Hayes v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 29 December 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 11169,11169 |
| Citation | 95 Idaho 137,504 P.2d 810 |
| Parties | Michael T. HAYES, Plaintiff, v. Lewis GARDNER, Defendant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Wm. F. Boyd, of Brown, Peacock, Keane & Boyd, Kellogg, for plaintiff.
W. Anthony Park, Atty. Gen., J. Dennis (J. D.) Williams, Deputy Atty. Gen., James G. Reid, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant.
This habeas corpus proceeding was initiated in this Court by the petitioner, Michael T. Hayes, against the defendant, Lewis Gardner, Sheriff of Shoshone County, to challenge an order of the District Court of the First Judicial District, denying his request for a hearing before a magistrate on the question of whether he should be treated as a juvenile rather than as an adult. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by this Court, and a return to the writ was made by the defendant Sheriff.
On July 13, 1972, when the petitioner was seventeen years of age, a criminal complaint charging him with first degree murder was filed in district court. The petitioner was also seventeen at the time the offense charged to him was committed.
In early August, 1972, a preliminary hearing was held before a magistrate. The petitioner moved the magistrate to retain jurisdiction and to proceed under the provisions of the Youth Rehabilitation Act (). The magistrate denied this motion and ordered the petitioner bound over to district court. On August 16, 1972, the state filed in district court an information charging the petitioner with first degree murder.
On August 31, 1972, the petitioner moved the district court to remand his case to the magistrate's division because he had not been afforded a hearing on the issue of whether treatment as a juvenile should be waived. The court denied this motion, concluding that insofar as the relevant statutes purported to deprive the district court of jurisdiction over minors who have committed felonies, they were in violation of article 5, section 20 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides: 'The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity * * *.' This proceeding was brought to challenge the district court's ruling.
The petitioner takes the position that the magistrate's division of the district court had exclusive Y.R.A. jurisdiction over him, which had to be waived before he could be held for criminal proceedings (i. e., as an adult). He also argues that it would be illogical to give the prosecutor unfettered discretion to decide whether to treat a child as a juvenile rather than as an adult when State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972), makes the decision on that issue subject to a full investigation and hearing, and further subject to the definite criteria set out in the Gibbs opinion. The district court expressed the view that Gibbs was not controlling because in that case the prosecution was initiated by a petition filed under the Y.R.A. and not by a criminal complaint in district court.
This case presents two issues: (1) Does the magistrate's division of the district court have exlusive jurisdiction to deal with cases which are within the purview of the Y.R.A. and (2) must a full investigation and hearing be conducted before a child may be held for criminal proceedings (rather than for juvenile proceedings)? We conclude that the district court, as well as the magistrate's division thereof, may hear cases within the Y.R.A.; but regardless of the forum in which such proceedings are commenced, a full investigation and hearing must be conducted by the court before a child may be treated as an adult instead of as a juvenile.
Section 16-1803(1)(b) of the Idaho Code provides:
'Except as otherwise provided herein and subject to the prior jurisdiction of a United States court, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings:
1. Concerning any child living or found within the county:
b. who has violated any federal, state or local law or nunicipal ordinance, regardless of where the violation occurred, excepting violations of regulations and ordinances pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles unless in violations of sub-sections (c) and (d) hereof.' Emphasis added.
When used in I.C. § 16-1803(1)(b), 'child' means a person less than eighteen years of age. I.C. § 16-1802(c). Although 'the court' is defined as the probate court (I.C. § 16-1802(a)), I.C. § 1-103 now provides that wherever the term 'probate court' appears in the Idaho Code, it shall mean 'the district court or the magistrate's division of the district court, as the case may be.' Therefore, I.C. § 16-1803(1)(b) (set out above), when read in conjunction with I.C. §§ 1-103 and 16-1802(a), provides that the district court or the magistrate's division thereof has exclusive Y.R.A. jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a child who has committed a felony.
Hence, insofar as the Y.R.A. regulates the matter, the district court, as well as the magistrate's division thereof, may hear cases falling within the purview of the Y.R.A. Moreover, under current procedural rules and statutory provisions, magistrates may hear Y.R.A. proceedings only when assignable cases have been assigned to them by the senior district judge. See I.C. § 1-2208(4); Rule 24, Rules of the Supreme Court for the Magistrate's Division of the District Court and the District Court.
The petitioner contends that he was entitled to a full investigation and hearing before he could be held for criminal proceedings. His position is supported by this Court's recent decision in Gibbs, supra.
When read in conjunction with I.C. §§ 1-103 and 16-1802(a), I.C. § 16-1806(1) (a) states:
'1. The (district court, or the magistrate's division of the district court,) may waive jurisdiction and order a child held for criminal proceedings after full investigation and hearing when:
a. a child sixteen (16) years of age or over is alleged to have committed an act prior to having become eighteen (18) which would be a felony if committed by an adult * * *.'
This section provides that such a child may be held for 'criminal proceedings'-i. e., for prosecution as an adult rather than for proceedings as a juvenile under the Y.R.A.-only after a 'full investigation and hearing.' And that investigation and hearing is required to comport with certain criteria set forth in Gibbs.
Here, no investigation or hearing of any kind was conducted; no judicial discretion was exercised on the issue of whether the petitioner should be treated as an adult or as a juvenile. This result completely circumvents the protections recently set forth in Gibbs. Much of the language used there is instructive:
'(T)he waiver decision rests entirely in the discretion of the magistrate (not in the discretion of the prosecutor).' Id. at 915, 500 P.2d at 216.
Id. at 915, no. 29, 500 P.2d at 216.
'The most important (statutory right of the juvenile) is that to treatment as a juvenile rather than as an adult.' Id. at 914, 500 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
'This difference in possible dispositions reveals that (the decision to waive jurisdiction under the Y.R.A. is) 'critically important' in the sense denoted by the (U.S.) Supreme Court.' Id.
A juvenile's right to a full investigation and a fair hearing cannot be avoided by having none at all.
The defendant argues, in essence, that where, as in this case, the prosecution commences criminal proceedings against a child-thereby treating him as an adult-no Y.R.A. jurisdiction has been invoked and, therefore, no waiver of such jurisdiction is necessary. The defendant's reliance upon I.C. § 16-1804 1 is misplaced. All this section means, by its reference to I.C. § 16- 1806(1)(a) and (1)(b), is that criminal proceedings may go on, even though the defendant was less than eighteen at the time the offense was allegedly committed by him, where Y.R.A. jurisdiction has already been waived pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806(1). The position taken by the defendant amounts to an undesirable attempt to circumvent the procedural safeguards delineated in Gibbs. Moreover, as a matter of law, the defendant's argument is conclusively refuted by I.C. § 18-216, which provides:
'Criminal Trial of Juveniles Barred-Exceptions-Jurisdictional Hearing-Transfer of Defendant to District Court.-(1) A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if:
(a) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was less than fourteen (14) years of age; or
(b) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was not less than fourteen (14) nor more than seventeen (17) years of age (i. e., he was not less than fourteen but less than eighteen), unless:
1. a court of this state has no jurisdiction over him pursuant to chapter 18, title 16, Idaho Code (see I.C. § 16-1803), or
2. the court having jurisdiction pursuant to chapter 18, title 16, Idaho Code, has entered an order waiving jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal proceedings against him (see I.C. § 16-1806(1)(a)).
(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to try or convict a person of an offense if criminal proceedings against him are barred by subsection (1) of this section. When it appears that a person charged with the commission of an offense may be of such an age that criminal proceedings may be barred under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall hold a hearing thereon, and the burden shall be on the prosecution to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the criminal proceeding is not barred upon such grounds. If the court determines that the proceeding is barred, custody of the person charged shall be...
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...provisions of I.C. § 18-216 and an obvious error was committed. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court that Hayes v. Gardner, 95 Idaho 137, 504 P.2d 810 (1972), recognized I.C. § 18-216 to be the operative statute in resolving whether a child within the meaning of the Youth Rehabili......
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