Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 17470

• Decision Date: 21 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 17470,17470
• Citation: 818 S.W.2d 296
• Parties: Garey D. HAYES, Claimant-Appellant, v. HUDSON FOODS, INC., Employer-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 296

818 S.W.2d 296

Garey D. HAYES, Claimant-Appellant, v. HUDSON FOODS, INC., Employer-Respondent.

No. 17470.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Oct. 21, 1991.

Stephen E. Walsh, Poplar Bluff, for claimant-appellant.

James A. Cochrane, III, Dale E. Gerecke, Finch, Bradshaw, Strom & Steele, Cape Girardeau, for employer-respondent.

SHRUM, Presiding Judge.

In this workers' compensation case, the employee Garey D. Hayes appeals from the Final Award entered by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying him compensation.

The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding that the claimant was not entitled to benefits because his left arm carpal tunnel syndrome was not work related and was not an occupational disease. An underlying issue is whether the Commission committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of lack of other incidents of carpal tunnel syndrome affecting other employees performing work similar to that performed by the employee.

Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

In August 1987, the employee Garey D. Hayes and his wife went to work for the employer Hudson Foods, Inc., as farm managers of a poultry production enterprise. On this job, they were responsible for a 160,000 square foot building which housed 230,000 live chickens. They were required to do whatever was needed to care for and raise baby chickens to broiler size. As designed, the poultry farm had automatic conveyor systems to feed and water the chickens. However, manual labor was required on the job, especially when breakdown of the automatic systems required hand feeding and watering. Additionally, the employee and his wife spent from 2 to 4 hours per day picking up dead chickens and carrying them out of the chicken houses in 5-7 gallon buckets.

In early March 1988, the employee broke the fourth finger on his right hand. ¹ After being initially treated elsewhere for that injury, he went to the Poplar Bluff Veterans Hospital in April and May 1988 for treatment of the fractured finger. At that time, the employee also complained of (a) "tingling" in his left hand with pain going into his left wrist and into his shoulder, and (b) weakness of the left elbow and wrist.

An x-ray examination of his right hand, both elbows, and both wrists was requested at that hospital on April 8, 1988. Following that exam, the radiologist included in his recorded findings that the "[d]istal end of left ulna shows some contour irregularity with alteration in distal radio-ulnar relationship probably representing long-standing subluxation which would be congenital or less likely post-traumatic." From the VA Hospital's record of the employee's admission on May 2, 1988, we learn that he reported the symptoms in his arm and wrist had "become progressively worse since he injured his left elbow 6 1/2 months" before. That record conflicts with the employee's trial testimony that his left upper extremity symptoms first appeared in April or May 1988. ² On cross-examination, the employee admitted that he injured his left elbow six months before his admission to the VA Hospital but testified that he had not reported the fall for fear he would be fired.

Following nerve conduction studies, the employee was diagnosed by VA physicians as having a median nerve compression syndrome of the left hand of "undetermined etiology." For this condition he was initially treated with medication but, ultimately, in December 1989, he was treated surgically to release the nerve. Physicians at the Veterans Hospital did not rate the employee's permanent disability. However, Dr. Brenda Kluttz, a St. Louis physician, rated the employee's disability as 25% "of [the] left hand" but expressed no opinion as to the cause of the disability.

Although the employee testified that his job duties involved a significant amount of manual labor, the employer's evidence on that issue was contradictory. For example, Dale McCullough, a broiler supervisor who worked directly over the employee at the time of his alleged wrist injury, testified that the employee's job duties did not involve an extensive amount of repetitive wrist movement. Although he did testify that it would take approximately four hours per day to pick up the dead chickens he further testified that, based upon his observations, the employee's wife did most of the work in regard to picking up the chickens. Stanley Joyner, a broiler products manager, testified that the employee's job activities did not involve repetitive use of his wrist and that the employee could work at his own pace and rest when necessary. He also testified that he was familiar with numerous other couples who managed other broiler facilities for the employer and that no other employees had developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of the work performed on the poultry farms.

The Administrative Law Judge determined that "[b]ased on the lack of medical evidence supporting the employee's allegations, and based on the credible testimony of the employer's witnesses, I find that the employee did not sustain a work related accident or occupational disease." He further concluded that the employee's diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome (left arm and wrist) is not medically causally connected to his work related activity. The Commission, by a divided vote, affirmed the judge's opinion. The employee appeals the Commission's decision.

DID THE COMMISSION ERR IN FINDING THE EMPLOYEE'S LEFT ARM

CARPAL TUNNEL SYNDROME WAS NOT JOB RELATED?

In Point I, the employee claims that the Commission erred in finding that the employee's left arm and wrist carpal tunnel syndrome was not medically causally connected to his work activity. He claims that finding was error because it was not necessary that there be an expert medical opinion directly relating the disease to his job. His position is that (a) his testimony describing the nature of his work, (b) plus the evidence that the left arm carpal tunnel syndrome "arose simultaneous with his work," (c) plus the lack of evidence of any "other cause associated with the onset of the disease," when considered together, establishes his left arm carpal tunnel syndrome was job related. In his brief, the employee says that his testimony, "if believed, constituted substantial evidence to establish that he sustained the injury, its cause and the extent of his disability." (Emphasis added.) He cites Riggs v. Daniel International, 771 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo.App.1989); Ford v. Bi-State Development Agency, 677 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Mo.App.1984); Fogelsong v. Banquet Foods Corporation, 526 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo.App.1975); Smith v. Terminal Transfer Company, 372 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Mo.App.1963), in support of his argument. We recognize that those cases so hold but note that each involves accidental injuries to the claimants and not occupational diseases.

As a general rule, a claimant's medical expert in an occupational disease case must establish the probability that the disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Sheehan v. Springfield Seed & Floral, 733 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.App.1987). There must be medical evidence of a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease. Estes v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo.App.1978). Where workers' compensation benefits are sought for a job-related carpal tunnel syndrome, a claimant must submit an expert medical opinion establishing a probability that working conditions caused the disease even though they need not be the sole cause. Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo.App.1988). Applying the general rule enunciated in Sheehan, Prater and Estes, we find no error in the Commission's determination that the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome was not medically causally related to his job because of "the lack of medical evidence," especially when that determination was also based upon a determination that the employer's witnesses were credible.

Even if Riggs, Ford, Fogelsong, and Smith are applied, we must reject the employee's argument in Point I. His argument ignores the Commission's determination that the employer's evidence was credible. The Commission found that no doctor related the employee's disease to his job and that the medical records did not support a finding that his carpal tunnel syndrome was related to his job activities. We agree. The record fully supports that determination. But that was not the singular basis for denying the employee's claim as he seems to believe. Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge chose not to believe the employee's testimony about his job duties and the work he actually performed. This is evident from reading the following from his decision.

Based on the lack of medical evidence supporting the employee's allegations, and based on the credible testimony of the employer's witnesses, I find that the employee did not sustain a work related accident or occupational disease. (Emphasis added.)

In the total absence of medical testimony concerning causation, testimony concerning the employee's job duties was determinative of his claim. This follows because the appellate courts of this state have recognized that carpal tunnel syndrome is an ordinary disease of life but it can be an occupational disease where a job produces a greater exposure. Prater, 761 S.W.2d 226; Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Company, 481 S.W.2d 548, 554 (Mo.App.1972). "[T]he distinction here is that, whereas people use their hands and wrists frequently every day in and out of occupations, their exposure to carpal tunnel syndrome is casual compared to the massive exposure to which a workman is subjected who is required to perform an occupational duty involving identical hand and wrist movements" with much greater frequency and for a sustained duration. Id. at 554. We have said the determinative inquiry...