Haygood v. Younger

Decision Date30 November 1981
Docket NumberNo. Civil S-75-738 LKK.,Civil S-75-738 LKK.
Citation527 F. Supp. 808
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesFrank HAYGOOD, Plaintiff, v. Evelle J. YOUNGER, etc., et al., Defendants.

Jack Jacobson, Santa Cruz, Cal., for plaintiff.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., State of Cal., Wm. George Prahl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KARLTON, District Judge.

In Haygood v. Younger, 14 Cal.3d 802, 122 Cal.Rptr. 760, 537 P.2d 880 (1975), the California Supreme Court determined that Frank Haygood had spent almost five years longer in prison than was permitted under the applicable law. After he was released he brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages against those he believed responsible for his wrongful incarceration. He predicated his claim upon asserted violations of both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the eighth amendment, made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.

After trial, the jury found that defendants Cranke and Seymour caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his constitutionally protected rights, and the court entered judgment accordingly.1 Those defendants have now moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 50(b).2

I THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts relating to the plaintiff's various terms of imprisonment, and the miscalculation which led to his unlawful confinement are set forth in the California Supreme Court's opinion in In re Haygood, 14 Cal.3d 802, 804-808, 122 Cal.Rptr. 760, 537 P.2d 880 (1975). It is sufficient for the purposes of this opinion to note that the California Adult Authority erroneously determined that the plaintiff's properly imposed term for escaping from prison did not begin to run until the plaintiff finished serving a term for a robbery which took place after the escape. The result of this miscalculation was that, in 1974, Frank Haygood found himself serving time in prison for a robbery term from which he had been "administratively discharged" as of 1969, and for an escape term from which he should have been discharged in 1969. Furthermore, although he was serving time, he was receiving no credit towards the escape term. With the help of another prisoner, Phillip Gaskill, the plaintiff began contacting prison and Department of Corrections authorities, asking how it was possible that he was not being credited for time served on this term.

In March, 1974, the plaintiff received responses to his inquiries from defendant Harold Cranke, a Records Officer at the prison, and defendant Benjamin Seymour, a Records Officer for the California Department of Corrections. Their responses told the plaintiff, in effect, that his file had been reviewed and that he was lawfully incarcerated under the state's "continuous term policy." With Mr. Gaskill's aid, the plaintiff petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. That Court determined in effect that plaintiff had been held unlawfully, at least since his terms were retroactively fixed in October, 1970. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the plaintiff released forthwith. In re Haygood, 14 Cal.3d at 812, 122 Cal.Rptr. 760, 537 P.2d 880.

The liability of the defendants Cranke and Seymour for plaintiff's excessive incarceration was submitted to the jury at the close of trial. The jury was instructed on both the due process and cruel and unusual punishment theories of liability and returned a general verdict against the defendants. The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The defendants' chief contention in support of said motion is that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to prove that defendants Cranke and Seymour intended to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and that any lesser showing fails to meet the state of mind requirement for a damages action based on the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The primary issue, therefore, is what state of mind must the defendants have entertained in order to be liable for violating plaintiff's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

This issue is best analyzed in three parts: First, what state of mind, if any, is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself? Second, what showing is required when the statutory action is based on the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against deprivation of liberty without due process? Third, what is the necessary showing for an action based on the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments? I will address each of these questions in turn; in doing so I will apply the ascertained rules to the specifics of this case. Finally, I will briefly discuss the defendants' claim that they are entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto based on their good faith defense.3

II

PARRATT V. TAYLOR: MENTAL STATES

AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1983

The starting point in my consideration of the defendants' motion is section 1983 itself. I conclude that the statute requires no particular state of mind on the defendants' part in order for liability to be imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

Nothing in the language of that statute either explicitly or implicitly requires that an aggrieved plaintiff prove anything regarding a defendant's state of mind. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, has often discussed damage actions under section 1983 as lawsuits sounding in tort. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 989, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Perhaps because most torts involve some form of culpable mental state on the part of the tortfeasor (intent, recklessness, negligence, etc.), the lower courts struggled for years to determine what particular state or states of mind were required by this statutory "tort" action. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973); Arnold v. I.B.M. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1981). The result was an impossible tangle of diverse legal doctrines. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 533, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1911-12, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

Over the course of two decades the Supreme Court loosened this knot, strand by strand. In Monroe v. Pape, 325 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Court held that the civil cause of action provided by section 1983 — unlike its criminal law counterpart (18 U.S.C. § 242) — did not require a showing that the defendant acted with the specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally protected rights. In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2691-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), the Court suggested that simple negligence could provide a basis for liability under section 1983. The following year, the Court emphasized that "by the plain terms of section 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1924, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). Finally, last term, the Supreme Court severed the remaining threads: in unambiguous terms it announced that there is no state of mind requirement for an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

In Parratt, an inmate of a Nebraska prison (Taylor) ordered a hobby kit by mail. Contrary to the prison's regular procedures, the prisoner was not notified when the package containing the hobby materials arrived; when he inquired about his materials he was told that the package had been lost. The prisoner filed an action under section 1983, alleging that his fourteenth amendment rights had been violated.4 The district court held that by negligently failing to follow their own policies the prison officials had deprived the prisoner of his property without affording him due process of law. The district court granted the prisoner summary judgment and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, per curiam. 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case for the express purpose of deciding "whether mere negligence will support a claim for relief under § 1983." 451 U.S. at 533, 534, 101 S.Ct. at 1911, 1912.

After setting forth the facts and posture of the case, the Court reviewed its own decisions in the area. It concluded that "section 1983 ... has never been found by this Court to contain a state of mind requirement... Both Baker v. McCollan and Monroe v. Pape suggest that section 1983 affords a `civil remedy' for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color of state law without any express requirement of a particular state of mind. Accordingly, in any section 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two...

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