Hayes v. Secretary of the Army

• Decision Date: 21 February 1979
• Docket Number: 78-153 Erie.,Civ. A. No. 78-152 Erie
• Citation: 465 F. Supp. 646
• Parties: Michael C. HAYES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, Clifford Alexander and the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Thomas JEFFERSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, Clifford Alexander and the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

465 F. Supp. 646

Michael C. HAYES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, Clifford Alexander and the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Thomas JEFFERSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, Clifford Alexander and the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Civ. A. Nos. 78-152 Erie, 78-153 Erie.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

February 21, 1979.

Orton, Nygaard & Dunlavey, North East, Pa., for petitioners.

Robert J. Cindrich, U. S. Atty., John Paul Garhart, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for respondents.

OPINION

WEBER, Chief Judge.

Petitioners were members of an army reserve unit located in the Western District of Pennsylvania who were involuntarily placed on active duty in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, allegedly for failing to comply satisfactorily with their duties as reservists. While within this District on Christmas leave, the Petitioners filed with the Court Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Habeas Corpus to determine the legality of their call to active duty. The Respondents, the Secretary of the Army and the Petitioners' commanding officer at Fort Sill, oppose the issuance of the Writ on jurisdictional grounds.

First, the Respondents attack the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the Writ on the grounds that the Petitioners are not in custody in the Western District of Pennsylvania. On the basis of the facts alleged in the Petitions, we do not believe this requirement is missing. The Petitions allege that the Petitioners were illegally and involuntarily re-classified in this District from reserve to active status as the result of their neglect of duties as reservists. The Petitioners contend that their involuntary re-classification increases the restraint on their personal liberty. The additional obligations of active duty inhibit their personal freedom and form the necessary increase in custody which the writ of habeas corpus was designed to protect, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948). The Petitioners are not any less on active duty when they are home on Christmas leave than they are when they are in their barracks at Fort Sill, and thus are no less in custody when they are here than they are when at Fort Sill. Recognizing that mere presence within a District is not enough to support jurisdiction, Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 91 S.Ct. 995, 28 L.Ed.2d 251 (1971), we stress that the change in classification from reserve to active status occurred when the Petitioners were within the District on the basis of conduct which occurred here. It was in this District that the Petitioners were notified of their reclassification, and hence it was within this District that the increased restraints of active duty were first imposed. Accordingly, for the purpose of habeas corpus jurisdiction, we hold that the Petitioners are in custody in this District. See United States v. Wheeler, 321 F.Supp. 471 (E.D.Pa.1970); Donigan v. Laird, 308 F.Supp. 449 (D.Md.1969). If these Petitioners were not domiciled within this District at the time the Army changed their status and if their reclassification did not allegedly arise from conduct within this District, the Court might well have decided that they were not in custody here for purposes of habeas corpus solely because they were physically present here at the time their petitions were filed, see Eisel v. Secretary of the Army, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 378, 477 F.2d 1251, 1263 (1973).

The Respondents rely on Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1970), as authority for the proposition that the Petitioners were not in custody in this District when they filed their petitions. Jarrett was an army officer who sought relief for the denial of his request for discharge as a conscientious objector. Jarrett's request for discharge was made and denied in Fort Knox, Kentucky after he had completed jungle operations training at Fort Knox. He filed his habeas corpus petition while visiting his home in California on leave before departing for Vietnam. The Court held that Jarrett was not in custody in California because he had never been assigned to an army post there, 426 F.2d at 217. In this regard, Jarrett is critically different from the instant cases because the Petitioners in both were assigned to perform, and actually did perform, their reserve duty in the district in which they filed their petitions. Accordingly, we think that the reasoning of Jarrett compels us to hold that the Petitioners are in custody in this...