Hayes v. Deere & Co.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | C21-2051-LTS-KEM |
| Parties | HANNAH HAYES, Plaintiff, v. DEERE & COMPANY, d/b/a John Deere Company, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This case is before me on cross-motions for summary judgment and a motion for sanctions by plaintiff Hannah Hayes. Defendant Deere & Company (Deere) has filed a motion (Doc. 37) for summary judgment as to all counts, to which Hayes has filed a resistance (Doc. 49) and Deere has filed a reply (Doc. 58). Hayes has filed a motion (Doc. 39) for summary judgment on Count III - Coworker Hostile Work Environment, to which Deere has filed a resistance (Doc. 56) and Hayes has filed a reply (Doc. 59) to Deere's statement of additional facts. Hayes has also filed a motion (Doc. 60) for sanctions against Deere pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Deere has filed a resistance (Doc. 61) and Hayes has filed a reply (Doc. 62). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).
On October 7, 2021, Hayes commenced an action against Deere in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County. Doc. 3. On October 13, 2021, Deere removed the case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Doc. 1. Hayes asserts violations of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) based on supervisor sexual harassment (Count I), supervisor hostile work environment (Count II), coworker hostile work environment (Count III) and constructive discharge due to a hostile work environment (Count IV).
Deere has filed a second amended answer (Doc. 24) denying the claims and asserting various affirmative and additional defenses. The parties agreed to a scheduling order and discovery plan (Doc. 17) under which discovery was due by November 1, 2022, a deadline that was later extended to December 12, 2022. See Doc. 29. The parties timely filed their motions for summary judgment.
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A material fact is one that “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. Facts that are “critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not. Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question.” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine.” Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996). On cross motions for summary judgment, the “court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998).
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.[2] Hayes began her employment at Deere on November 14, 2011. Doc. 49-2 at 4. She worked at the Waterloo Foundry facility, which is a Union facility with members from the United Autoworkers Union. Id. at 1-2. On March 22, 2020, she submitted a note from her therapist recommending that she be transferred to second shift to improve her mental health treatment for depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Id. at 4-5. Deere moved Hayes to second shift starting April 8, 2020. Because Hayes' department did not have a second shift, Deere transferred her to an open position in the MELT department (MELT). Id. at 6. The grade four wages Hayes received in MELT were the highest she had earned while working for Deere. Doc. 56-3 at 2.
There are approximately 15 employees on second shift in MELT who are divided into two roles: furnace operator and crane operator. Doc. 49-2 at 2. MELT is a dangerous department that involves using a magnet to place raw steel on a pan, which is then placed into the furnace and melted at up to 2,850 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. at 3. It is then checked and tapped out into a ladle where a crane operator picks it up and stores it in a holder furnace. Id. at 2-3.
Upon joining MELT, employees are trained for up to eight weeks. Id. at 3. In order to qualify as a permanent MELT employee, an employee must pass the training period and receive the requisite certification. The parties have some disputes about how an employee becomes qualified and receives his or her certification. Deere asserts that at the end of training, a trainer signs off on the trainee. Hayes asserts that a trainer must sign off on the trainee's certification. The supervisor will speak with the trainer and the trainee and walk through the qualification, which involves a series of job tasks. If the trainer refuses to sign off, the supervisor will ask why and identify the specific items for which sign off is refused and assign the trainee to the supervisor or another trainer, according to Deere, or to “a different trainer or the same trainer,” according to Hayes.[3]While Deere maintains that the disqualification process is not solely based on feedback from trainers, Hayes cites Nathan Roedema's deposition testimony that Id. at 4.
Hayes started training in MELT on April 8, 2020. At that time, she was the only female employee in the department. She was initially assigned to train with Joe Foster. Foster trained Hayes between April 8 and May 22, 2020. Id. Foster was loud and short-tempered from Hayes' first day in MELT. After four and a half days in her new position, Hayes was off work from April 16 through April 29 due to COVID-19. When she returned, Foster began teaching her how to run the furnace. He yelled at her for not listening. Id. at 10. In early May, Hayes was off work due to medical issues. Id. at 1011. At some point in May 2020, she and Foster began exchanging text messages that were personal in nature. Hayes alleges Foster asked her to send naked pictures to him but she did not keep any of these text messages. Id. Hayes admits that she and Foster had “flirted a little bit . . . because at times, he could be funny.” Id. at 11. Hayes states that during her training, Foster said he was going to enjoy working with Hayes because of her “nice tits and ass.” Id. Hayes asserts that Foster told her everyone else in MELT wanted her to fail, but he would make sure she passed her training period because he had a “soft spot” for her. Doc. 56-3 at 7-13. She also asserts that Foster assured her he would make sure she passed her training period so she would receive grade four wages. Id.
Hayes returned to work on May 11, 2020, and trained with Foster. On May 12, 2020, Foster was training Hayes when he put his hand down her pants. Doc. 49-2 at 11; Doc. 56-3 at 11. Hayes asserts this was not consensual, that she told Foster he should not...
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