Hayes v. Walker

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: WHITFIELD, J. PARKHILL, J. TAYLOR, J.
• Citation: 44 So. 747,54 Fla. 163
• Decision Date: 23 July 1907
• Parties: HAYES v. WALKER, Chief of Police.

44 So. 747

54 Fla. 163

HAYES
v.
WALKER, Chief of Police.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

July 23, 1907

Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; Joseph B. Wall, Judge.

Habeas Corpus by Ed. Hayes against George Walker, chief of police. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where provisions contained in an act violate some requirement of the organic law, or are not a part of, or properly connected with, the subject expressed in the title of the act, and such part so unconstitutional or so illegally embraced in the act can be eliminated or disregarded without destroying the effectiveness of the act for the purpose intended, the illegal part should be so eliminated or disregarded, and the valid portion held to be operative; but if the illegal part be of such import that the other portions of the statute, without it, would cause results not contemplated or desired by the Legislature, then the effectiveness of the act for the purpose intended is impaired, and the entire statute must be held to be inoperative.

The title of chapter 5857, p. 700, Acts 1907, entitled 'An act to extend the corporate limits of the city of Tampa,' clearly expresses one general subject, and a provision in said act that the added territory shall not be liable for nor taxed to pay any existing bonded indebtedness of the city of Tampa is germane to and properly connected with the subject expressed in the title. Only the subject, and not matter properly connected therewith, is required by the Constitution to be expressed in the title of the act.

The constitutional provisions requiring a uniform and equal rate of taxation, and a just valuation of all property, and that incorporated cities or towns shall impose taxes for municipal purposes and for no other purposes, and that all property shall be taxed for municipal purposes upon the principles established for state taxation, do not prohibit the Legislature from making proper and reasonable classifications of property for purposes of municipal taxation, so long as such classifications are not arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjustly discriminating, and apply similarly to all under like conditions, and do not violate any other provision of the organic law. Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., not concurring.

Classifications for purposes of legislation may be made with reference to similarity of situation, circumstances, requirements, and convenience to best subserve the public interest. The test as to the validity of classifications for purposes of legislation is good faith, not wisdom. Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., not concurring.

The statutory provision contained in chapter 5857, p. 700, Acts 1907, that certain described property annexed to an existing municipality shall not be liable for nor taxed to pay any existing bonded indebtedness of the city, cannot be said to be an unreasonable, unjustly discriminating or arbitrary classification of property for taxation purposes, and in view of the presented facts the classification appears to be founded upon equitable principles within the bounds of the wide discretion that should be accorded to the Legislature in the interest of the public welfare. Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., not concurring.

COUNSEL [44 So. 748]

[54 Fla. 164] Sparkman & Carter and J. P. Wall, for plaintiff in error.

E. R. Gunby and Glen & Himes, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, J.

This writ of error was taken to a judgment of the circuit court for Hillsborough county sustaining a demurrer to the petition and remanding the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding. The errors assigned are: (1) Remanding the petitioner; (2) sustaining the demurrer to the petition; (3) quashing the writ of habeas corpus; (4) sustaining the constitutionality of chapters 5857 and 5859, pp. 700, 704, Laws Florida approved May 17, 1907.

[54 Fla. 165] All questions as to whether or not the matters here presented can properly be determined in this proceeding have been expressly waived, and the court will consider as properly presented all points shown by the record to be material to the right of the plaintiff in error to be discharged from custody by habeas corpus.

The contention briefly stated is that the plaintiff in error is illegally deprived of his liberty by the chief of police of the city of Tampa, Fla., under a commitment from the municipal court of the city of Tampa, for the alleged reason that the offense for which he was sentenced to custody was not committed within the territory of the city of Tampa, and consequently the judgment and commitment of the municipal court of the city of Tampa under which the plaintiff in error is deprived of his liberty are illegal and do not authorize the detention of the plaintiff in error in the custody of the chief of police of the city of Tampa. The territory within which the offense was committed was placed within the corporate limits and authority of the city of Tampa by two statutes (chapters 5857 and 5859, pp. 700-704, Laws Florida), both of which were approved and became effective on May 17, 1907.

It is contended that these statutes, in so far as they purport to place within the corporate limits of the city of Tampa the territory within which the offense in this case is charged to have been committed, are unconstitutional, null, and void because: (1) Each of said statutes violates section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, which provides that each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; (2) each of said statutes violates sections 1 and 5 of article 9 of the Constitution, which provide for equal and uniform taxation; and (3) each of the said statutes undertakes, by way of compensation for the annexation of the territory mentioned to the city of [54 Fla. 166] Tampa, to relieve all of the real and personal property embraced within said territory so attempted to be taken in from liability or taxation for the then existing bonded indebtedness of the city of Tampa.

The petition upon which the writ of habeas corpus was issued alleges: That at and prior to the passage of the statutes above referred to the bonded indebtedness of the city of Tampa amounted to $1,010,500 for outstanding bonds; 'that a large part of the money arising from the sale of said bonds was used in the erection of a city hall and public offices of the city of Tampa, for the purchase of sites and erection of stations for the fire department of the city of Tampa, for the erection of a bridge across the Hillsborough river connecting that portion of the city on each side of the bridge, in the purchase of a public park for the city of Tampa, in the erection and construction of a main sewer line running through the city of Tampa east and west and north and south; and that in the purchase, construction, erection, and [44 So. 749] building and acquirement of the aforesaid properties none of the expenses thereof were used or charged to any particular portion of the city of Tampa or to the abutting property of the citizens of the city of Tampa.'

The Constitution of Florida does not enumerate the powers of the Legislature, but it contains limitations upon the Legislature in enacting laws in certain particulars, and, unless statutes duly enacted clearly violate some express or implied prohibition or limitation contained in the Constitution, the courts have no power to pronounce them invalid. Thomas v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 332, 40 So. 831; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Edgerton v. Mayor, etc., of Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140, text 145.

A liberal rule of construction should be applied when the constitutionality of a statute duly enacted is questioned, and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in [54 Fla. 167] favor of the validity of the statute assailed. The court should, in deference to the legislative department of the government, uphold a statute alleged to be unconstitutional, unless it is clearly made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Campbell v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. ----, 43 So. 874; State ex rel. Turner v. Hocker, 36 Fla. 358, 18 So. 767; Schiller v. State, 49 Fla. 25, 38 So. 706.

The provision of the Constitution that 'each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith,...