled, whether or not he has transferable job skills.
8. Considering his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Hayes can perform, such as information clerk and general office clerk.
9. Plaintiff has not been under a disability from December 15, 2010, the alleged onset date, through the date of the decision.

(Tr. 15-20).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Standards of Review

The function of this court on judicial review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the final decision of the Commissioner as trier of fact and whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate legal standards in evaluating the evidence. Richard ex rel. Z.N.F. v. Astrue, 480 F. App'x 773, 776 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.2005)); Stringer v. Astrue, 465 F. App'x 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 716 (5th Cir. 2002)). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Richard ex rel. Z.N.F., 480 F. App'x at 776; Stringer, 465 F. App'x at 363-64; Perez, 415 F.3d at 461. This court may not reweigh the evidence in the record, try the issues de novo or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, even if the evidence weighs against the Commissioner's decision. Halterman ex rel. Halterman v. Colvin, No. 12-31099, 2013 WL 5913945, at *2 (5th Cir. May 9, 2013) (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)); Stringer, 465 F. App'x at 364. The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence. Luckey v. Astrue, 458 F. App'x 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)); Newton, 209 F.3d at 452.

The ALJ is entitled to make any finding that is supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether other conclusions are also permissible. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). Despite this court's limited function, it must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached and whether substantial evidence supports it. Joubert v. Astrue, 287 F. App'x 380, 382 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Perez, 415 F.3d at 461). Any findings of fact by the Commissioner that aresupported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Ray v. Barnhart, 163 F. App'x 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 390); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.

To be considered disabled and eligible for SSI or DIB,1 plaintiff must show that he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 to 404.1599 & appendices, §§ 416.901 to 416.998 (2012). The regulations include a five-step evaluation process for determining whether an impairment prevents a person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.2 Id. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;Alexander v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 719, 720 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 2007)); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461. The five-step inquiry terminates if the Commissioner finds at any step that the claimant is or is not disabled. Id.

The claimant has the burden of proof under the first four parts of the inquiry. If he successfully carries this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other substantial gainful employment is available in the national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. When the Commissioner shows that the claimant is capable of engaging in alternative employment, the burden of proof shifts back to the claimant to rebut this finding. Alexander, 412 F. App'x 720-21; Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.

The court weighs four elements of proof when determining whether there is substantial evidence of disability: "'(1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history.'" Chrisner v. Astrue, 249 F. App'x 354, 356 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991)); accord Perez, 415 F.3d at 463.

B. Factual Background

Hayes testified that he was 53 years old, had completed the seventh grade and can read, write and do simple arithmetic. (Tr. 29). He said he used to have a driver's license, but he stopped driving and let his license expire because he gets dizzy when he takes his medicine and his hands lock up. He stated that he worked as a brick mason and also poured and finished concrete along with that job. (Tr. 30). He testified that he stopped working in December 2010.

Plaintiff said he has high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma, arthritis and gout. He stated that his doctors told him to avoid the sun. He testified that he has arthritis in his hands, ankles and feet, and gout in both of his feet and hands.

Hayes stated that he was in motor vehicle accidents in August 2011 and January 2012. (Tr. 31). He said that he had surgery on his left ankle after the first accident and that both his ankles swell. He testified that he never had recommended surgery on his left ankle to remove the screws because he was told that Medicaid would not pay for it. (Tr. 32).

Plaintiff stated that the second accident occurred when he was a passenger in a vehicle. He said that a truck ran a red light, hit his vehicle and flipped it over. He said he woke up in the hospital. He stated that his right knee, neck and back were injured and he has a ruptured disk in his back.

Hayes said he has been treated at Tulane Medical Center and Tulane Covenant House. He stated that his medications make him drowsy. He testified that he uses a cane because his back or knees sometimes give out when he is walking.

Plaintiff said he typically stays close to the house, does not go too far, takes his medicine and sleeps because his feet...

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