Hayes v. Parker

• Citation: Hayes v. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq. 630, 7 A. 511 (N.J. 1886)
• Decision Date: 01 June 1886
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: CAROLINE D. HAYES, administratrix, appellant, v. BENJAMIN F. PARKER, respondent

7 A. 511

41 N.J.E. 630

HAYES, Adm'x,

v. PARKER.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June Term, 1886.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-chancellor Van Fleet, whose opinion is reported in Parker v. Hayes, 39 N. J. Eq. 469.

Mr. Cortlandt and R. Wayne Parker, for appellant, Hayes.

S. B. Ransom, for respondent, Parker.

REED, J. This case involves the liability of the estate of David A. Hayes, who was the guardian of Benjamin F. Parker, to account to the ward for the assets which came to his hands as trustee. The assets were derived from the estate of Isaac S. Parker, the father of the ward. The former in his will bequeathed to Benjamin the sum of $7,400, invested in lands in the state of Illinois. The said sum was to be collected by the executors of the will, and by them paid over to Harriet Parker, an aunt of Benjamin, who was appointed guardian of Benjamin, and trustee of this fund, until Benjamin attained the age of 21 years. She was to invest it on bond and mortgage, and apply the interest thereof to the maintenance and education of the ward. In March, 1862, Harriet Parker was removed, and David A. Hayes was appointed in her stead.

The surviving executor under the will of Isaac S. Parker, about this time, filed a bill in the court of chancery for the settlement of the estate, and for distribution of the assets; and, in pursuance of a decree made in that cause, the executor assigned to Hayes a promissory note of one Cory for $840, cash in the hands of one Jesse Blinn amounting to $423, the promissory note of Thomas McNeil for $2,200, and another note of said McNeil for $1,000. No account has ever been rendered, but a release was executed by the ward to the said Hayes. This release, which would otherwise be a complete bar to any claim against Hayes, is alleged by Parker to have been executed while he was still an infant. The vice-chancellor finds as a fact in the case that this allegation is true. Upon review, while the proof that the birth of Parker occurred in the spring of 1847 is not the most satisfactory, yet I think the finding below upon this point of the case cannot be said to have been erroneous. Accepting this as the date of his birth, he was still a minor at the time of the execution of the release in May, 1867. The question then arises whether Parker is in a position to invoke the aid of a court of equity to call the guardian or his representative to an account.

It is, of course, true that at law the execution of this paper by the minor is voidable. Nor would his assertion, made at the time of its execution, that he was of age, operate to change his position in a court of law. The fact that the infant had, by his false representations, led the other contracting party to negotiate and execute the contract, and injuriously change his position even, would, in an action by the adult to enforce it, be no answer to the plea of infancy.

At law it is conclusively presumed that a person within the age of 21 is unfitted for business, and that every contract into which he enters is to his disadvantage, and that he is incapable of fraudulent acts which will estop him from interposing the shield of infancy against its enforcement. In equity, however, this rigid rule has its exceptions. Equity will regard the circumstances surrounding the transaction—the appearance of the minor, his intelligence, the character of his representations, the advantage he has gained by the fraudulent representations, and the disadvantage to which the person deceived has been put by them—in determining whether he should be permitted to invoke successfully the plea of infancy. Evroy v. Nicholas, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 488; Clarke v. Cobley, 2 Cox, 173; Ex parte Unity, etc., Banking Ass'n, 3 De Gex & J. 63; Cory v. Oertcken, 2 Madd. 40; Overton v. Banister, 3 Hare, 503; Story, Eq. Jur. § 240; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 815, 945.

This equitable rule was fully and correctly stated in the opinion of the learned vice-chancellor when the case was before the court of chancery. In the judgment of that officer, however, the facts did not permit him to treat this as a case in which the plea of infancy could be disregarded. The defendant's representative was ordered to account. I am compelled to differ from this conclusion. From the facts which I find proven, I regard the case as one in which the complainant is debarred from avoiding the release which he executed, and which, if accorded any significance, is a complete answer to his present demand.

The defendant, Hayes, was a practicing lawyer in the city of Newark. One Silas G. Randall, of Rockport, Illinois, with Hannah C. Parker, the mother of complainant, came to him, and' employed him professionally to take charge of these matters of Benjamin C. Parker, the complainant. They represented that Harriet Parker, the aunt, who was then guardian, was wasting the estate, and that she was irresponsible. Steps were taken to compel her to give security, or, in default of security, to have her removed, and also to prevent her from receiving any more of the assets from the executors of the will of Isaac S....