Hayes v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.

• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Heard by EISENHAUER
• Citation: Hayes v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 817 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa App. 2012)
• Decision Date: 09 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0546.,11–0546.
• Parties: Melvin HAYES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. VERMEER MANUFACTURING CO., Defendant–Appellee.

817 N.W.2d 495

Melvin HAYES, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.VERMEER MANUFACTURING CO., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 11–0546.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

May 9, 2012.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Darrell Goodhue, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. AFFIRMED.

Jill Zwagerman of Newkirk Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Kelsey Knowles, James Swanger, Michael Reck, and Mark McCormick of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by EISENHAUER, C.J., and DANILSON and BOWER, JJ.

DANILSON, J.

Melvin Hayes appeals from entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Vermeer Manufacturing Company. Hayes brought suit against his former employer, Vermeer, for retaliation and violation of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FLMA) after Hayes was terminated for repeated tardiness allegedly caused by side effects of medication taken for his mental health condition. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding the FMLA intermittent leave sought was not available to Hayes. Upon our review we conclude Vermeer's bankruptcy contentions, including that Hayes was not the real party in interest due to his bankruptcy, were not addressed by the district court and do not serve to uphold the judgment of dismissal. However, we conclude Hayes' FMLA certification was facially invalid and did not show he was entitled to FMLA leave. Absent a showing by Hayes of a right to FMLA leave, Vermeer was entitled to deny Hayes' request without further inquiry. Accordingly, we determine the district court properly granted summary judgment to Vermeer on Hayes' FMLA claim. We affirm the ruling of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Vermeer Manufacturing Company is an agricultural and construction equipment manufacturer that employed plaintiff Melvin Hayes as a welder from June 1999 until it fired him for attendance policy violations on August 13, 2008. ¹ During his employment, Hayes worked five days per week on the first shift, which began at 6:30 a.m. and ended at 3:30 p.m. Aside from his tardiness, absenteeism, and some episodes of depression and crying while on the job, Hayes was a very capable welder and performed his job in a satisfactory manner. He received excellent progress reports and annual raises.

For a short time during 2006 or 2007, Hayes requested and was granted FMLA leave for “anger and mental instability.” Hayes' primary care physician, Dr. Daniel Wright, provided Hayes the FMLA certification for his request. Hayes was allowed to return to work after completing his FMLA leave. Apparently, he resumed his job duties in full capacity.

Late in 2007, Hayes learned his wife was having an affair. Hayes' mental health deteriorated. He began treatment at Pine Rest mental health facility in January 2008. From February 1 to February 5, 2008, he was admitted as an inpatient to Ottumwa Regional Health Center for suicidal ideations. Hayes was tardy to work on January 18, March 18, March 22, March 31, and April 1, 2008. Vermeer informed Hayes repeatedly that he must arrive on time or he would be considered tardy. Vermeer told Hayes if he was not able to get to work on time, he should call his immediate supervisor thirty minutes before his shift began.

Hayes told Vermeer that medication for his depression caused him to oversleep and feel drowsy. Some days, Hayes spent hours crying while at work. Vermeer suggested Hayes could apply for FMLA leave. On April 4, 2008, Hayes asked his primary care physician, Dr. Wright, to provide him an FMLA certification to excuse his tardiness. Dr. Wright declined to do so.

However, Hayes' treating psychiatrist, Dr. Elaine Duryea, did provide him an FMLA certification. The certification provided Hayes had a “Serious Health Condition” which qualified for FMLA leave under the category “Chronic Condition Requiring Treatment.” Dr. Duryea described the nature of Hayes' illness as “major recurrent depression plus personality disorder NOS.” Dr. Duryea noted Hayes experienced his “1st episode” twelve years ago, and “this episode started early January '08.” The certification further provided, the “Period of incapacity: 02/01/08 to 02/05/08—unable to work—inpatient; 2/05/08 to chronic—continued treatment, expect to be tardy 1 1/2 hours due to sedation from meds 4–5 times/month.” The certification noted Hayes was “able to perform all of his essential job functions,” and did not “need to work less than a full schedule,” but his treatment would be “ongoing” and “continuing.” The certification was dated April 3, 2008, and was faxed to Vermeer on April 4, 2008.

The record includes a letter addressed to Hayes dated April 7, 2008, written by Patti Maloy, Vermeer's medical leave administrator, requesting “additional information” before a determination could be made on his FMLA request. The letter also asked, “If your medication is not changing why is it necessary for you to be tardy to work? Is there a way to change the medication time at night to keep you from oversleeping?” It is disputed whether this letter was received by Hayes, as he was having difficulty receiving his mail during that time period and had no recollection of receiving the letter. In addition, the letter is not signed by Patti Maloy, and it is not clear whether it was actually sent to Hayes.²

Hayes was tardy to work again on April 16 and April 30, 2008, due to the side effects of his medication. He was written up for these incidents. On April 30, 2008, Patti Maloy sent a letter to Hayes indicating his FMLA request was denied. The evidence in the record is contradictory as to whether Hayes received this letter denying his request for FMLA leave.

On August 11, 2008, Hayes was tardy again, due to having a flat tire en route to work. On August 13, 2008, Vermeer terminated Hayes “effective immediately” for excessive violations of its attendance policy, citing Hayes' tardiness in March, April, and August 2008. On September 11, 2008, Hayes filed a written notice of appeal of his termination with Vermeer, alleging a violation of his FMLA rights, which stated in part:

An FMLA was filled out by my psychiatrist at Pine Rest and was rejected by [Vermeer employee] Patty Maloy, who is in charge of reviewing the FMLA's. I did not receive notice that the FMLA was rejected or what additional information might be needed for the FMLA to be approved.

On April 23, 2009, Hayes and his wife ³ filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The petition did not list any claim against Vermeer. The bankruptcy proceeding resulted in a discharge on August 4, 2009.

On December 23, 2009, Hayes filed a petition against Vermeer, alleging a violation of his rights under the FMLA and retaliation. On December 22, 2010, Hayes filed a motion to compel discovery. On that same day, Vermeer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing (1) Hayes sought leave not permitted by the FMLA, (2) Hayes was estopped from pursuing his claim by having represented he had no such claim on his bankruptcy schedules; (3) Hayes was not the real party in interest; and (4) Hayes' claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Hayes filed a motion for additional time to respond to summary judgment due to Hayes' illness and the need to complete discovery. The motion sought a delay until April 8, 2011, the date fixed in the scheduling order to complete discovery. The motion was granted by the district court, but the time granted was to be fixed at a subsequent hearing on Hayes' motion to compel that was set for January 14, 2011. A calendar entry order filed on January 14, 2011, reflects that Hayes was granted until February 11, 2011, to file his resistance, and the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was fixed for February 18, 2011. The calendar entry order also limited the hearing on the motion for summary judgment to two narrow legal issues: (1) whether Hayes' claim was precluded by his bankruptcy and (2) whether Hayes' FMLA certification “met the statutory requirements of a valid request.” The calendar order also stated: “Plaintiff will be allowed to set out any factor which further discovery would reasonably affect the legal validity of the request made as a defense to the motion.”

After the hearing, the district court entered a ruling on March 20, 2011, granting summary judgment in favor of Vermeer, determining “intermittent leave” under the FMLA was not available to Hayes because his requested leave was not for medical treatment, recovery, or because of incapacity. The court noted Hayes' physician “certified that he was able to perform the essential functions of the job and there was no direction to stay home.” The court further concluded Hayes “simply overslept because of a medically related condition.” The court did not reach the bankruptcy issues raised by Vermeer. Hayes appeals.

II. Scope of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. “Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law .” Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 179 (Iowa 2011). We are to view the facts on the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment should seldom be granted in the context of employment actions, because such actions are inherently fact based. Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1998). “Summary judgment is not appropriate unless all the evidence points one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party .” Id.

III. Bankruptcy Issues.

As an initial matter, Vermeer argues Hayes' bankruptcy precludes his FMLA claim. Specifically, Vermeer contends: (1) Hayes lacks standing to bring the claim; (2) Hayes' claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (3) Hayes is estopped from pursuing his claim by having...