Hayes v. Second Nat. Bank of Richmond, 1-777A160
| Docket Nº | No. 1-777A160 |
| Citation | 375 N.E.2d 647, 176 Ind.App. 299 |
| Case Date | April 27, 1978 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Page 647
Stanley W. Hayes, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF RICHMOND, Defendant-Appellee.
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1978.
[176 Ind.App. 300]
Page 649
Gale Graber, Graber & Sandifer, P. C., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.William H. Reller, Reller, Mendenhall, Kleinknecht & Milligan, Richmond, for defendant-appellee.
ROBERTSON, Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Margaret B. Hayes (Hayes), as executrix, appeals the granting of defendant-appellee's, The Second National Bank of Richmond (Bank), motion for summary judgment construing the will of Stanley W. Hayes, Sr. and presents the following issues for review.
(1) Whether the testator's will manifested a clear intent that the remainder of the trust vest in the children surviving at the death of the trust beneficiary rather than at the death of the decedent.
(2) Whether IC 1971, 29-1-6-1(c) applies to the case at bar.
Decedent Stanley W. Hayes, Sr. bequeathed a specific amount of money to his sons, Brice E. Hayes, Winchell C. Hayes, and Stanley W. Hayes, Jr. and made a bequest for his institutionalized daughter, Joan, to the Bank in trust, for her use and benefit.
Stanley W. Hayes, Jr., predeceased his sister Joan on April 2, 1975; the latter died on May 1, 1975. Hayes, as executrix of the estate of Stanley W. Hayes, Jr., brought an action against the Bank for wrongful distribution of the residue of the trust created for and during the lifetime of Joan Hayes in that distribution was made only to the two brothers who survived her death.
[176 Ind.App. 301] The following portion of Item V of testator's will forms the crux of the controversy:
"At the death of my daughter and after the payment of her proper burial, then all property remaining in said trust, I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter's children, equally, and if she have no children, then the same to my other children then living, equally, absolutely and in fee simple." (Our emphasis).
Hayes contends that this portion of the provision may be interpreted to apply to all children still living at the death of the testator. If so, then she, as executrix of her husband's estate, would be entitled to a portion of the residue of the trust property. The Bank, on the other hand, contends that the clear intent of the testator was that the residue of the trust be distributed to his children surviving at the death of Joan, the trust beneficiary. Although Hayes requested trial by jury, the trial court was persuaded by the latter argument and granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment.
The testator undoubtedly has the right, within legal limitations, to fix the time of vesting of any estate created by him. Moreover, the question of whether or not in a given case a particular estate or interest is vested or contingent depends, in final analysis, upon the intention of the testator as interpreted from the will. The various rules of construction which the courts have formulated to assist them in case of doubt must yield when they would lead to a result which is contrary to the manifest intention of the testator. However, if the will itself fails to disclose the intention of the testator, the court will invoke the settled rules of construction to determine whether the interest was intended to be vested or contingent. Dawson v. McKee (1954), 124 Ind.App. 233, 116 N.E.2d 538.
The law favors the vesting of estates at the earliest possible moment, and wills should be construed accordingly in the absence of a clear manifestation of the intention of the testator to the contrary. Further, words postponing the estate are construed to refer to the beginning of possession and enjoyment of the estate and not to the vesting thereof. Moorman v. Moorman (1973), 156 Ind.App. 606, 297 N.E.2d 836; Aldred v. Sylvester (1916),184 Ind. 542, 111 N.E. 914.
[176 Ind.App. 302]
Page 650
In the case at bar, the intent of the testator must have been manifested so clearly that the trial court was justified in rendering summary judgment for the Bank. The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to provide a procedural device for prompt disposition of cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be determined in a trial, either by a court or a jury. A material fact is one which may be dispositive of the case; clearly, testator's intent is a material fact. If any doubt remains as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, such doubt must be resolved against the movant of the summary judgment. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp. (7th Cir. 1954) 210 F.2d F.2d 879, cert. den. 347 U.S. 1013, 74 S.Ct. 867, 98 L.Ed. 1136. Moreover, even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate when the information...To continue reading
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Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, No. 782S261
...no dispute or conflict regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, 650. Woodward contends that there are material issues of fact as to whether the covenant not to compete was supported by consideration, was......
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Suyemasa v. Myers, No. 1-180
...the action, even though conflicting facts on some elements of a claim exist. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, trans. The trial court found that the contracts were oral contracts, that they were governed by the laws of Tennessee, and that the action......
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Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., No. 2-1178
...177, 340 N.E.2d 756; Stuteville v. Downing (1979), Ind.App., 391 N.E.2d 629; Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond (1978), Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647. The facts which Brett claims are in dispute, e. g., whether the defendants knew or should have known that there was swimming in this area,......
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Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, No. 1-1280A372
...no dispute or conflict regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, trans. denied. Woodward asserts there are material issues of fact as to whether the covenant not to compete was supported by consideration,......
-
Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, No. 782S261
...no dispute or conflict regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, 650. Woodward contends that there are material issues of fact as to whether the covenant not to compete was supported by consideration, was......
-
Suyemasa v. Myers, No. 1-180
...the action, even though conflicting facts on some elements of a claim exist. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, trans. The trial court found that the contracts were oral contracts, that they were governed by the laws of Tennessee, and that the action......
-
Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., No. 2-1178
...177, 340 N.E.2d 756; Stuteville v. Downing (1979), Ind.App., 391 N.E.2d 629; Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond (1978), Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647. The facts which Brett claims are in dispute, e. g., whether the defendants knew or should have known that there was swimming in this area,......
-
Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, No. 1-1280A372
...no dispute or conflict regarding a fact which is dispositive of the action. Hayes v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1978) Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 647, trans. denied. Woodward asserts there are material issues of fact as to whether the covenant not to compete was supported by consideration,......