Hayes v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:17-cv-1159-J-32PDB
• Parties: RICHARD LEROY HAYES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

RICHARD LEROY HAYES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:17-cv-1159-J-32PDB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

December 7, 2020

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, Richard Leroy Hayes, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Doc. 1. He challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of cocaine while armed, for which he is serving a cumulative twelve-year term of incarceration as a Habitual Felony Offender. See id. Respondents filed a Response. See Doc. 12.¹ And Petitioner filed a Reply. See Doc. 15. This case is ripe for review.

II. Governing Legal Principals

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed orargued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clearerror) with unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.").

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

"The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must show that: (1) counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Notably, there is no "iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other." Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, "a court need not address theperformance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa." Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 466 U.S. at 697.

"The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is "any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard," then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). "Reviewing courts apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "When this presumption is combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel's performance." Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis

Ground One

Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the legality of the traffic stop that led to evidence being illegally seized from Petitioner's vehicle. Doc. 1 at 4. He contends that police conducted the stop and issued a citation for "improper parking within an intersection"; however, the conduct police stated they observed did not amount to such a violation. Id. at 5. As such, according to Petitioner, the police dismissed that traffic violation and thus, the resulting criminal charges should have also been dismissed.² Id.

Petitioner raised this claim in his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief.³ Resp. Ex. G at 4-7. The state filed a response to the claim, arguing the following, in relevant part:

In the instant case, the Defendant was issued two traffic citations, to-wit: operating a motor vehicle without a safety belt in use (Florida Statute 316.614(4)(B)) and improper parking within an intersection (Florida Statute 316.1945(1)(A)(3)). Neither of the traffic violations the Defendant received require another vehicle to be impeded or hindered as the Defendant argues in his Motion. The statute theDefendant references in his Motion, 316.2045, is directed at a pedestrian who impedes or hinders traffic. Thus, it is irrelevant that the arrest and booking report did not include the information that a car was impeded or hindered by the Defendant's vehicle and/or whether the defense attorney was surprised by that testimony. Furthermore, and contrary to the Defendant's allegation that the officers do not handle traffic enforcement and are members of a drug hit crew, Nobles testified that he is a sergeant in Zone 5 and addresses complaints from citizens, which can include drug complaints, but also includes many other types of complaints. Faulkner testified that he was assigned to a unit that targeted violent crime in Zone 5. Holtsman and Thompkins both testified that they were Zone 5 patrol officers.

During the trial, Sergeant Nobles testified that he came into contact with the Defendant based upon a traffic stop. Specifically, Nobles testified that he first saw the Defendant parked about one length away from a stop sign with a gentleman leaning into the passenger window and a car sitting behind him waiting for him to move out of the way. Nobles also testified that he noticed the Defendant was not wearing a seatbelt at the time. Nobles used a picture on Google map to explain the exact location of his vehicle and the Defendant's vehicle to the jury. Nobles also testified that Officer Faulkner was driving his patrol car directly behind him and as he passed the Defendant's vehicle, he notified Faulkner that the Defendant was not wearing a seatbelt and Faulkner confirmed that he also noticed the Defendant was not wearing a seatbelt. Based upon his observations, Nobles

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