Hayes v. State
| Citation | 487 So.2d 987 |
| Decision Date | 07 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | 4 Div. 436 |
| Parties | Paul HAYES, alias v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Donald F. Colquett, Opp, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and David B. Karn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Paul Hayes, was indicted and convicted of the offense of theft of property in the first degree as proscribed by § 13A-8-3, Code of Alabama 1975. As a result, he was sentenced as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions to imprisonment for a term of life.
Specifically, the jury found Hayes guilty of the theft of a 1970 Buick Skylark automobile, belonging to Greg Wayne Howard. At trial, Mr. Howard testified that he first met Hayes at the county jail on one of the Tuesdays that he was there preaching to the inmates. He further explained that he let Hayes and his wife, Kathy, stay at his apartment for a week or two, but that they had left about a week prior to the disappearance of his automobile. Mr. Howard stated that when he went outside on the morning of September 27 or 28, 1981, his car, which had been parked in front of his apartment, was gone; that his keys had been inside his apartment, but that there were signs that someone had come through a window; and that, although he had given Kathy permission to use his car on several occasions, and although he had seen Kathy on the evening prior to the car's disappearance he had given no one permission at the time it disappeared. Finally, he testified that his car was returned to him in October by Deputy White.
Deputy White testified that he went to Oklahoma and picked up Hayes; that he also picked up a female prisoner; and that Howard's father took possession of Howard's automobile, which was in an impound yard in Sayre, Oklahoma.
On cross-examination, Officer Shaw testified that, after Hayes's confession, a deputy sheriff told him that the sheriff had offered Hayes and his wife a deal whereby they could go to Georgia; however, no such deal or offer was made in his presence.
The only issue requiring our attention is whether Hayes was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. "We start with the statement that the resolution of this issue must be based on the facts contained in the record and the facts, as alleged, leave much to be desired as we consider appellant's contentions." Slaughter v. State, 377 So.2d 625, 625 (Ala.Cr.App.), rev'd, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979).
A chronology of events preceding Hayes's ultimate trial date, as revealed by testimony, exhibits, and the case action summary, is as follows:
September 28, 1981, the District Court of Covington County issued a warrant of arrest for Hayes on the charge of theft of property in the first degree.
October 17, 1981, Hayes was arrested and incarcerated (as reflected by the execution of the arrest warrant).
January 18, 1982, Hayes was indicted by the Covington County Grand Jury.
February 8, 1982, Hayes was appointed counsel, arraigned, and released on bond.
April 12 and May 24, 1982, alias writs of arrest were issued. In addition, forfeiture for Hayes's bond was entered.
June 13, 1984, Hayes was again incarcerated on the instant charge.
August 27, 1984, the case was continued on motion of Hayes.
September 24, 1984, the case was continued by agreement.
October 10, 1984, Hayes filed a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.
October 22, 1984, motion for discovery filed and cause continued by motion of Hayes.
November 9, 1984, after a hearing, the motion to dismiss was denied.
November 26, 1984, a jury found Hayes guilty as charged.
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Hayes testified to the following:
He was arrested in Oklahoma and extradited back to Alabama to face the present charges. On February 8, immediately after his appearance at arraignment, he met with Sheriff Chambers at the jail to sign an appearance bond for his release. His wife was also present. The bond had already been signed outside his presence by two other persons. The signatures were purportedly those of his in-laws, but Hayes recognized them as being forged, so he refused to sign the bond. Sheriff Chambers told him to sign. The sheriff also told him "to get out of the State of Alabama and don't worry about the charges, that they would not be brought up against [him] just as long as [he] stayed out of the State of Alabama." So Hayes went to Harrison County, Georgia and did not return, because he relied on Sheriff Chambers's statement.
While in Harrison County, during 1982, Hayes was arrested by the Sheriff on behalf of Covington County; but he was released. However, he was again arrested in 1982 on the Covington County charge. Hayes was also arrested for subsequent offenses committed in Georgia: on April 8, 1982, for the offense of first degree forgery, which occurred February 26, 1982; on July 28, 1982, for forgery; and on January 7, 1983, for forgery. Hayes pleaded guilty to all three. He received probation for the first two offenses, but this probation was revoked on February 9, 1983. When he pleaded guilty in 1984, on the third charge, he received a sentence of ten years, five to be served in the penitentiary and five to be served on probation. On June 13, 1984, after Sheriff Chambers had been replaced by Sheriff Harrell, Hayes was returned to Alabama to answer the present charge.
Hayes also testified that, at some unspecified time, while living in Georgia, his wife called District Attorney Lanier and Hayes listened on an extension. (Prior to leaving Covington County for Georgia, his wife had two charges pending against her; she pleaded guilty to one and the other was dismissed.) In the conversation, the district attorney stated that "since [they] were already on probation in the State of Georgia and [they] had to do that, that he actually didn't see fit for [them] to be coming back over [there], seeing as how Mr. Chambers had already told [him] not to come back."
Hayes finally testified that, as a result of the time lapse, two material witnesses were unavailable: Bernice Sasser Mitchell, whose whereabouts are unknown, and his wife, who would have to get permission to leave Georgia, since she is serving probation and parole.
Mr. Richard White, who was chief deputy sheriff in 1982, testified to the following:
Sometime during 1982, he received a call from someone with the Harrison County Sheriff's Department, who inquired if Hayes and his wife were wanted in Alabama. (He thought he had previously sent copies of the pending indictments to the sheriff's department.) He told them that they did want them. He was led to believe that the Hayeses were not incarcerated at that time, but that they could be picked up. After picking up "a subject," the Harrison County authorities called White again and wanted to know what the Covington County authorities proposed to do. White responded that he would call back after talking with Sheriff Chambers. When he informed Chambers of the situation, Chambers said that "if [Hayes] can't be brought back--if he isn't brought back, he can't be tried, can he." White then called the Harrison County office and explained that they were not interested.
Mr. Glen Chambers, former sheriff, then testified as follows:
On direct, Mr. Chambers also testified that, if a question arose about extradicting someone, he would talk to the District Attorney, but that the Chief Deputy usually handled such things.
On cross-examination, Mr. Chambers testified as follows "Q. You don't recall that on the day that--do you recall the day he made bond?
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972):
(Footnote omitted.)
Thus, an "inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case...." Id. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188. In adopting "a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed," id. at 530, 92...
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