Hayes v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC
| Decision Date | 26 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-1239 |
| Parties | RANDY RAY HAYES, an individual, Plaintiff, v. RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Washington corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Randy Ray Hayes ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Defendant Receivables Performance Management, LLC ("Defendant"), bringing claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count I); Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (Count II); and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (Count III). Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion [32] for a more definite statement of claim by Plaintiff and to dismiss all claims in Plaintiff's complaint [1] for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion [32] is granted in part and denied in part. The motion for a more definite statement of claim is denied in light of the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss, which is denied in part with respect to Counts I and II. Plaintiff may proceed with his FDCPA claim predicated on 15 U.S.C. § 1692d and his TCPA claim against Defendant. The motion to dismiss is otherwise granted, and Plaintiff's other claims in Count I and Court III in the Complaint are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is given until October 26, 2018 to file an amended complaint regarding the dismissed claims consistent with this opinion if he chooses to do so. This case is set for further status on November 7, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.
Defendant is "a national leader in accounts receivable management" and regularly collects upon consumers in Illinois. [1, ¶ 8.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant regularly uses the mail and/or telephone to collect, or attempt to collect, delinquent consumer accounts and is a member of ACA International, an association of credit and collection professionals. According to Plaintiff, beginning in January 2017 and continuing until the filling of this action on February 16, 2017 [id. ¶ 13], Defendant has repeatedly called Plaintiff's cellular phone seeking to speak with "Iesha Wayne," [id. ¶¶ 20, 28].
Upon answering the calls from Defendant, Plaintiff experiences a brief pause lasting a few seconds in length and has to say "hello" multiple times before a live representative joins the call. [Id. ¶ 21.] On other occasions, no one has answered when Plaintiff picks up and he experiences "dead air." [Id. ¶ 20.] While it is unclear how many times Plaintiff has spoken to a representative of Defendant, Plaintiff has spoken to a representative at least once and informed him or her that he is not "Iesha Wayne," and has demanded that Defendant stop contacting him more than once. [Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 24.] The calls have not stopped despite Plaintiff's demand; in fact, Defendant has called Plaintiff at least twenty times since he demanded Defendant stop calling. [Id. ¶ 28.] On several occasions, Defendant has called Plaintiff multiple times in a day. [Id. ¶¶ 26-27.] Prior to the calls at issue, Plaintiff had had no business dealings with Defendant. [Id. ¶ 17.]
Plaintiff filed his complaint ("the Complaint") against Defendant relating to these events on February 16, 2017. [See, 1.] Plaintiff brought claims against Defendant for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count I); TelephoneConsumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (Count II); and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (Count III).
This case was initially assigned to Judge Shadur. [See, 7.] Defendant filed a motion for a more definite statement of claim and to dismiss for failure to state a claim on April 20, 2017. [See, 15.] On April 28, 2017, Judge Shadur continued the motion to dismiss until June 5, 2017 [20], and on June 1, stayed the case indefinitely in light of the ACA International litigation pending in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, [21; 24, at 3]. On August 28, 2017, the case was reassigned to this Court. [22.] On December 8, 2017, the Court lifted the stay and gave Defendant two weeks to refile its motion to dismiss. [See, 31.] Defendant then filed the instant motion for a more definite statement of claim and to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. [See 32.] Plaintiff filed a response [36], and Defendant has filed a reply [42].
Defendant seeks a more definite statement of claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule ("Rule") 12(e) and has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
A motion for a more definite statement is appropriate if a pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Upon a motion that points to the purported defects and the details desired, the Court may order the filing of a more definite statement. In considering such a motion, a court should be mindful of the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which a "short and plain statement of the claim" will suffice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), suchthat the defendant is given "fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original). Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the "speculative level." E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). Evaluating whether a "claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. (quoting McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Rule 12(e) provides that a party may move for a more definite statement of claim when the pleading in question "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(e). In light of the Court's resolution of Defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court denies Defendant's Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement of claim. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint that Defendant believes to be vague or ambiguous, Defendant may renew its 12(e) motion at the appropriate time.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA, TCPA, and ICFA.
To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish that (1) Defendant qualifies as a debt collector as defined in the Act; (2) the actions complained of were taken in connection with the collection of any debt; and (3) Defendant's actions violated one or more substantive provisions of the FDCPA. Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2010). Defendant moves to dismiss Count I arguing (1) that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show he is a consumer and thus entitled to bring an action under the FDCPA, (2) Plaintiff's assertions that he is a consumer prohibit his claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692b; (3) Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his claims under the substantive provisions of the FDCPA: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692d, 1692e, 1692f. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Plaintiff's complaint states that he is "a consumer as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA." [1, ¶ 5.] As explained above, conclusory allegations of law are not sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff must state facts that plausibly show he is a consumer. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes he has not done so.
Section 1692a(3) defines "consumer" as "any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations preclude a finding that he is a consumer because they assert Plaintiff mistakenly received calls inDefendant's pursuit of someone else's debt. [32, at 5; 1, ¶¶ 13, 20-25.] The question is whether Plaintiff's allegations that he is natural person who received multiple telephone calls attempting to collect the debt of an unrelated third person are sufficient to allege he is a consumer under the FDCPA. [1, ¶¶ 4, 13, 18-22.]
The Seventh Circuit has held that the definitions set forth in the FDCPA "extend[ ] the reach of the statute to collection activities without regard to...
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