Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc.

Decision Date06 August 1993
Docket Number93-1033,Nos. 92-2374,s. 92-2374
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,686 Mary HAYES, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Hayes, Jr., and Eric Hayes, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. DOUGLAS DYNAMICS, INC., Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

John Benjamin Carroll with whom Woodruff L. Carroll, Syracuse, NY, was on brief, for plaintiffs, appellant.

John L. Kerr with whom Whiting & Elinoff, South Weymouth, MA, was on brief, for defendant, appellee.

Before BOUDIN and STAHL, Circuit Judges, and FUSTE, * District Judge.

FUSTE, District Judge.

Appellants Mary and Eric Hayes appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a negligence and breach of warranty action resulting from a car accident in which Robert Hayes, Jr., the son of Mary and brother of Eric, was killed. The district court held that plaintiffs failed to adduce adequate evidence to show that defendant's product was the proximate cause of the decedent's fatal injury. We affirm.

I. Background

On January 30, 1988, Robert Hayes, Jr. and his brother Eric were passengers in the rear compartment of a Ford Tempo. Robert, Jr. was sitting in the right rear passenger seat, and Eric was sitting behind the driver's seat. While the car was stopped at an intersection, waiting to make a left turn, it was hit from behind by a Chevrolet pickup truck. The driver of the truck attempted to swerve and avoid the car. The collision pushed the car into oncoming traffic where it was hit in the left front area by a van. The car spun one-hundred and eighty degrees before coming to rest. Robert, Jr. died the following day from a head injury sustained in the accident. The cause of death was a blow to the back of the head, behind the right ear. The other three passengers suffered minor injuries.

Exactly which part of the truck hit the Tempo is a central issue in this case. The Chevrolet truck was fitted with a Western brand snowplow manufactured by defendant-appellee Douglas Dynamics. The snowplow unit is designed so that the frame, consisting of a metal hydraulic pump and motor unit with a metal lift channel, can remain attached to the truck even when the snowplow blade is removed. The blade was not attached to the truck at the time of the accident. Part of the lift channel consists of a lift arm which protrudes outward from the front of the truck. The end of the lift arm is a U-shaped plate approximately 2 inches by 3 1/2 inches in dimension.

II. Theories of Recovery and Defense

Plaintiffs brought a diversity jurisdiction suit in federal district court alleging breach of warranty 1 and negligence and contending that defendant is liable for the wrongful death of Robert, Jr. and the mental injuries suffered by Eric Hayes as a result of seeing his brother sustain the fatal injury. The plaintiffs' theory is that the protruding lift arm of defendant's product caused the death of Robert, Jr., either by directly striking his head, or by propelling forward some metal piece of the Tempo which then dealt the fatal blow to his head. The plaintiffs also argue that the presence of the plow frame on the truck altered the dynamics of the pickup, making it more dangerous in a collision.

In order to succeed in a claim for breach of warranty under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's product was the proximate cause of the injury. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50, 61, 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312 (1988); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 633, 378 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1978). A plaintiff alleging that a product was negligently designed can proceed by showing that the product either proximately caused or enhanced the injuries alleged. Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 413 Mass. 205, 212, 596 N.E.2d 318, 323 (1992). Because it is undisputed that Robert, Jr. was killed by a single blow to the head the plaintiffs must show that the plow frame either caused the injury or that the injury would not have been fatal if the frame had not been attached to the truck. If the plaintiffs cannot prove that the plow frame was the proximate cause of the fatal injury itself, or that it caused an enhancement of a lesser injury, then the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Proximate cause is a legal definition which requires that the precipitating object or action "in a continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred." Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 254, 198 N.E. 159, 161 (1935). A plaintiff need not prove the exact cause of the accident or disprove every possible cause, but he must show that there is a greater likelihood that the accident resulted from the defendant's negligence than that it did not. Enrich v. Windmere Corp., 416 Mass. 83, 616 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (1993). Therefore, in order to proceed with their claims, the plaintiffs here must be able to show that there is a greater probability that the lift arm caused the death of Robert, Jr. than that some other object in the crash was the agent of injury.

Defendant alleges that the evidence offered by plaintiffs is insufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the snowplow, directly or indirectly, caused the injury to Robert, Jr. Accordingly, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion seeking similar relief. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment and the denial of their cross-motion. Plaintiffs also challenge several prejudgment rulings of the district court. 2

III. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial". Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee's Note). Therefore, if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and any affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Where, as here, the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, that party must make a showing that the evidence is insufficient to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once this showing has been made, it is up to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine disagreement as to some material fact. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992). In this context, "genuine" means that "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party", and a "material fact" is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Appellate review of summary judgment decisions is plenary. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). In applying this standard, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, the plaintiffs. Bank One Texas, N.A. v. A.J. Warehouse, Inc., 968 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir.1992).

IV. Discussion

In support of their claims, the plaintiffs offer direct evidence in the form of the depositions of witnesses and photographs from the scene, as well as the affidavits of several experts. 3

A. Direct Evidence
1. Paul Porter

Paul Porter, a police officer who arrived immediately after the accident, testified that based on his examination of the vehicles, he believed that the front of the truck, with an emphasis on the left front quarter, struck the right rear of the Tempo. Porter stated that he saw "the plow frame and front end as one entity," and did not think that the plow frame did all of the damage to the Tempo. Porter testified that no blood or hair samples were found on the plow frame itself. In addition, Porter stated that when he arrived at the accident scene, Robert, Jr. was still in the car. The officer observed that the boy was pinned under a piece of the Tempo, a metal pillar from between the side rear window and the rear window. The pillar was leaning against the head of Robert, Jr., behind his right ear.

Because Porter did not distinguish between the plow frame and the front of the truck, his testimony does not help to establish that the snowplow frame, directly or indirectly, caused the death of Robert, Jr. Porter's testimony about the lack of blood or hair on the plow frame tends to refute the theory that the lift arm itself came into contact with the victim's head. In addition, the officer's observation of the metal pillar leaning against the decedent's head suggests one alternative explanation for how Robert, Jr. may have received the head injury.

2. William Richardson

William Richardson, the driver of the truck, stated that he hit the car off-center because he swerved in an attempt to avoid the accident. He testified that approximately the center of the front end of his truck hit the right rear passenger side of the Tempo, but he was unable to see whether the lift arm itself impacted the car. Richardson's testimony establishes that the right rear passenger area of the Tempo received the brunt of the collision. Due to this, it is understandable that the injury to Robert, Jr. was more severe than that to any other occupant of the car. Because Richardson could not see what happened to the lift arm during the collision, his testimony does not help to establish a causal link between defendant's product and the injury to the victim.

3. Police Photographs

The police photographs offered by the plaintiffs depict a mangled mass of metal in the right rear passenger area of the Tempo, and some damage to the left front of the truck. The pictures show that...

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