Hayes v. Union Pac. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 28990.,28990.
• Citation: 88 F. Supp. 108
• Parties: HAYES et al. v. UNION PAC. R. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

88 F. Supp. 108

HAYES et al. v. UNION PAC. R. CO. et al.

No. 28990.

United States District Court N. D. California, S. D.

January 19, 1950.

Harold M. Sawyer, Gladstein, Andersen, Resner & Sawyer, all of San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

T. W. Bockes, W. R. Rouse, Elmer Collins, James A. Wilcox, all of Omaha, Neb., and E. E. Bennett, Edward Renwick, Malcolm Davis, and W. J. Schall, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Union Pac. R. Co.

Marion B. Plant, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, all of San Francisco, Cal., for Dining Car Employees Union Local 372.

ROCHE, Chief Judge.

This is an action to prevent, and secure damages for, unlawful discrimination under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. Petitioner Hayes is a Negro member of the respondent Dining Car Employees Union Local 372 (hereinafter referred to as "Union") and is employed by respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter referred to as "Railroad") in its dining car and commissary service. He brings this action on behalf of himself and all other Negro employees similarly situated.

Respondents have filed certain motions to strike and have moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of (1) failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and (2) lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter. In resisting these motions the petitioners rely entirely on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173, and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187. Indeed, petitioners go so far as to assert that unless they bring themselves within the principle of the Steele and Tunstall cases, supra, there is no authority on which jurisdiction of this Court can rest. The fundamental question of jurisdiction thus depends on whether the record before this Court discloses a factual situation within the scope of the cited authorities. The Steele and Tunstall cases, supra, involved collective bargaining agreements that were discriminatory by their terms. There is no allegation in the present case that the collective bargaining agreement executed by Union and Railroad on June 1, 1942, and still in effect, discriminates against petitioners. They allege, instead, that discrimination has been effected by the conduct of the respondents under the agreement, and contend that this is sufficient, under the Supreme Court decisions, to give this Court jurisdiction. The alleged discrimination arises in connection with respondent Railroad's seniority assignments and promotions.

It appears from the record that the collective bargaining agreement provides that, as of the date of his hiring (whether before or after the date of the Agreement), each member of the Union employed by Railroad shall be assigned a seniority date in a seniority group and class. There are four seniority groups: AA (selective runs covering streamliner trains), A (standard dining car runs), B ("challenger" runs covering the so-called challenger type trains which Railroad discontinued in 1947), and C (miscellaneous, covering such types as cafe-lounge cars). Each group contains certain seniority classes, such as, Class I (chef-caterer), Class II (chef), and Class III (second cooks, etc.). The Agreement further provides the system by which employees can advance to a higher seniority classification. Non-temporary and certain other types of positions which become vacant are announced by means of a bulletin. Bids are then accepted from employees desiring to be considered for such vacancies. Promotion and assignment are based on seniority, fitness and ability; fitness and ability being sufficient, seniority prevails. Assignment to a nontemporary position of a seniority higher than that held gives to the employee so assigned such higher seniority classification and seniority date.

Petitioners allege that at the time of their original hiring only white members of the Union have been assigned to Group A, Classes I and II, while all Negro members have been assigned to Group B, Class III. They further allege that Railroad has refused to accept petitioners' bids for bulletined positions in higher seniority classifications, while filling such positions with Union's white members having lesser seniority than have petitioners, and that Railroad has employed petitioners in Group A, Classes I and II positions without any criticism of their fitness and ability but without assigning them such seniority classification. Petitioners further charge that they have been so deprived of their seniority rights solely because they are Negroes and that this has been done by Railroad in connivance with the Union.

Turning now to the Steele and Tunstall cases, supra, upon which the petitioners ground their right of action, we find certain points of similarity and one of vital difference. In those cases the petitioners were Negro firemen employed by the respondent railroads, whose established practice was to promote only white firemen to engineers. The respondent Brotherhood, which excluded Negroes from its membership, was the authorized, exclusive bargaining representative of the craft of firemen employed by the railroads. The Brotherhood and the railroads entered into agreements restricting the seniority rights and the employment of Negro firemen, without giving them prior notice or opportunity to be heard.

The facts before this Court show that the respondent Union is the authorized, exclusive bargaining representative for all of Railroad's employees in its dining car and commissary service and that Negro employees are admitted to Union membership without discrimination. They further show the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between Union and Railroad but the record contains no allegations that such agreement discriminates against petitioners. Since the petitioners have amended their original complaint twice and have filed a supplemental complaint, the absence of such allegations indicates that the agreement is not discriminatory. The Court believes that this difference between the facts in the instant case and those before the Supreme Court in the Steele and Tunstall cases, ...