Hayes v. Harvey
Decision Date | 10 May 2016 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2617 |
Parties | Theodore Hayes, et al., Plaintiffs v. Philip E. Harvey, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Rachel Garland, Michael Donahue, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Susanna Randazzo, Kolber Freiman & Randazzo, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.
This is an action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the "Housing Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Presently, before this Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, [ECF 16 and 17], which have fully briefed the issues.1 The parties' dispute arose from the decision of Philip E. Harvey ("Defendant") in February 2015, to not renew the Section 8 tenant-based housing assistance payment contract and the related lease agreement with Theodore Hayes and Aqeela Fogle (collectively "Plaintiffs" or the "Hayes Family"), set to expire naturally on April 30, 2015. Specifically, the parties disagree as to their respective rights and obligations as owner/landlord and tenant under various provisions of the Housing Act.
For the reasons set forth, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The relevant facts in this case were drawn from the "Statement of Undisputed Facts," submitted by Plaintiffs, [ECF 16-1], which Defendant does not contest but, instead, supplements with additional facts.
[ECF 17]. These facts are summarized as follows:
Rule 56 governs the summary judgment motion practice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Specifically, this rule provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Galena v. Leone , 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir.2011).
Rule 56(c) provides that the movant bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record which the movant "believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden can be met by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
After the moving party has met its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to rebut the moving party's claim by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" that show a genuine issue of material fact or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." See Fed. R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A–B). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions, Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir.1982), nor rest on the allegations in the pleadings. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rather, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and either by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, "designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id.
Here, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact; however, they each argue that the undisputed facts require the entry of judgment in their respective favor. The parties' dispute is premised upon their differing interpretation of their respective rights and obligations under various provisions of the Housing Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the "enhanced voucher" provision in ...
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Hayes v. Harvey
...of a lease term.The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District Court ruled in favor of Harvey. Hayes v. Harvey , 186 F.Supp.3d 427 (E.D. Pa. 2016). It reasoned that Harvey was bound by the enhanced voucher statute by virtue of the HAP contract and lease that he execu......
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Hayes v. Harvey
...of Harvey, denied the Hayes family's motion for summary judgment, and denied their motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. 186 F.Supp.3d 427 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The court concluded that while Harvey was subject to the terms of section 8, the enhanced voucher provision did not provide the ......
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