Hayes v. State

• Decision Date: 21 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC96813.,SC96813.
• Citation: 803 So.2d 695
• Parties: Joseph HAYES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

803 So.2d 695

Joseph HAYES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC96813.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 21, 2001.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review Hayes v. State, 748 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Castleberry v. State, 402 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), on the issue of whether a defendant may be separately convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle where the defendant steals various items from inside a victim's residence, including the victim's car keys, and then proceeds outside the residence to steal the victim's motor vehicle utilizing these keys.¹ We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We conclude that where there is a geographic and temporal separation in the taking of separate property, including a motor vehicle, from one victim, the defendant may be convicted of both armed robbery of that separate property and grand theft of a motor vehicle without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Joseph Hayes was convicted of armed robbery, armed burglary of a structure, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. See Hayes, 748 So.2d at 1044

. Hayes' convictions stemmed from an incident in which he and two others entered a residence and stole various items from the victim, including computers, cell phones, a beeper, a camera, and keys to the victim's van. See id. After exiting the residence with these items, Hayes and the two others used the keys to steal the van, which was parked outside of the victim's residence. See id.

On appeal, Hayes asserted that his convictions for armed robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997),² and grand theft of a motor vehicle under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1997),³ were obtained in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy because both convictions resulted from the same criminal episode. See Hayes, 748 So.2d at 1044

. Relying on this Court's opinion in Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994), Hayes argued that because both acts arose out of a single criminal episode, double jeopardy prohibited convictions for both of these offenses because they are degree variants of the core offense of theft. See Hayes, 748 So.2d at 1044 n. 2.

The Third District, however, concluded that there was no double jeopardy violation because "where there is the theft of various items, including car keys, from inside the victim's dwelling, and the thief proceeds outside to use the keys to steal the victim's car, there is a sufficient separation of time and place to treat the auto theft as a separate crime" apart from the robbery of items from inside the victim's home. Id. at 1044. The Third District concluded that the theft of the motor vehicle "occurs not upon the taking of the keys but upon the subsequent taking of the car." Id. at 1044-45.⁴

The First District addressed circumstances similar to Hayes in Henderson v. State, 778 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). In Henderson, the First District held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude convictions for both robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle where the defendant and an accomplice broke into the victim's residence, forced the victim to the floor and tied her up, ransacked the victim's room, took a number of valuables, including the victim's car keys, and then, utilizing the victim's car keys, stole the victim's motor vehicle. See id. at 1046-48. The First District cited Hayes with approval and held that "the robbery in this case was sufficiently separated from the later theft of the car by both time and geography to justify separate convictions." Id. at 1047. As the Third District did in Hayes, the First District certified conflict with Castleberry and J.M. See Henderson, 778 So.2d at 1047

.⁵

On facts materially indistinguishable from those in Hayes and Henderson, the Fifth District in Castleberry addressed whether the defendant could be convicted of both robbery and grand theft, where the defendant entered the victims' residence, tied up the victims, stole a gun, ammunition, money, jewelry, clothes, and other personal property, including one of the victim's car keys, then exited the residence and stole the victim's motor vehicle. 402 So.2d at 1231-32. The Fifth District concluded that because possession of the victim's motor vehicle was the "product of the same force and fear" involved in the robbery and the defendant committed the crimes during the same continuous sequence of events, the defendant could not be convicted of both robbery and grand theft. Id. at 1232. The Fifth District determined that the two takings constituted only one statutory violation because the defendant had committed only one robbery. See id. Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed the defendant's conviction for grand theft of a motor vehicle. See id.

ANALYSIS

A. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be ... twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The issue in this case is whether multiple convictions and punishments for robbery and grand theft would be prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996)

(explaining that the prohibition against double jeopardy applies equally to both multiple convictions and the imposition of multiple sentences). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), where multiple punishments are imposed at a single trial, "the role of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments arising from a single criminal act."

In Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1982), we explained the constitutional scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Legislature's powers as follows:

The "power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the" legislature. The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the state to seek and the courts to impose more than one punishment for a single commission of a legislatively defined offense. "But the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized." The Double Jeopardy Clause "presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments," but rather, "seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense."

Id. at 1267 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).

As we explained in Borges, 415 So.2d at 1266, the common law "single transaction rule," which had previously limited convictions arising out of a criminal transaction or episode to the most serious offense, has been legislatively overruled. Therefore, if the Legislature intended separate convictions and sentences for a defendant's single criminal act, there is no double jeopardy violation for the multiple punishments. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)

; State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997); M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996); State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989).

Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997),⁶ recognizes that multiple convictions and punishments may be imposed for separate offenses committed in the course of one criminal transaction or episode. Under section 775.021(4)(a), "offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial."

In Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153, 153 (Fla.1994), we applied section 775.021 to determine whether the Legislature had authorized convictions for both robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle, where the convictions stemmed from a single taking of an automobile at knifepoint. In Sirmons, the defendant was charged with two crimes for the taking of the same property. Id. Because the defendant had committed only one criminal act, we applied section 775.021(4)(b) and, after comparing the elements of the robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle statutes, we concluded that the Legislature did not authorize multiple convictions for the single taking of one automobile. See id. at 154.⁷ Thus, as we explained in Sirmons, multiple punishments or convictions were not permitted for the defendant's single taking of the motor vehicle at knifepoint because the offenses in question were "merely degree variants of the core offense of theft." Id. at 154.

Although Hayes contends that Sirmons is dispositive in this case, Hayes' argument is premised upon his assertion that his theft of personal property from inside the victim's residence and subsequent taking of the victim's motor vehicle constituted a single taking amounting to one criminal act. If Hayes is correct that his multiple convictions were premised upon a single taking of the victim's property, based upon Sirmons, Hayes' convictions for...