Haygood v. Younger

• Decision Date: 25 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-4686,81-4686
• Citation: 718 F.2d 1472
• Parties: Frank HAYGOOD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Evelle J. YOUNGER, etc., Defendants, and Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1472

718 F.2d 1472

Frank HAYGOOD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Evelle J. YOUNGER, etc., Defendants, and Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 81-4686.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 1983.

William George Prahl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for defendants-appellants.

Jack Jacobson, Santa Cruz, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before WISDOM ^*, SNEED and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour, records officers at Folsom State Prison and the California Department of Corrections, respectively, appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a section 1983 action. Frank Haygood alleged that Cranke and Seymour violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights by improperly investigating his legal status while he was incarcerated pursuant to a series of concurrent and consecutive sentences. He contended that their conduct resulted in his unlawful confinement beyond the actual term of those sentences. The jury returned a general verdict of $2,090 in damages. Cranke and Seymour also appeal the award of $45,383 in attorney's fees. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS

The decision of the California Supreme Court, which appears in part in the margin, granting Haygood's habeas corpus petition provides the background facts leading to his release. ¹ See In re Haygood, 14 Cal.3d 802 On October 8, 1970, the Adult Authority granted Haygood a parole date of December 14, 1970. Had Haygood not violated his parole all terms would have been discharged on July 8, 1974. His "C" term was Haygood, following his release on parole, violated his parole and was returned to prison. Again he was released and again he returned. At that time, December 13, 1973, the Authority, after finally revoking his parole, purported to refix his "C" and "D" terms at their maximum of life imprisonment. Id. at 807-08, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 763-64, 537 P.2d at 883-84.

                122 Cal.Rptr. 760, 537 P.2d 880 (1975).  1958 is a good year in which to commence the recital of facts particularly relevant to this case.  Haygood escaped in that year from a prison camp while serving concurrent sentences previously designated as his "A" and "B" terms.  While at large he committed a robbery, for which he received a sentence designated his "C" term.  Subsequently he was convicted of the escape, for which he received a sentence designated his "D" term.  Upon his return to prison, the Department of Corrections and the California Adult Authority treated his "D" term for escape as consecutive not only to his "A" and "B" terms, which he had been serving when he escaped, but also the "C" term imposed for the robbery he committed after escaping.  Id. at 806-07, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 762-63, 537 P.2d at 882-83
                also fixed by the Adult Authority at ten years and his "D" term at five-and-one-half years resulting in a final discharge date of July 8, 1974, on all his terms.  Because the October 8 action fixed the "C" term at less than the time already served, Haygood received an "administrative discharge" for that term retroactive to January 8, 1969, the date upon which he had served ten years on the term.  The Adult Authority intended by this order to cause the "D" term to commence retroactively as of that date.  Id. at 807, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 763, 537 P.2d at 883.  Although plaintiff's prison records indicated that he had completed the maximum possible sentence on his "A" and "B" terms as of 1963 and 1961, respectively, the Adult Authority continued to refer to those terms in accordance with the "continuous term policy."    That policy provided that when a prisoner receives a sentence which is to run consecutively to another term, no single term is discharged until all are.  Each consecutive sentence was regarded as but a segment of a single continuous term
                

Thereafter Haygood received a form from the Adult Authority notifying him of his legal status. At trial he testified that he thought the form indicated that he was still serving time on his "A" and "B" terms as well as his "C" term and that he had not been credited with having served any time on his "D" term. A correctional counselor at Folsom State Prison met with Haygood on at least five occasions to discuss these concerns. The counselor also discussed them with defendant Cranke, a Records Officer II at Folsom State Prison. Haygood later wrote to Cranke regarding his sentences. After reading the letter, Cranke reviewed Haygood's central file, which included his legal status form, the cumulative case summary, the abstracts of judgment, and materials from the sentencing proceedings. Cranke answered Haygood's concerns about his sentence by referring him to the continuous term policy set forth in two California Attorney General's opinions.

A short time later Haygood wrote a letter to the Administrative Officer of the Adult Authority, who, without acting, passed the letter on to defendant Benjamin Seymour, a Records Officer III for the Department of Corrections. Seymour reviewed Haygood's central file and pertinent Attorney General's opinions and spoke with Cranke to confirm Haygood's legal status. On April 1, 1974, Seymour sent a letter to Haygood responding to his questions.

Dissatisfied with these responses, Haygood filed a pro per petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Id. at 804-05, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 761, 537 P.2d at 881. In accord with the objections he had expressed in his letters, Haygood alleged that the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority "had acted unlawfully in refixing certain of [his] terms ... and in revoking credit for time served on another." Id. at 805, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 761, 537 P.2d at 881.

Counsel for Haygood was appointed and in a supplemental petition prepared by counsel it was alleged that the order of the sentencing judge on his 1959 escape conviction "did not purport to make the 'D' term consecutive to the 'C' term, and that even had the judge attempted to order that the 'D' term be consecutive to the 'C' term, he lacked authority to do so." Id. at 808, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 764, 537 P.2d at 884. A fellow prisoner who had aided Haygood in composing his numerous letters to prison authorities conceded at the section 1983 trial that neither he nor Haygood had had this theory in mind prior to appointed counsel's preparation of the supplemental petition.

The California Supreme Court by a six to one majority found the argument raised by supplemental petition dispositive. It held that the Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority had erroneously treated the "D" term as consecutive to the "C" term by misinterpreting the 1959 escape To this point this case presents nothing very unusual. The Adult Authority under California's then indeterminate sentencing procedures, which were in effect until 1976-77, miscalculated the release date of a recidivist prisoner. This mistake was corrected by the California Supreme Court as a result of Haygood's utilization of California's habeas corpus procedures. A wrong done by officials of California was corrected by California courts.

judgment. Haygood's terms had therefore effectively terminated no later than October 8, 1970, the date of the administrative action fixing his terms. Thus, the Adult Authority had no power to refix terms which he had already irrevocably discharged. The court ordered him released.

This case commences to take on its present form when Haygood alleged in this section 1983 action that he had been deprived of his right to liberty without due process of law and that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Attorney General of the State of California, the Director of the California Department of Corrections, members of the California Adult Authority, the Administrative Officer for the Adult Authority, and four prison officials, including Cranke and Seymour, were named as defendants.

On April 13, 1976, the district court dismissed the complaint as to the Attorney General and the Adult Authority members on the ground that they were absolutely immune. On January 5, 1978, the court dismissed the Director insofar as the complaint sought damages. On March 21, 1978, the court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants insofar as it sought declaratory relief. On the third day of trial, the court granted the motion for directed verdict as to two of the prison officials and the Administrative Officer for the Adult Authority, but denied it as to Cranke and Seymour, the remaining defendants. The jury returned a general verdict against Cranke for $640 and against Seymour for $1,450. The trial court denied their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Haygood v. Younger, 527 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.Cal.1981).

We have disposed of Haygood's appeals from the pretrial dismissals by unpublished memorandum order. This appeal concerns only the propriety of the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Cranke and Seymour contend that the district court erred in seven different ways. These are:

1. By ruling that simple negligence can support a cause of action under section 1983 founded on deprivation of due process and Eighth Amendment rights;

2. By holding that the availability of a tort remedy under California law did not provide Haygood due process so as to preclude his section 1983 suit;

3. By finding the evidence introduced at trial sufficient to support the jury verdict;

4. By denying their motion for directed verdict based on a good faith defense;

5. By awarding Haygood attorney's fees under section 1988;

6. By denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of Haygood's attorney's fees; and

7. By awarding attorney's...