Hayes v. State
| Decision Date | 16 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 5062,5062 |
| Citation | 599 P.2d 558 |
| Parties | Mike Leanard HAYES, Appellant (Defendant below), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Gerald M. Gallvin, Director, Wyo. Defender Aid Program (argued), Laramie, Frank R. Chapman, Public Defender, Casper, and Kurt Kelly, Student Intern, Laramie, appeared on brief for appellant.
Gay V. Bartels, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), John D. Troughton, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., appeared on brief for appellee.
Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.
Appellant-defendant here appeals from his conviction on three counts of first degree murder for which he was sentenced to three consecutive life terms. He alleges error in connection with the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Spencer Anneberg, relative to his mental responsibility at the time of commission of the crime. Specifically, he contends that Dr. Anneberg's testimony was inadmissible under § 7-11-305, W.S.1977; that it was admitted in violation of an Order in Limine; and that such was reversible error inasmuch as the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury without such testimony. Appellant's Motions for Mistrial, for New Trial, for Judgment of Acquittal, and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict were denied. We affirm.
Although appellant pleaded "not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency," appellant did not attempt, at the trial, to controvert the fact that he killed the three individuals as alleged in the three-count information, and the only issues on appeal are those which concern his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency at the time of the crime.
After appellant entered the aforesaid plea, the court ordered the Wyoming State Hospital to observe, examine and report on his mental and physical condition pursuant to § 7-11-303, W.S.1977. In a report dated June 2, 1978, Dr. Bancroft M. Brooks of that hospital reported that appellant was On August 16, 1978, the Sheriff of Uinta County advised that he was unable to serve a subpoena on Dr. Brooks and that his whereabouts were unknown. On August 22, 1978, the County and Prosecuting Attorney filed a motion for an order appointing Dr. Spencer Anneberg, a psychiatrist at Sheridan, as a designated examiner of the state's choosing, alleging in his motion that the examiner from the Wyoming State Hospital, who had previously examined appellant, had "been dismissed for substandard professional work." The motion was granted and the order made on August 22, 1978. After making the examination, Dr. Anneberg telephonically advised appellant's counsel on August 23, 1978, that he concluded that the accused did not have mental illness or deficiency at the time of the crime, and that he would so testify.
legally competent to stand trial, but that he was suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the crime. On June 12, 1978 (more than five days after receipt of the report), appellant requested an order for examination of him by a designated examiner of his own choosing. On August 1, 1978, the order was made, and Dr. Bernice B. Elkin, a psychiatrist at Casper, was chosen for the examination. She reported her findings and conclusions on August 23, 1978. In her report, she advised that appellant was suffering from manic-depressive disorder or bipolar depression. Her conclusions were substantially the same as Dr. Brooks' with reference to competency to stand trial and with reference to his lack of capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the crime.
The trial was scheduled for, and held on, August 24, 1978. On August 24, 1978, appellant filed a Motion in Limine. It was argued just prior to the beginning of the trial. In the motion, appellant requested that the testimony of Dr. Anneberg be limited. Appellant argued that the request for the appointment of Dr. Anneberg was not made within the five days after receipt of the copy of the Wyoming State Hospital report as required by § 7-11-303(d); that Dr. Anneberg did not submit a written report of his examination pursuant to § 7-11-303(d); and that Dr. Anneberg was therefore not a competent witness. Appellant also argued that the testimony of Dr. Anneberg was excludable under Rule 403, W.R.E. 1 Appellant conceded that it was proper for Dr. Anneberg to testify as an expert witness pursuant to § 7-11-305(d), i. e., as one who did not examine the appellant, but who could testify as to the validity of the procedures and scientific propositions of those who did examine him. The court granted the Motion in Limine.
Additional facts of the case will be set forth as required under the discussions of appellant's allegations of error.
Appellant contends that the provisions of § 7-11-305 prevented receipt into evidence of the following testimony of Dr. Anneberg:
Since the determination of this issue involves the application of the 1975 legislative enactment 2 relative to the plea of insanity (§§ 7-11-301 through 7-11-306, W.S.1977), an analysis of it is in order.
Sections 7-11-301, 7-11-302, and 7-11-306 are not material to our determination. Section 7-11-301 defines "facility," "designated examiner" and "mental deficiency." Section 7-11-302 also has a definition posture. It provides:
Section 7-11-306 concerns the disposition to be made of a person found Not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency excluding responsibility at the time of the crime.
The remaining three sections concern, respectively, the three situations with which the court must proceed in this area: (1) the situation in which the mental illness or deficiency exists at the time of the trial to the extent that the accused is unfit to proceed with it (§ 7-11-303); (2) the situation in which the mental illness or deficiency of the accused exists at the time of the crime to the extent that it excludes responsibility of the accused for the crime, and the accused entered a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" (§ 7-11-304); and (3) the same situation as the second one except the accused entered a plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" (§ 7-11-305).
In this case, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency." It appears that at least some of the problem here presented results from a misunderstanding of the proper application of §§ 7-11-303, 7-11-304, and 7-11-305 to the situations presented by appellant's pleas.
The situation with reference to appellant's contention that his mental illness or deficiency existed at the time of the trial to the extent that he was unfit to proceed with it is governed by § 7-11-303. When reasonable cause exists to so believe, that section directs the court to order an examination of the accused by a designated examiner, who must file a written report of his examination 3 with the clerk of court. The clerk delivers copies of the report to the prosecuting attorney and to the accused or his counsel. Within five days thereafter, both the state and the accused may make a written request for an examination by a designated examiner of their own choosing. Such examiner must furnish a copy of the report of his examination to the court and opposing counsel. The court then makes a determination and finding on the issue of fitness to proceed (after a hearing if there is a contest to the examination made by the first designated examiner, or if the court Thus, the determination as to whether or not the accused is unfit to proceed due to mental illness or deficiency at the time of trial is a court determination, not a jury determination. It is not in the nature of a defense to the charge. It is a threshold issue, necessary to be resolved to prevent a violation of due process through conviction of a person incompetent to stand trial. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Wolcott v. United States, 10th Cir., 407 F.2d 1149, cert. den. 396 U.S. 879, 90 S.Ct. 156, 24 L.Ed.2d 137 (1969); U. S. v. Bettenhausen, 10th Cir., 499 F.2d 1223 (1974); § 7-11-302, W.S.1977, supra.
orders a hearing even if there is no contest). 4 If the accused is found by the court not to be fit to proceed due to...To continue reading
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