Hayes v. Williamsville Cent. School Dist.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-CV-0770E(Sr).,No. 06-CV-0528E(Sr).,06-CV-0528E(Sr).,06-CV-0770E(Sr).
• Citation: 506 F.Supp.2d 165
• Parties: Barbara Yvonne HAYES and Barbara Yvonne Hayes on Behalf of Her Son Harry Hayes, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. Barbara Yvonne Hayes and Barbara Yvonne Hayes on Behalf of Her Son Harry Hayes, Plaintiffs, v. Williamsville Central School District, New York State Education Department and United States Department of Health and "Human Services Office for Civil Rights Region II, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

506 F.Supp.2d 165

Barbara Yvonne HAYES and Barbara Yvonne Hayes on Behalf of Her Son Harry Hayes, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Barbara Yvonne Hayes and Barbara Yvonne Hayes on Behalf of Her Son Harry Hayes, Plaintiffs, v. Williamsville Central School District, New York State Education Department and United States Department of Health and "Human Services Office for Civil Rights Region II, Defendants.

No. 06-CV-0528E(Sr).

No. 06-CV-0770E(Sr).

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

August 10, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barbara Yvonne Hayes, Williamsville, NY, pro se.

Albert Grande, West Seneca, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel J. Moore, David W. Oakes, Sara E. Visingard, Harris Beach LLP, Pittsford, NY, Peter B. Sullivan, New York State Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER¹

ELFVIN, Senior District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff BarBara Yvonne Hayes (Ms Hayes) filed the instant² Amended Complaint pro se on behalf of herself and her son, Harry Hayes, alleging violations of 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"³)), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (§ 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA")), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d — hereinafter referred to a "Title VI") against the Williamsville School District ("the District"), the New York State Education Department ("the Education Department") and the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights Region II ("the U.S. Civil Rights Office").⁴ The Education Department has filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement and/or to Dismiss (Dkt.# 8) and the District has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.# 7). The parties have filed their respective Responses and Replies, oral argument was held on June 1, 2007 and the motions are now before the Court for decision. Having fully reviewed the submissions of the parties and carefully considered the matter before it, the Court issues the following decision regarding the above motions and various other motions pending in both cases. (See fn.2 herein).

DISCUSSION

The Education Department's Motion

The Education Department moves for dismissal, primarily on two grounds: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims filed against it pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) any IDEA claims against it are untimely. In its motion for a more definite statement the Education Department argues that the Amended Complaint does not comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCvP).

The gravamen of the claims against the Education Department herein are that it "errorred [sic] in many of its findings regarding complaints", hearings and appeals Ms. Hayes filed against the District and also that it "continuously errored [sic] in the handling" of these complaints, hearings and appeals due to "bias and incompetence" of the hearing officers⁵. The Amended Complaint seeks monetary relief from this defendant (i.e., $600,000 on each cause of action) and an Order revoking the individual hearing officers' certificates forever.⁶ Notwithstanding this certificate revocation request, this is not a claim for injunctive relief because it does not seek prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law but rather seeks money and other punitive action from the state to punish the hearing officers for their past allegedly improper behavior. See generally Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1997) ("A federal court may grant prospective injunctive relief only to stop or prevent acts that are illegal under federal law.")).

The Court agrees with the defendant Education Department that the Amended Complaint is very difficult to decipher and does not indicate which cause of action is asserted against which defendant.⁷ However, for purposes of the motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the Court will construe the Amended Complaint to assume that each cause of action as asserted therein was asserted against the Education Department. Other problems presented by the unartful and inarticulate drafting of the Amended Complaint will be addressed, infra.

a. The Motion to Dismiss

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XI.

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal court claims against states, absent their consent to such suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). A state agency or department such as the Education Department is "[a]n official arm of the state" that "enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as is enjoyed by the state itself." Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir.1999); see also Pennhurst, supra at 100, 104 S.Ct. 900; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 28 n. 1 (2d Cir.1991). In other words, this Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit extends to the defendant Education Department.

There is both instructive and persuasive authority specifically applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to the types of claims filed by plaintiffs herein. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-344, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (§ 1983 claim)⁸; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S., 651, 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (§ 1983 claim); University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (ADA claim)⁹; Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.2002) (ADA claim); Cowan v. University of Louisville School of Medicine, 900 F.2d 936, 941(6th Cir. 1990) (FERPA claim)¹⁰. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs attempt to interpose claims against the Education Department for violations of § 1983, the ADA or FERPA, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and will be dismissed.

With respect to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI, however, there is a clear statutory waiver of immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, in pertinent part provides that, "[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, * * * [or] Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 * * *" and the remedies available for violation of such are the same as are available in a suit against any other public or private entity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) and (2); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996).

Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Section 504, provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States * * * shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance * * * ". 29, U.S.C.A. § 794(a). With respect to remedies available to plaintiffs when Section 504 is violated, the statute provides that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance" 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(2).¹¹ In other words "[b]ecause the remedy provision of § 504 refers to Title VI, the first step is to look at what remedies are available under Title VI." Cortes v. Board of Governors, 766 F.Supp. 623, 624 (N.D.Ill.1991). The remedies available under Title VI, include compensatory damages and injunctive relief only and clearly prohibit punitive damage awards. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187-189, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002). This damages rule has also been expressly applied to suits brought under § 504. Ibid. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs attempt to interpose claims against the Education Department for violations of Title VI and § 504 and to the extent that these claims seek only compensatory damages (injunctive relief is moot, as Harry has graduated), they will be allowed.

Lastly, to the extent that the IDEA claim is asserted against the Education Department, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar its pursuit, it is nevertheless untimely. See, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A), 1415(i)(2)(B); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 217(1); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir.1993). The Court agrees with defendant's argument that, under the most generous interpretation of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), the last possible date for plaintiff to file suit against this defendant in this regard would have been in December 2006 and plaintiffs, having not filed until March 2007 the Amended Complaint which added the Education Department as a defendant herein, such is therefore untimely and will be dismissed.

b. The Motion for a More Definite Statement

In the alternative and with respect to any claims not dismissed, the Education Department seeks a more definite statement of plaintiffs' claims...