Hayes v. Towles
| Decision Date | 09 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 11099,11099 |
| Citation | 506 P.2d 105,95 Idaho 208 |
| Parties | Bobby L. HAYES, Plaintiff, v. James G. TOWLES, District Judge, Defendant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
David A. Frazier, Coeur D'Alene, for plaintiff.
This original proceeding was initiated by the petitioner, Bobby L. Hayes, who filed in this Court an application for a writ of review of an order of the District Court of the First Judicial District, Shoshone County, whereby the petitioner was adjudged guilty of contempt of court. This Court granted the petitioner's application and subsequently issued the requested writ.
In April, 1958, the petitioner's then wife Wanda Hayes filed a divorce complaint in which, inter alia, she prayed for judgment '(r)equiring the defendant (Bobby L. Hayes) to pay to plaintiff for the support of the minor children of the parties the sum of $80.00 per month beginning the 1st day of May, 1958, and continuing until said children reach the age of 18 years or until plaintiff shall remarry under such circumstances as said payments shall become unnecessary for the support of said children.' Having been served with process, Bobby Hayes failed to appear, answer, or plead; and the district court therefore declared him in default on May, 12, 1958. On that same day, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which, inter alia, required 'that defendant pay to plaintiff for the support of the minor children of the parties the sum of $80.00 per month beginning the 1st day of May, 1958, and continuing until said children reach the age of 18 years or until plaintiff shall remarry under such circumstances as said payments shall become unnecessary for the support of said children.' Emphasis added. Also filed on May 12 was a default decree of divorce which, inter alia, 'required (defendant) to pay to plaintiff for the support of the minor children of the parties the sum of $80.00 per month, the first payment to be made immediately upon receipt of this order and subsequent payments to be made thereafter on the first day of each month beginning June, 1958.' Thus, although the findings and conclusions conformed to the prayer for child support contained in the complaint, and although by its own terms the decree purported to be 'in accordance with said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,' a variance nevertheless existed between the language of the decree, on the one hand, and the language employed in both the complaint and the conclusions of law on the other-in that the decree failed to specifically provide that the defendant's child support obligation would continue only 'until said children reach the age of 18 years or until plaintiff shall remarry under such circumstances as said payments shall become unnecessary for the support of said children.'
Subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree, Wanda Hayes, on two occasions in 1958 and 1959, attempted to collect delinquent child support by execution proceedings. Thereafter, Bobby Hayes was absent from the State of Idaho until March, 1967. In October, 1959, Wanda Hayes remarried, becoming Wanda Hayes Ryan. From 1959 to 1971, Bobby Hayes expressed the belief that under the terms of their divorce decree, Wanda's remarriage had terminated his obligation to pay child support; he did not, however, at any time request a hearing to determine whether Wanda had remarried under circumstances rendering the child support payments unnecessary. (The children at all times herein pertinent were under the age of eighteen.)
The litigation culminating in the challenged contempt order began when, on January 26, 1972, Wanda Hayes Ryan petitioned the district court for an order directing the issuance of execution against the property of Bobby Hayes. On the same date, the requested writ was issued in order to satisfy delinquent child support payments. At the same time, the court issued an order to show cause and an 'order in proceedings supplementary to execution,' which 'restrained (Bobby Hayes) from selling or otherwise disposing of or encumbering any money or property not exempt from execution.'
Pursuant to the order to show cause issued on January 26, a hearing was held on January 31, 1972, at which Bobby Hayes appeared in person but without counsel. At this hearing, the court discovered the discrepancy between the language used in the 1958 divorce complaint and that employed in the default decree finally entered in the case. The court suggested to Bobby Hayes that he consult an attorney and continued the matter to allow him to do so. Before adjourning on January 31, however, the court dissolved the writ of execution previously issued, but the court continued in effect the order restraining Bobby Hayes from disposing of any assets. Immediately upon reconvening on February 29, 1972, the court, sua sponte, amended the divorce decree nunc pro tunc to conform with the prayer for child support contained in the complaint; in doing so, the court relied upon I.R.C.P. 60(a) 1, which provides for the correction of clerical mistakes and errors arising from oversight or omission. Then, after hearing the testimony of Bobby Hayes on February 29, the court suggested that contempt proceedings be initiated against him for violating the court's order restraining him from disposing of or encumbering any property not exempt from execution. On March 27, 1972, the court entered a memorandum decision finding that child support payments had not become 'unnecessary' under the circumstances of Wanda Hayes' remarriage; hence, the court again ordered that execution issue to satisfy delinquent child support payments.
On April 7, 1972, a hearing was conducted on the contempt matter. The court found that immediately after the hearing of January 26, 1972, a 'drastic change' occurred in Hayes' normal habits, with the result that within a week or two of the January 26 hearing every asset, except for an automobile and two checks, had disappeared for one reason or another. More specifically, the court found that Bobby Hayes had dissipated his checking account, transferred certain shares of stock, and lost substantial sums of money on horse racing wagers. The court therefore entered an order adjudging Bobby Hayes guilty of contempt.
The petitioner does not contend that he did not, in fact, violate the restraining order issued by the district court. Rather, he argues as follows: (1) the default decree of divorce granted relief in excess of that prayed for in the demand for judgment (2) under I.R.C.P. 54(c), the court was without jurisdiction to enter a default judgment which differs in kind from or exceeds in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment; (3) the default decree is therefore void insofar as it pertains to child support; (4) hence, the January 26 writ of execution and the order in proceedings supplementary thereto are void, since they are based upon a void judgment; (5) thus, also void is the restraining order originally issued as part of supplementary proceedings and subsequently continued in effect by court order; and (6) the violation of a void order does not constitute contempt.
A judgment by default may not differ in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the plaintiff's demand for judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(c). The district court is without jurisdiction to enter a default judgment which differs in kind from or exceeds in amount that demanded in the prayer of the complaint. Cobb v. Cobb, 71 Idaho 388, 390, 233 P.2d 423 (1951); Sonleitner v. McLaren, 52 Idaho 791, 794, 20 P.2d 1014 (1933). If, through judicial error, a default judgment exceeds the demand of the complaint, the excess is void. McHan v. McHan, 59 Idaho 496, 506, 84 P.2d 984 (1938); Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 19, 50 P.2d 1087 (1936), cert denied, 299 U.S. 615, 57 S.Ct. 319, 81 L.Ed. 453 (1937); Stablein v. Stablein, 59 Wash.2d 465, 368 P.2d 174 (1962); see Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 461, 195 P. 625 (1921). However, where, through clerical error, oversight, or omission, a default judgment exceeds the demand of the complaint, no part of the judgment is void; rather, the judgment is subject to correction under I.R.C.P. 60(a), which in petinent part provides: 'Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts...
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...relief beyond that prayed for in her complaint. I.R.C.P. 54(c); Jensen v. Jensen, 97 Idaho 922, 557 P.2d 200 (1976); Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973). It would be a strange type of equity to allow a plaintiff on a default proceeding to obtain the relief which she demands f......
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...subject matter. See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947); Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973). But that proposition appears not to be applicable in this case since the TRO which resulted in the contempt citation was ......
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