Hayes v. Pa. Dep't of Transp.
Decision Date | 27 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 1264 C.D. 2012,1264 C.D. 2012 |
Parties | Dontae Hayes v. Danny Rodriguez and Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Appeal of: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Appellant/defendant Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals by permission from an interlocutory order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court). The trial court denied DOT's motion for summary judgment, which was predicated on sovereign immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
Like too many motor vehicle accidents, this is a tragic case. Appellee/plaintiff Dontae Hayes was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Danny Rodriguez.1 Mr. Rodriguez attempted to pass a slower moving vehicle andlost control, causing the vehicle he was driving to leave the roadway. The vehicle crashed into a median guardrail, a portion of which entered the front passenger compartment of the vehicle, causing severe and permanent bodily harm to Mr. Hayes.
On December 15, 2010, Mr. Hayes filed a complaint in the trial court against DOT and Mr. Rodriguez averring negligence. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a-14a.) In particular, Mr. Hayes alleged, inter alia, that DOT caused or allowed a dangerous condition to exist in the subject guardrail and failed to properly inspect, repair, or maintain the same. (Id. at 9a-10a.) DOT filed an answer and new matter, specifically denying Mr. Hayes' allegations of negligence. (Id. at 15a-20a.) DOT asserted the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity and filed a cross-claim against Mr. Rodriguez. (Id.)
Following a period of discovery, DOT moved for summary judgment, preserving its sovereign immunity defense. DOT alleged, in relevant part:
(Id. at 24a-27a.) In his response to the motion, Mr. Hayes admitted the core of DOT's allegations.2 By order dated May 4, 2012, the trial court denied DOT's motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 170a.)
On appeal,3 DOT argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, because sovereign immunity bars Mr. Hayes' guardrail claim against DOT. We agree.
We have addressed and settled issues of guardrail-related claims against the Commonwealth in a number of cases over the past decade. As we so aptly explained in Lambart v. Katz, 8 A.3d 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010):
Lambert, 8 A.3d at 413-14 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
First, we will address whether Section 8522(b)(4) of the Code waives sovereign immunity. DOT appears to argue that Mr. Hayes failed to put forth any evidence to suggest that a dangerous condition on Commonwealth property (i.e., the roadway) caused Mr. Rodriguez's vehicle to leave the road and strike the guardrail. We agree. In Lambert, we held, inter alia, that allegedly outdated guardrails and DOT's failure to maintain them did not create a dangerous condition on Commonwealth real estate under the real estate exception to sovereign immunity. Lambert, 8 A.3d at 417. In Lambert, three people died when the vehicle in which they were traveling left the road, hit guard cables and posts,then struck a tree and descended an embankment. Id. at 411-12. We largely based our decision in Lambert on our examination of Dean.
In Dean, a truck fishtailed on a snow-covered roadway, causing the driver to veer off the road and over a steep embankment where it overturned. The incident seriously injured a passenger in the vehicle. The passenger sued DOT, alleging that her damages would have been minimized had DOT installed a guardrail along that portion of the roadway. Our Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Snyder, where it repeated the view that only alleged artificial conditions or defects of land may result in waiver under Section 8522(b)(4) of the Code, addressed the passenger's argument that the absence of a guardrail amounted to a dangerous condition of the highway and that a trial court could not address that argument in a summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court in Dean noted that Commonwealth agencies only are required to ensure that the condition of their "property is safe for the activities for which it is regularly used, intended to be used or reasonably foreseen to be used." Dean, 561 Pa. at 510, 751 A.2d at 1133-34 (quoting Snyder, 522 Pa. at 434, 562 A.2d at 312). In holding that DOT cannot be held liable for failure to erect a guardrail under Section 8522(b)(4) of the Code, the Supreme Court reasoned that the absence of a guardrail is not a dangerous condition of the Commonwealth real estate. Dean, 561 Pa. at 511-12, 751 A.2d at 1134. Specifically, it explained that a guardrail "does not render the highway unsafe for the purposes for which it was intended, i.e., travel on the roadway." Id. at 511, 751 A.2d at 1134.
Id. at 512, 751 A.2d at 1334-35. To date, however, the General Assembly has not acted on the Supreme Court's invitation to "correct" its interpretation of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity with respect to guardrails.
Also, this Court has held that the Commonwealth is immune from suit regarding the design and maintenance of guardrails.5 Stein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 989 A.2d 80, 88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 613, 20 A.3d 1214 (2011); see also Fagan v. Dep't of Transp., 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) ( that sovereign immunity shields Commonwealth where decedent was passenger in vehicle that for unknown reasons left road and struck turned-down guardrail,...
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