Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hospital, No. 21490

Decision Date30 May 2001
Docket Number No. 21522., No. 21516, No. 21490
Citation2001 SD 69,628 N.W.2d 739
PartiesCraig R. HAYES, M.D., and Craig R. Hayes, M.D., P.C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTHERN HILLS GENERAL HOSPITAL; Charles Schulz, Hospital C.E.O.; Black Hills Medical Center, P.C.; Lupus Partnership; Northern Hills Medical Associates, Inc.; Ruth M. McLaughlin, M.D.; Ruth M. McLaughlin, M.D., P.C.; Randall P. Graff, M.D., Individually and in his Capacity as Director of Northern Hills General Hospital; Randall P. Graff, M.D., P.C.; Thomas J. Groeger, M.D.; Individually and in his Capacity as Director of Northern Hills General Hospital; Thomas J. Groeger, M.D., P.C.; Reuben B. Trinidad, M.D., Individually and in his Capacity as Director of Northern Hills General Hospital; and Reuben B. Trinidad, M.D., P.C.; and Scott K. Ross, M.D., Defendants and Appellees.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Michael P. Reynolds of Quinn, Day & Barker, Gregory A. Eiesland of Johnson, Eiesland, Huffman & Clayborne, Mike Abourezk of Abourezk Law Firm, Rapid City, SD, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

Edward C. Carpenter of Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp, Bushnell & Carpenter, Rapid City, SD, Attorneys for defendants Black Hills Medical Center and other physicians and appellees.

Jeffrey G. Hurd of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, SD, Attorneys for defendant and appellee Northern Hills General Hospital.

STEELE, Circuit Judge.

[¶ 1.] The trial court directed a verdict against Craig R. Hayes (Hayes) on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found against Hayes on his claim for interference with business relations, but in his favor and against three individual physician defendants on his claim for breach of fiduciary duty, awarding $500 in compensatory damages and $3000 in punitive damages. Hayes appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Hayes was one of several physicians who formed the Black Hills Medical Clinic (BHMC), a closely held corporation, in 1981. Affiliated with BMHC were two partnerships, Canis Lupus and Northern Hills Medical Associates, and another closely held corporation, Northern Hills Medical Associates, Inc. All entities involved the same shareholders and partners. The clinic practice was very lucrative, partially due to its contract to provide medical services to the employees, retirees, and dependants of Homestake Gold Mine. By 1992, Hayes' relationship with the other shareholders of BHMC had deteriorated greatly. On July 2, 1992, pursuant to a shareholder agreement, the other shareholders voted to remove Hayes from BHMC.

[¶ 3.] After his termination from BHMC, Hayes asked Charles Schulz, the administrator of defendant Northern Hills General Hospital (NHGH) for space to set up a temporary clinic for lab and radiology services. Schulz told Hayes that NHGH would work with him on a trial basis. NHGH prepared two rooms, and Hayes began to practice there on July 6, 1992. On July 28, 1992, a written lease with a 60-day notice of termination provision was executed. Hayes' clinic proved to be problematic for NHGH, mostly due to its location near the drug, alcohol, and mental health units, along with parking and telephone system problems. The lease was terminated on August 13, 1992.

[¶ 4.] In November 1992, Hayes opened a clinic in Spearfish, but continued to see patients in Deadwood two days a week. After Hayes' termination from BHMC, NHGH's administrator drafted the emergency call schedule for NHGH, rotating call among physicians. In March 1993, due to an inability to comply with a 20-minute response time, Hayes reduced his staff privileges at NHGH from active to courtesy staff. In 1995, Hayes joined Queen City Medical Center. He also resumed his active staff privileges at NHGH.

[¶ 5.] This lawsuit was originally filed on August 4, 1993, setting forth sixteen counts on various legal and equitable theories. The trial judge bifurcated the legal and equitable issues, and awarded Hayes $102,765.95 for his interest in BHMC. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all legal counts. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the counts of tortious interference with prospective business advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hosp., 1999 SD 28, 590 N.W.2d 243, 248-250 (Hayes I). On remand the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found in favor of the defendants on the claim of interference with prospective business relations. The jury further found in favor of Hayes and against three individual physician defendants on the claim of breach of fiduciary duty, awarding $500 in compensatory damages and $3000 in punitive damages.

DECISION

[¶ 6.] Hayes raises eleven issues on appeal, which we consolidate to five.

ISSUE ONE

[¶ 7.] Whether the trial court properly directed a verdict on Hayes' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[¶ 8.] If sufficient evidence exists so that reasonable minds could differ, a directed verdict is not appropriate. The trial court's decisions and rulings on such motions are presumed correct and this Court will not seek reasons to reverse. U.S. v. State, 1999 SD 94, 598 N.W.2d 208. In an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the question whether the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous is initially for the trial court. Richardson v. East River Elec. Power Co-op., 531 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1995).

[¶ 9.] Hayes asserts that the circumstances surrounding his termination from BHMC give rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, Hayes' testimony on this claim centered around alleged mistreatments, including being required to be on emergency call seven days a week for a period of time, mistreatment of his patients, and mail maliciously being stamped "Return to Sender" by the defendants.

[¶ 10.] In Hayes I, the trial court had dismissed this claim on a motion for summary judgment. We found issues of material fact that made summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56 inappropriate and therefore remanded it back to the trial court. Hayes I, 1999 SD 28 at ¶ 44, 590 N.W.2d at 252. Hayes believes that a directed verdict on this claim was improper because there were disputed facts and the claim was remanded for jury trial. Even though similar, the legal standards for summary judgment and a directed verdict are sufficiently distinct so as to support different ruling. Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 (1981). A preclusion of summary judgment does not necessarily prevent a directed verdict once the evidence has been fully developed. Further, what is considered to be the facts at the summary judgment stage may not turn out to be the actual facts if the claim goes to trial. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (1996). We review the trial court ruling on a motion for a directed verdict under the following standard:

A motion for a directed verdict under SDCL 15-6-50(a) questions the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict against the moving party. Upon such a motion, the trial court must determine whether there is any substantial evidence to sustain the action. The evidence must be accepted which is most favorable to the nonmoving party and the trial court must indulge all legitimate inferences therefrom in his favor. If sufficient evidence exists so that reasonable minds could differ, a directed verdict is not appropriate. The trial court's decisions and rulings on such motions are presumed correct and this Court will not seek reasons to reverse.

In re Estate of Holan, 2001 SD 6, ¶ 9, 621 N.W.2d 588, 590-91.

[¶ 11.] After reviewing the evidence, we find that reasonable minds could not differ on this issue. Hayes contends that the defendants mistreated his patients and that this mistreatment caused him emotional distress. The mistreatment was never directed at Hayes himself and the alleged mistreatment of patients was not done in Hayes' presence. A plaintiff may not recover under an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action when the alleged conduct is directed at a third person, and the plaintiff was not present when the conduct occurred. Bradshaw v. Nicolay, 765 P.2d 630 (Colo.App.1988); Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash.2d 195, 961 P.2d 333 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt l.

[¶ 12.] Hayes also alleges that the manner in which his mail was handled by the defendants after his departure, the unfair emergency room policies intended to harass and intimidate him, and the discriminatory treatment of his patients constituted examples of extreme and outrageous conduct. Suffice it to say that upon a fair reading of the record, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court that at the close of the plaintiff's case, there was no substantial evidence to sustain the action. We affirm on this issue.

ISSUE TWO

[¶ 13.] Whether the trial court properly excluded evidence of the death of Rachel Kruse.

[¶ 14.] Hayes contends that evidence of the death of Rachel Kruse should have been admitted because it was relevant to claims for tortious interference, emotional distress, and punitive damages. Kruse was a patient of Hayes. He claims she died because the defendants allegedly refused Kruse family requests to contact Hayes concerning her treatment.

[¶ 15.] Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and the party claiming error must show prejudice from the record. Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659 (S.D.1986). This Court has held it is proper to exclude evidence that would open up mini trials, with the result that the trial would be extended considerably. Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989). Here it appears that the issue of Kruse's death was settled out of court in an unrelated malpractice action. The defendants denied any wrongdoing....

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