Haygood v. Sec'y

Decision Date11 July 2017
Docket NumberCase No. 3:14-cv-641-J-34JBT
PartiesRODERICK HAYGOOD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER
I. Status

Petitioner Roderick Haygood, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (Petition, Doc. 1), which he later amended (Amended Petition, Doc. 4). Haygood challenges a 2008 state court (Baker County, Florida) judgment of conviction for sale and delivery of cocaine, trafficking in hydrocodone, and unlawful use of a two-way wireless communication device. Haygood also filed a supporting Memorandum of Law and Facts (Pet. Memorandum, Doc. 5). Respondents filed a memorandum in opposition to the Amended Petition. See Respondent's Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response, Doc. 15) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.).

On behalf of Haygood, counsel Jack R. Maro filed a notice of appearance (Doc. 17) on April 13, 2016, and an Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time in which to File a Response to Respondent's Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 18). Counsel asserted that Haygood's family had recently retained him, and he requested a sixty-day extension to file a reply because he needed to review 1,200 pages of documents and determine "what and what not must be addressed." Id. The magistrate judge granted the extension and directed counsel to file Haygood's reply by June 29, 2016 (Doc. 19). When counsel did not file a reply, the Court sua sponte extended the deadline initially to September 6, 2016 (Doc. 20), and again to October 21, 2016 (Doc. 21). When counsel still failed to file a reply, the Court issued an order on November 7, 2016, announcing that it would treat the matter as ripe for review, as it appeared that Haygood did not intend to file a reply (Doc. 22). As such, this case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On November 15, 2007, the State of Florida charged Haygood by information with three offenses: count one - sale of a controlled substance (cocaine); count two - trafficking in illegal drugs (hydrocodone, twenty-eight grams or more); and count three - unlawful use of a two-way communication device (a cellular phone). See Resp. Ex. A at 6-7. On July 18, 2008, a jury found Haygood guilty as to all three counts. See Resp. Ex. A at 31-32; Resp. Exs. C, D, E. The court sentenced Haygood to fifteen years imprisonment on count one, twenty-five years imprisonment on count two to be served as a minimum mandatory of twenty-five years, and five years imprisonment on count three, with all sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to any other active sentences Haygood was already serving. Also, the court recognized 382 days credit for time served on each count. See Resp. Ex. A at 55-65; Resp. Ex. G.

With the benefit of counsel, Haygood appealed his conviction to the First District Court of Appeal. See Resp. Ex. I. The State filed an answer brief (Resp. Ex. J). OnSeptember 17, 2009, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed Haygood's conviction and sentence per curiam without issuing a written opinion. Haygood v. State, 18 So. 3d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (table); Resp. Ex. K. The mandate issued on October 5, 2009. Resp. Ex. L.

Haygood filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Resp. Ex. M at 1-24. On May 10, 2012, the trial court summarily denied the motion by written opinion with attachments. Id. at 26-148. Haygood appealed the denial of relief to the First District Court of Appeal. See Resp. Ex. N. The State filed a notice that it would not file an answer brief. See Resp. Ex. O. The First District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the trial court's denial of Haygood's motion on November 27, 2013. See Resp. Ex. P. The mandate issued on December 26, 2013. Resp. Ex. Q. Haygood v. State, 127 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (table).

III. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court.Because this Court can "adequately assess [Haygood's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

IV. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
A. Exhaustion

Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[ ]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) ("[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.").

B. Procedural Default and Exceptions

"[W]hen 'the petitioner fails to raise the [federal] claim in state court and it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile," a procedural default occurs. Owen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural default doctrine."). In such circumstances, federal habeas review of the claim is typically precluded. Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012); Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. Nevertheless, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010).

To show cause for a procedural default, "the petitioner must demonstrate 'some objective factor external to the defense' that impeded his effort to raise the claim properly in state court." Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). "[T]o show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that 'the errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness.'" Id. (quoting McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).

"When a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a default of an ineffective-assistance claim . . . where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Martinezv. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012). However, the "prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit." Id. (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (describing standards for certificates of appealability to issue)); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914 (2013). This narrow exception to the procedural default rule

applies only where (1) a state requires a prisoner to raise ineffective-trial-counsel claims at the initial-review stage of a state collateral proceeding and precludes those claims during direct appeal; (2) the prisoner failed to properly raise ineffective-trial-counsel claims during the initial collateral proceeding; (3) the prisoner either did not have counsel or his counsel was ineffective during those initial state collateral proceedings; and (4) failing to excuse the prisoner's procedural default would result in the loss of a "substantial" ineffective-trial-counsel claim.

Lambrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 851 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 629 (11th Cir. 2014).

In the absence of a showing of cause and...

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