Hayes v. Smith
| Decision Date | 27 September 1920 |
| Docket Number | 4573. |
| Parties | HAYES v. SMITH, COUNTY TREASURER. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Sanders County; R. Lee McCulloch, Judge.
Action by Joseph M. Hayes against Mary Smith, as treasurer of Sanders county, Mont. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
S. C Ford and Frank Woody, both of Helena, and A. A. Alvord, of Thompson Falls, for appellant.
A. S Ainsworth, of Thompson Falls, for respondent.
On March 1, 1919, Joseph M. Hayes owned and was in the possession of 3,700 sheep in Morrow county, Or., where he resided, and where the sheep were duly assessed for taxation for the year 1919. In June following the sheep were shipped consigned to the Chicago market. On June 19, the shipment reached Thompson Falls, Mont., and there the sheep were unloaded, and for the ensuing three months were grazed in Sanders county, as was permitted by the bill of lading. On July 8, the assessor of Sanders county listed the sheep for assessment and taxation for 1919, and, the tax levy having been made and the tax extended, this property was charged with the sum of $518. Hayes applied to the county board of equalization for a cancellation of the assessment, but without avail, and his appeal to the state board was equally unsuccessful. Thereafter this suit was instituted to enjoin the treasurer from collecting the tax, and in the complaint the foregoing facts are set forth somewhat more in detail. The treasurer appeared by general demurrer, which was overruled, and, declining to plead further, suffered judgment to be rendered and entered in favor of the plaintiff, and appealed to this court.
It is the contention of the plaintiff, concurred in by the district court, that the statute under which the revenue officers assumed to act is in contravention of the provisions of sections 1 and 11, article 12 of the state Constitution, and for that reason null and void. At the earliest opportunity after our Constitution was adopted an elaborate revenue measure was passed and approved (Laws 1891, p. 73), which provided generally for the assessment and taxation of all property subject to the jurisdiction of the state, and with minor amendments and modifications that act has been carried forward and is now in full force and effect.
This legislation was the response to the constitutional mandate that the legislative assembly should pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of article 12 of the Constitution, and particularly the provision in section 11 that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. It is elementary that the taxing power of the state does not extend beyond the territorial limits of the state, and neither does it extend to all subjects actually within the confines of the state, and upon which the state has the physical power to impose a tax, as, for instance, property being transported in interstate commerce while actually in transit through the state. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 33 S.Ct. 299, 57 L.Ed. 615.
Whatever may be said of its vast character and sweeping extent, the power of taxation, of necessity, must be limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state, or, as otherwise characterized, to subjects which have acquired a situs within the state for the purpose of taxation. In most jurisdictions the annual assessment of property subject to taxation is made as of some definite date, and the situs of the property determined as of that date. In pursuance of that general policy, our Legislature, by the repeated references in the revenue measure, evinced very clearly an intention that in order for personal property, other than the net proceeds of mines, to acquire a situs for the purpose of taxation it must be within the state and subject to its jurisdiction at 12 o'clock noon on the first Monday of March. The references will be found in sections 2510, 2511, 2512, 2552, 2556, 2578, 2579, and 2601, Revised Codes, and possibly elsewhere, but the foregoing are sufficient for present purposes. No provision was made for the assessment of property introduced into the state after the first Monday of March, and in practice such property was not assessed for that fiscal year. Those principles have remained constant to the present time, unless modified by the legislation under which plaintiff's property was assessed. The authority of the Legislature thus to fix a definite date as of which the situs of personal property for taxation is to be determined cannot be gainsaid, and since our Legislature did so, the question of uniformity of taxation is to be determined with reference to that fact.
On March 14, 1901, the act in question was passed and approved which provided for the assessment and taxation of live stock brought into this state for the purpose of grazing. Laws of 1901, p. 57. Section 1 of that act, now section 2531, Revised Codes, reads as follows:
"All live stock brought into this state by any person or persons whomsoever, for the purpose of being grazed for any length of time whatsoever, shall be taxed for the year in which such live stock shall be brought into the state."
The other sections of the act relate to the procedure, and are not directly involved here. Although the act does not in express terms confine its operation to live stock brought into the state for grazing purposes after the first Monday of March, by necessary implication it does so, and such a construction is commanded, otherwise the entire act would be meaningless. This is the only change, material to the determination of this appeal, which has been injected into the law...
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