Hayes v. State

• Decision Date: 05 November 1956
• Docket Number: No. 4,4
• Citation: 211 Md. 111,126 A.2d 576
• Parties: Leo Elmer HAYES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 111

211 Md. 111

126 A.2d 576

Leo Elmer HAYES v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 4.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 5, 1956.

Morris Lee Kaplan, Baltimore (Harry I. Kaplan and Louis L. Horowitts, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

James H. Norris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., David Kauffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anselm Sodaro, State's Atty. and James W. Murphy, Asst. State's Atty., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and COLLINS, WILLIAM L. HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ., and GEORGE HENDERSON, Special Judge.

WILLIAM L. HENDERSON, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment and sentence of twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary from January 7, 1956, after the appellant had been convicted by Judge Carter, sitting without a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, on the first count of an indictment charging attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon. The appellant contends that the verdict of the trial court was clearly wrong, because the evidence showed that the pistol used in the attempted robbery was unloaded, and it is contended that an unloaded pistol is not a dangerous or deadly weapon.

The State produced testimony to show that the appellant, with an accomplice who has not been apprehended, came to the filling station operated by the witness, Grice, 'stuck a gun' in his ribs and said: 'This is it, give me your money.' Grice testified: 'I asked him if it was a big joke he was trying to pull on me, and he pulled the hammer back on the gun and shoved it a little tighter and said, 'Does this look like a joke?' * * * When he throwed the hammer back on the gun, I stuck my thumb in the gun and blocked the gun and taken the gun away from him.' The hammer hit his thumb. He did not examine the gun and did not know whether it was loaded or not. He twisted the man's arm and held him until the police came, in response to a call from his helper. The other man ran away.

Officer Ledon testified that Grice was struggling with the appellant when he arrived on the scene. He examined the gun Grice had taken from the appellant and it was not loaded. In a statement which the appellant gave to the police, offered in evidence by the State, the appellant said the gun belonged to his companion. 'I took the gun away from him at the bar when he was flashing it around. We both agreed * * * to hold up the gas station.' He admitted saying to the attendant 'this is a holdup' and pointing the gun at him. The appellant did not take the stand, but after verdict and before sentence he told the court: '* * * just at the time that happened I was pretty well drunk * * * I mean I know that the gun was not loaded, I knew it was not loaded myself.'

The common law crime of robbery is not defined by statute in Maryland, but the penalty is fixed at from three to ten years by Code 1951, Art. 27, sec. 573. Code 1951, Art. 27, sec. 574A, as enacted by Ch. 457, Acts of 1927, provides: 'Every person convicted of the crime of robbery or attempt to rob with a dangerous or deadly weapon or accessory thereto, shall * * * be sentenced to imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary for not more than twenty years.'

The question whether an unloaded pistol is a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of this statute has not been previously passed upon by this Court. In Crawford v. State, 174 Md. 175, 179, 197 A. 866, 867, the question was whether a previous acquittal by a magistrate of "Assaulting and shooting * * * with a pistol" was res judicata in a subsequent indictment for murder. It was held that the charge before the magistrate was, in effect, a charge of assault with intent to murder, of which the magistrate had no jurisdiction, so that his finding had no legal significance. It was conceded in that case that the pistol was loaded and discharged. But the Court quoted a statement from United States v. Williams, C.C., 2 F. 61, 64, that 'Whether a particular weapon is a deadly or dangerous one is generally a question of law. Sometimes, owing to the equivocal character of the instrument--as a belaying pin--or the manner and circumstances of its use, the question becomes one of law and fact, to be determined by the jury under the direction of the court. But where it is practicable for the court to declare a particular weapon dangerous or not, it is its duty to do so. A dangerous weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury. A loaded pistol is not only a dangerous but a deadly weapon. The prime purpose of its construction and use is to endanger and destroy life. This is a fact of such general notoriety that the court must take notice of it.'

The question has been passed upon in the courts of many other states. In California the statute provides that all robbery perpetrated by a person armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon is robbery in the first degree. In People v. Egan, 77 Cal.App. 279, 246 P. 337, 339, it was held that an unloaded pistol is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute, the court stating that 'It is a matter of common knowledge that in committing robbery pistols are frequently used as bludgeons rather than as firearms.' The holding has been followed in later cases, notably People v. Freeman, 86 Cal.App. 374, 260 P. 826 and People v. Ash, Cal.App., 199 P.2d 711, where it is pointed out that it is only the potentiality of its use to effectuate the implied threat of injury that makes any weapon dangerous. An unloaded pistol may not only be used as a bludgeon, but it can be loaded under some circumstances within a matter of seconds.

The courts passing on the point have sometimes...