Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:01-CV-00198-WRW.,4:01-CV-00198-WRW. |
| Citation | 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 |
| Parties | James HAYES Plaintiff v. FAULKNER COUNTY, ARKANSAS; Marty Montgomery, Sheriff of Faulkner County, in his individual and official capacities; and Kyle Kelly, Major, in his individual and official capacities Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
James M Hayes, Conway, AR, Pro se.
Gordon S. Rather, Jr., Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, AR, for plaintiff.
Michael R. Rainwater, James Stephen Holt, Scott Paris Richardson, Duncan & Rainwater, Little Rock, AR, for defendants.
On October 15, 1997, a Vilonia police officer issued two citations to Plaintiff James Hayes ("Plaintiff" or "Hayes") for not having tags and vehicle insurance. Mr. Hayes was instructed to appear in the Vilonia Municipal Court on November 10, 1997. He did not appear as ordered, and two arrest warrants were issued. Each warrant had a cash-only bond amount set by the court.
On April 3, 1998, an Arkansas State Trooper stopped Mr. Hayes for an unrelated traffic violation. When the officer discovered that there were two outstanding warrants, he arrested Mr. Hayes, placed him on the court's docket for May 11, 1998, and jailed him at the Faulkner County Detention Center ("FCDC"). Mr. Hayes was not able to post bond and remained in jail at the FCDC until May 11, 1998, when he appeared in court for the first time since his arrest, pled not guilty, and was released with orders to appear before the judge on May 27, 1998. On May 27, Mr. Hayes appeared as ordered, and the charges against him were dismissed.
On April 3, 2001, Mr. Hayes filed a pro se Complaint against Faulkner County, Arkansas (the "County"), alleging that he should have been "taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay" under Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and, because he was not taken before a judge, his due process rights under the United States Constitution were violated.1
The County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 27, 2001, alleging: (1) Mr. Hayes was arrested according to a valid warrant and held as ordered by the Vilonia Municipal Court until his scheduled appearance; therefore, the 38-day detention complied with the Court's schedule; (2) County officials are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity; and (3) Mr. Hayes should not have sued the County because the doctrine of respondent superior does not apply.
On August 23, 2003, I denied the County's Motion, holding that Mr. Hayes' 38-day detention before his first appearance hearing, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Hayes was arrested under a valid warrant, violated Mr. Hayes' due process rights.2 I concluded that "summary judgment was not appropriate because questions of fact existed regarding whether the 38-day delay was due to a County policy or custom, or whether it was unique to Plaintiff."3
Mr. Hayes later amended his Complaint to add Sheriff Martin "Marty" Paul Montgomery ("Sheriff Montgomery") and Major Kyle Kelley, the Jail Administrator for Faulkner County ("Major Kelley"). The County objected to the Amended Complaint, asserting that the statute of limitations barred the addition of new parties.4 I overruled the County's objection, holding that the amendment was proper under the "relation back" doctrine. On March 3, 2003, a bench trial commenced in this case. I find in favor of Plaintiff for the reasons set forth below.
Mr. Hayes brings his claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in relevant part that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ...."5
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a pretrial detainee's claims are "properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"6 and that pretrial detainees are entitled to protection "at least as great" as that afforded to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.7 Although the Eighth Circuit has not yet determined the appropriate standard to apply in cases concerning a pretrial detainee's due process rights, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that, if a convicted prisoner may prevail by proving that prison official were "deliberately indifferent" to his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, the same standard satisfies the fault requirement of due process claims filed by pretrial detainees.8
Mr. Hayes first asserts that Faulkner County is liable for his 38-day detention in the FCDC. The Supreme Court has determined that government entities, such as the County, are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.9 A government entity may only be held liable for injuries caused by the government itself.10 In order to prevail against the County, Mr. Hayes must prove: (1) that he had a constitutional right; (2) that the governmental entity had a policy; (3) that the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.11
In this case, Mr. Hayes had a constitutional right to be taken before a judge within a reasonable time after his arrest, to ensure that "basic and fundamental rights" were protected under the state and federal constitutions.12 In Gerstein v. Pugh,13 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of an individual arrested without a warrant and held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."14 Under Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, this same right extends to an individual arrested under a validly executed warrant.15
Rule 8.1 provides that "[a]n arrested person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay."16 The Arkansas Supreme Court has addressed Rule 8.1 on numerous occasions, and has recognized that:
Rule 8.1 is designed and has as its purpose to afford an arrestee protection against unfounded invasion of liberty and privacy. Moreover, the person under arrest taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay will have the charge[s] explained, will be advised of his constitutional rights, and will have counsel appointed for him if an indigent, and arrangements for bail can be made expeditiously. Such action may avoid the loss of the suspect's job and eliminate the prospect of the loss of income and the disruption and impairment of his family relationship. Indeed, these are basic and fundamental rights which our state and federal constitutions secure to every arrestee.17
Under Rule 8.1, a person may be detained "only for as long as it takes to process `the administrative steps incident to arrest.'"18 An extended detention without this first appearance "substantially impinges upon and threatens" the rights protected by the hearing.19 Therefore, "federal due process simply does not permit the state to detain an arrestee indefinitely without procedural protections."20
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that "compliance with [Rule 8.1] is mandatory,"21 not discretionary.22 The sheriff and prosecuting attorney are responsible if the rule is not followed.23 The police may not absolve themselves of liability by merely notifying the prosecuting attorney's office of an accused's arrest.24 For violations of this rule, "there are remedies for victims ... through civil litigation."25
Defendants correctly assert that there is no specific guidance in Rule 8.1, or in the Commentary, as to what constitutes an "unnecessary delay." However, in Cook v. State,26 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a delay of 31 days before bringing an accused to a judicial officer violated Rule 8.1. In Richardson v. State,27 the court held that a delay of 35 days violated the rule.28 Therefore, even though Rule 8.1 does not specify what is meant by the phrase "unnecessary delay," the law as it existed before Mr. Hayes' arrest clearly established that Mr. Hayes had a constitutional right to be taken before a court by the police long before 38 days had passed,29 and he wasn't. The County's failure to take Mr. Hayes before the court not only deprived him of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest, but also compromised his right to be advised of the charges against him, his right to have counsel appointed to represent him, if appropriate, and his right to have a judge determine whether he should be released on bail.30
The evidence established that Faulkner County adopted a policy which violated Plaintiffs constitutional right to be taken before a judge without unnecessary delay.31 A "policy" is a "deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question."32 According to the Supreme Court, a single decision by a policymaker may give rise to governmental liability.33
It is undisputed that Sheriff Montgomery is one of the County's official policymakers. He had "custody, rule, and charge of the jail within his county and all prisoners," and was authorized to "appoint a jailer for whose conduct [he was] responsible."34 Sheriff Montgomery appointed Major Kelley to supervise the FCDC, and the two officers developed the County's official policies and procedures.
According to Sheriff Montgomery and Major Kelley, the County adopted a...
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...the proposition that the "Arkansas sheriff sets county policy in area of law enforcement"); see also Hayes v. Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (E.D. Ark. 2003) ("It is undisputed that Sheriff Montgomery is one of the County's official policymakers."). Regardless, Henry testi......
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...indicates that the plaintiff erroneously believed that the individual defendants were immune from suit. Hayes v. Faulkner Cty., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143 (E.D. Ark. 2003). This was a "mistake," unlike suing a John Doe. 5. Potocnik points out that the City did not identify the individual de......
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...to his constitutional rights; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Hayes v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D. Ark. 2003); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. There is no question that Plaintiff has a constitutional right to adequate me......
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Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark.
...District Court INITIAL APPEARANCE Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Ark. 2003). An arrestee brought a [section] 1983 action against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, complaining of his long detention prior to an initial court appearance. The district court ente......
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Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark.
...District Court COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Ark. 2003). An arrestee brought a [section] 1983 action against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, complaining of his long detention prior to an initial court appearance. The district court en......
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Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark.
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